501.BD Europe/5–3149: Telegram
The United States Deputy Representative to the Economic Commission for Europe (Porter) to the Secretary of State
507. Noce 554. From Porter.
1. Second session ECE Trade Committee1 ended 10:30 p. m., May 27 in complete failure after 5 days’ futile effort reach agreement on next steps. Sole accomplishments were (a) Defeat for fourth time in ECE of EE resolution for investigation “discriminatory trade practices” US/UK; and (b) unanimous agreement resolution requesting Executive Secretariat continue studies arising from resolutions adopted at February session and in light discussion at second session, present more comprehensive report to next session on possibilities developing intra-European trade. Recognized by all that agreed resolution does nothing except keep door slightly open for possible change of line by USSR.
2. Failure due entirely USSR rejection all proposals leading to [Page 121] provision any trade statistics or plans beyond regular published data. Poland appeared genuinely desirous strengthening new trade relations and groped persistently for constructive committee program. Lychowski’s progressively less ambitious proposals were received open-mindedly by OEEC countries, with French warmest supporter and UK coolest. However, all were mercilessly torpedoed by Arutiunian2 (USSR) and Bystricky3 (Czechoslovak). Other EE countries present, but played negligible roles.
3. USDel has no convincing explanation Soviet intransigence. Hypotheses include (a) Unwilling commit selves until results CFM meeting known (this interpretation favored by UK and France); (b) Chronic fear of disclosing economic information; (c) Soviets may believe that EE recalcitrance will strengthen their bargaining position and cause West make overtures; (d) Soviets may have become disturbed by earlier indications of Polish and Czechoslovak eagerness, and have decided to block action in ECE until consequences more carefully examined and stronger control over Satellite trade policy established; (e) Arutiunian may have lacked specific instructions and was stalling because inability do anything else (this is what Lychowski professes to believe). While first and last hypotheses may contain some truth, we think them too simple. Would appreciate views Embassy Moscow.
4. Opening day of meeting devoted entirely to procedural formalities. EE proposal for public meetings defeated 11–6. Next 3 days devoted general discussion with lengthy repetitions USSR charges against Mashall Plan, US export licensing policy, etc. EE extremely critical of Secretariat paper E/ECE/trade/3,4 partly on ground that it did not give information of type which EE has consistently withheld. Claimed it placed one-sided emphasis on fulfillment of import programs of OEEC countries, ignored development needs of EE countries, and failed pay sufficient attention to necessary credit and finance measures.
5. Quickly became apparent that proposals for general survey imports requirements and export availabilities would be impossible and various compromise proposals offered. Among suggestions made: (a) Secretariat representatives to visit European capitals for personal discussion national trade plans and prospects instead of soliciting data [Page 122] by questionnaire; (b) Geneva meeting for which trade representatives would bring information with them and produce it during discussion rather than submit anything to Secretariat in advance; (c) Special study by secretariat “in consultation with governments” of possible deals to relieve “lines of strain” in bilateral trading. Smaller working party met all day May 27 in effort to salvage something from proposals made. No agreement possible and outcome was meaningless resolution referred to in paragraph 1(b). In accepting resolution, Swedish delegation stated were doing so only because of committee’s inability to present better one.
However, made no effort conceal disappointment over proceedings. Were supported by Western delegations with particularly good statements from France and UK; USSR, Czechoslovakia agreed results were disappointing, but tried place blame on Secretariat for inadequate preparatory document and on West for failure investigate basic obstacles such as “US discrimination.” Lychowski also obviously disappointed, but tried to develop thesis that trade committee unlike other ECE technical committees and more time required in order find suitable operating technique.
6. Lychowski conducted himself in chair satisfactorily to Western delegations and won general admiration for his adroitness and patience in trying to salvage, even if unsuccessfully, some degree of constructive action. Sympathy for his difficult position, however, inclines French to accept too uncritically his concepts of East-West trade, which we believe look toward European regional anarchy despite his private denials. Poles received no support whatever from other EE delegations. Bystricky was either unable or unwilling make any distinction between Czechoslovak and Soviet interests, and several times gave coup de grace to Lychowski proposals. Discussion seemed to be over heads of other Satellite delegations, who were silent except on discrimination issue, and judging from their listless, feeble statements, even this seemed to bore them.
[Here follow two paragraphs describing the composition of Western delegations to the Trade Committee and reviewing the disposition of discussion materials prepared by the Department for the United States Delegation.]
9. Suggest VOA might usefully call attention Soviet over-riding obvious EE desire expand trade with West. First 6 paragraphs only for Moscow.
Sent Department 507; repeated Paris Torep 298 for USDel CFM, repeated Moscow 8; pouched Warsaw, Praha, Budapest, Bucharest, Belgrade, Sofia, Helsinki, Vienna, Berlin, London, Oslo, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Brussels, The Hague, Rome, Bern.
- Regarding the first session of the Committee on the Development of Trade, held in Geneva, February 1049, see telegram 194, February 22, from Geneva, p. 83.↩
- Amazasp Avakimovich Arutyunyan, Soviet Representative to the Economic Commission for Europe, Chief of the Economic Affairs Division of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, and member of the Collegium of the Foreign Ministry.↩
- Dr. Rudolf Bystricky, Czechoslovak Representative to the Economic Commission for Europe, Chief of the Economic Division of the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry.↩
- The paper was entitled “A Preliminary Study of the Potentialities for the Expansion of European Trade”.↩