760H.61/8–2349: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
priority
2133. British Ambassador1 informs me he has suggested to London that consideration be given to desirability of utilizing current Soviet threat against Yugoslavia to publicize British, US and French condemnation of this bellicose Soviet attitude with particular reference to its inconsistency with current wide-scale Soviet peace pretensions. My colleague suggested tentatively the delivery of notes to Soviet Ambassadors in London, Washington and Paris with simultaneous publication. He discounted advisability of combined or parallel representations in Moscow on grounds that Soviets would most likely refuse to accept notes delivered there detracting from their effect.
While I have considerable misgivings as to procedure proposed and am cognizant of the general anomalies inherent in the situation I feel there is sufficient merit in Kelly’s basic concept to invite Department’s attention thereto. It seems to me that if Department should consider such action tactically advisable at this juncture it would be preferable to air Soviet inconsistencies in the forum of the UN. Thus, if Yugoslav [Page 929] Government should be disposed to charges Soviets in Security Council with threats to the peace based on the language of Soviet notes of August 11 and 18,2 the western members could conceivably appreciably undermine Soviet peace offensive and counteract to some extent Soviet propaganda through its scheduled “World Peace Conferences” preceding the Assembly meeting. Airing in UN would also avoid to some extent opportunity which three-government approach would offer Soviets further to emphasize charges that “imperialist” powers backing Tito who has become their tool etc.
In weighing the pros and cons of this suggestion I am not unmindful of possibility that premature action might polarize the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict still further with the risk of precipitating Soviet reaction. Am also conscious that the tenor of latest Soviet note leads to belief that the implied menaces therein may well be designed along ideological party lines foreshadowing the ejection of Tito and his cohorts from “the party” or some such step as much as more open and vigorous action which would seem to raise the question whether international cognizance of the threat at this time might not complicate Tito’s situation internally with his Communist Party followers. Further, it is appreciated that, if as we think, Soviet purpose at present is at least in part the stimulation of war of nerves a Yugoslav appeal to the SC might tend to give it impression of a degree of anxiety which Yugoslavs rightly have apparently been at pains to avoid.
Manifestly the primary criterion in matters is Yugoslav Government’s own attitude and assessment potentialities and consequences this suggestion.
Have told Kelly foregoing views in friendly talk.
Sent Department 2133, repeated Belgrade 92, London 216, Paris 314.
- Sir David Kelly.↩
- The Soviet notes to the Yugoslav Government under reference here were concerned with Yugoslavia’s territorial and reparations claims against Austria and the alleged mistreatment of Soviet citizens in Yugoslavia; see footnotes 2 and 6 to telegram 2042, August 13, from Moscow, pp. 922 and 923, rsepectively.↩