711.00/9–149
Department of State Policy Statement
Yugoslavia
a. objectives
The fundamental long-range objective of US policy toward Yugoslavia is the re-emergence of that country as a democratic, independent member of the world community, cooperating with and adhering to the United Nations, and willing to contribute fully to the establishment of international peace and well-being. Economically, we seek the establishment of US-Yugoslav commercial relations consistent with the principles of the draft charter for an International Trade Organization and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, accompanied by effective Yugoslav participation in east-west trade as envisaged in the European Recovery Program.
Our present immediate objective, in the light of Tito’s defiance of Stalin and our view that Titoism should continue to exist as an erosive and disintegrating force within the Russian power sphere, is to extract the maximum political advantage from this quarrel within the Communist family. Accordingly, we are permitting Tito to purchase, to the extent his own funds and small credits will allow, urgently needed goods now required by Yugoslav civilian economy and which can no longer be obtained from the Soviet bloc because of the economic embargo. In this way, we hope to foster his independence of the USSR, strengthen his resistance to Soviet pressure, and provide an example to those dissatisfied elements in the Communist Parties of the Cominform countries of what they too might have if they embark on Tito’s course.
b. policies
Prior to the Cominform denunciation of Tito and his group on June 28, 1949 [1948], our attitude toward and relations with the present [Page 942] Yugoslav regime were largely conditioned by, and were on lines similar to, our policies in respect to the Soviet Union. The Tito-Kremlin break, however, has introduced new factors which call for constant watchfulness on our part and a continual reappraisal of our views toward Tito’s Yugoslavia.
We have no intention of making overtures to Tito, but at the same time we should take no step which he might construe as a definite repulse of any advances he might make toward closer association with us and the other western democracies, and in consequence might influence him to make his peace with Moscow. If Tito makes a definite move toward us, either through choice or necessity, we shall then consider, in the light of all prevailing circumstances, what specific steps we should take to accomplish our objectives.
The collapse of the hitherto accepted legend of Kremlin omnipotence and infallibility by the airing of Tito’s heresy has uncovered a path which gives promise of leading to the development of better economic relations between Yugoslavia and the ITS and the ERP countries. We have considered that an affirmative economic policy toward Yugoslavia on our part, permitting Tito to buy in the US urgently needed industrial goods, would be advantageous as a means of encouraging Yugoslavia’s further detachment from the Soviet bloc. Accordingly, we recommended to the National Security Council a relaxation in existing export controls with respect to US trade with Yugoslavia. These recommendations, approved by the President on February 18, 1949, authorize certain economic measures which we consider necessary for reasons of paramount political expediency, and provide, with respect to any possible conditions we might later impose on Tito, that these should be in the nature of political concessions on his part.
[Here follow sub-sections B,1 Political and B,2 Economic, reviewing United States political and economic relations with Yugoslavia from 1945, and section C, Relations With Other States. These sections comprise eight typewritten pages in the source text.]
d. policy evaluation
Considering the Communist nature of the Yugoslav Government, it must be admitted that the accomplishment of our long-range policy objectives toward Yugoslavia is not realizable at this time, despite certain favorable potentialities which may exist in the present Tito-Kremlin split. Yugoslavia is still a totalitarian dictatorship led by men who have consistently followed, and so far continue to follow, an anti-US policy. Our condemnation of the Yugoslav denial of the fundamental freedoms has had little noticeable effect in changing the attitude of the Yugoslav Government. Nonetheless, through our overseas broadcasts we are able to give a true picture of what we are doing [Page 943] to assist in the establishment of a peaceful and prosperous world community. These broadcasts should also exploit fully the discord which has arisen in Tito’s relations with his former Communist allies.
In the field of economic relations we should continue to carry out present policy in order to provide concrete examples for Tito that he will probably have a source to which he can turn for at least certain kinds of vital industrial materials no longer available to him from Cominform countries. The Yugoslav decision to join the Coal Committee of the Economic Commission for Europe, thereby obtaining an allocation of coke, formerly furnished by Poland and Czechoslovakia, was the first significant departure, as a result of Cominform economic sanctions, from Yugoslavia’s reliance on the eastern bloc.
These economic sanctions are forcing Yugoslavia to divert its trade to the west, which is an important ERP objective. Maximum economic advantage should therefore be extracted from the approaching Yugoslav trade reorientation. The ensuing months, during which it is hoped this shift will occur, will be extremely critical for Tito in his efforts to defeat the Soviet objective of strangling him by a trade embargo. Yugoslavia’s present critical balance of payments position and available dollar resources compare most unfavorably with its large requirements for foreign industrial materials. This situation calls for timely financial assistance, and it is in our interest to see that Tito has such credits as are necessary to keep his regime from foundering. In these circumstances, it may well be that active consideration should be given to the possibility of requiring some positive action on Tito’s part beyond the scope of general trade relations, in return for continued US economic aid. The US should not make political concessions sine qua non of economic aid. Nevertheless, we should be prepared to seize appropriate opportunities to draw Yugoslavia toward the west politically as well as economically.
One or two other unresolved matters, dormant at this time in view of the Tito-Cominform rift, may later arise. The present high state of tension in Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations makes it quite impossible for Tito to achieve within the near future his long-standing goal of uniting parts of Bulgarian Macedonia with the Yugoslav Macedonian Republic, as was provided for in the Yugoslav-Bulgarian Treaty of 1947. Similarly, it is highly improbable in the present circumstances, especially in the face of the Soviet-inspired threat to form an “independent Macedonian state,” that Tito will revive his former plans for the formation of a Balkan Federation under his leadership. While we would consider the formation of a comprehensive Balkan understanding of the kind envisaged by the UN Charter conducive to peace and stability in that region, there is no prospect of an understanding while the Tito-Kremlin struggle is going on; and no prospect of a free [Page 944] Balkan regional grouping so long as Soviet power dominates the greater part of the Balkan area.
Our former conflicts with Tito over the surrender of alleged war criminals and traitors have almost completely disappeared. Of the hundreds of persons whom the Yugoslavs claim are guilty of war crimes, we have turned over only those relatively few persons found within our jurisdiction who we are reasonably satisfied, after a thorough examination of all available evidence, did actually commit atrocities or wilfully collaborated with the enemy. While it is not improbable that at some future date Tito might renew his charges that we have failed to live up to our obligations in this respect, there are no present indications that such a campaign will be resumed. Most if these alleged Yugoslav traitors are merely political refugees who were successful in escaping from Tito’s grasp and are now residing in western Europe or in the US, where they are endeavoring to band together with a view to working toward the eventual liberation of their country from Communist control. Personal and policy differences between the several Yugoslav racial and political groups have so far prevented the establishment of a single unified organization. For the time being, because of our policy toward the Tito-Kremlin feud, we are not encouraging the formation of such a body.
The possibilities, in the near future, of achieving our fundamental long-range objectives in Yugoslavia, as opposed to the short-range objective of keeping Tito afloat, are not favorable. Nevertheless, we must bear in mind that the US and the way of life it represents have many admirers among the Yugoslav people. We should therefore continue to demonstrate that the economic security and prosperity promised but not realized by Tito can, in fact, be attained without resort to the suppression of individual liberties and civic rights. Accordingly, we should provide by our own example and through our information activities a constant reminder to the Yugoslav people of the desirability of a democratic system of government and mode of living.