Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume V

711.61/8–2349

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State

personal
informal
secret

Moscow, August 23, 1949.

Dear Dean: It might interest you to have particulars and sidelights on the visit to the Kremlin last week. The official telegrams carry the full substance, but some details may be helpful.

The appointment to see Stalin was asked for on Monday, August 8, acceded to on Saturday and occurred the following: Monday night, August 15. While there is no special significance attached to the comparatively short period of time between asking and seeing, it has been evident that this request and other protocol matters have been acted on without delay and with no obstruction of any sort. I was informed in person over the open telephone by an English-speaking secretary of Vyshinski at lunch time of exact procedure to be followed. Of course the “open” line does not mean anything here as only the MVD are in a position to tap it. Mr. Vyshinski’s secretary said bring whomever I liked and I said that my secretary would arrange the details with him later; which was done, and Wally Barbour¹ and George Morgan² were named and accepted without question.

We were told on Monday to be at the Borovitski Gate at 10:00 p. m. where a Lt. Colonel of the MVD looked in the car to verify the number of passengers, and we then followed a jeep at fairly high speed through the Kremlin grounds, trailed of course by my special boys. At the door there were two soldiers and another officer as guide. We left our hats and went up in the elevator two flights and down several corridors, with an MVD sentry about every 50 feet, to an anteroom where two officers who were at a desk rose very politely and sent for the interpreter. We now believe the interpreter is the son of Troyanovsky who was the first Soviet Ambassador to Washington after recognition in 1933.³ He is of slight build, narrow face, dark hair, and spoke excellent English. In fact, when I asked him where he learned it, he said he went to college in the United States—we think it was Swarthmore.

Without any formality we followed him across one small room and he motioned me to open the door to the next which I did. This gave into a rather narrow rectangular room with a desk at the far end near the window and a long table near the inside wall. The room was well lighted with hanging electric lights. Stalin and Vyshinski were at the opposite end of the room and moved forward to meet us. We shook hands normally and I introduced Mr. Barbour and Mr. Morgan and we were invited to sit down at the table. Vyshinski went in first next to the wall, Stalin at his left at the corner, the interpreter at the end of the table, with me facing Stalin, then Barbour and Morgan to my left.

I started the conversation with the usual polite remarks. Stalin replied at once he was glad to see me here and I launched into my opening remarks as reported. The interpreter was really splendid, taking down in shorthand my English rapidly and accurately, and the same for Stalin in Russian. This made it possible to speak in paragraphs rather than in sentences. Mr. Vyshinski also took complete notes of the conversation.

You will have noted from my telegram 2056 that Stalin remained unresponsive to my statement on the broad international situation. However, he did pick up at once the question of the Lend Lease and we went over that back and forth as per my telegram 2057.⁴ I felt he was being a little wary and perhaps somewhat suspicious that we were not giving the Soviet Government as favorable a settlement as we had others. Possibly I was able to dispel his doubts and certainly he insisted that the Soviet Government would keep its word.

(It would be most interesting to know whether you have had any reflection of Stalin’s attitude in the negotiations currently taking place in the Department.⁵)

On the VOA, little headway was made as you will note from 2058. Since the meeting we have not noticed the slightest change in the jamming effort. I am inclined to think the Politburo have no intention of losing their advantage unless until we hit them in a similar way, somewhere.

From this point onward the conversation became more personal, Stalin asking me if I had been in Moscow before. He showed his interest in this city by talking of the plans, the progress made before the war, the delays caused by the war and his hopes for its future. It seemed quite close to his heart and he is proud of what the Bolsheviks have done to displace the czarist capital of Leningrad.

At this point Stalin got up, went to the desk, got his pipe, which he toyed with a while and then lighted. We wondered if this were not part of the act, as it was quite in keeping with the usual treatment. He made “doodles” all the while with a fat red pencil. I thought he looked in good shape. He carried his years well, his black hair is silvered somewhat on the tips but his face was not particularly lined, and, while his eyes were tired, he seemed fully alert. He was dressed in uniform with shoulder boards of his own design consisting of an enormous silver rosette and some device nearer the collar which might have been an emblematic hammer and sickle. The uniform was khaki colored, in good condition, fitted well, and he looked quite trim. The atmosphere on leaving was a little more cordial than on arriving, and he did say that I was to see him when I wanted to on a pressing matter without formality.

The press here were in pretty hot pants for a story, but were given the bare minimum. I thought your announcements in Washington were entirely satisfactory.⁶ I hope you agree with me that nothing transpired that would give the Politburo a chance to make propaganda. I have told both the British and French Ambassadors the story of the visit and the substance of my conversation, for which they are very grateful.

The visit was a good thing if only to establish a precedent of seeing him. Vyshinski had stated, “Of course the Generalissimo is not in the habit of seeing foreign ambassadors”, but was proved wrong in this case as well as for the British. If the call had not been made I think there would have been a great deal of press comment abroad and at home. The diplomatic corps here had already begun to wonder why Stalin had received the British Ambassador and not the American. Such speculation sooner or later leads to press gossip.

Of course, personally, I was very glad to see Stalin in the flesh. It seemed to me evident that he is a man of firm will, with no intention of being diverted, either unless forced to do so or unless he sees advantage to the Soviet Union in so doing. It also seemed to me that his health was pretty good and as a Georgian he will probably live a long time yet. He certainly dominates the situation here, and Vyshinski was hopping around like a pea on a hot griddle to do his slightest wish.

Kindest regards,

Sincerely,

Alan

1. Walworth Barbour was Counselor of Embassy in the Soviet Union, with the rank of Minister.
2. George Allen Morgan was First Secretary and Consul at the Embassy in the Soviet Union.
3. Oleg Alexandrovich Troyanovsky was the son of Alexander Antonovich Troyanovsky, former Ambassador of the Soviet Union to the United States, 1934–1939. For documentation on the recognition by the United States of the Soviet Union on November 16, 1933, see Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933–1939, pp. 1 ff.
4. Post, p. 725.
5. In a preliminary answer dated September 22, 1949, to this letter from George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Ambassador Kirk was informed that two notes on lend-lease matters of August 8, 1949 pp. 716 and 717, respectively) had not yet been answered, and that “a deal for the return of icebreakers and frigates which belong to us” had not been reached. Secretary of State Acheson in his reply of September 30 summarized the progress of the negotiations in somewhat more detail and concluded: “Whether or not Stalin’s attitude will be reflected in subsequent negotiations, may become evident in the Soviet reply to our notes of August 8. But these replies will probably not be forthcoming prior to the completion of present discussions on the ice-breakers and frigates.” (711.61/8–2349)
6. In a memorandum of the press and radio news conference of August 17, Secretary of State Acheson informed the correspondents that Ambassador Kirk’s visit was fundamentally and primarily a courtesy call upon Stalin, and that only two points had been mentioned upon which the Ambassador hoped that “the Soviet Union might respond to our representations.” One of these topics concerned “the matter of jamming the ‘Voice of America’, and that the other was the matter of the Lend-Lease negotiations.” During the conversation neither had been discussed in detail. (Files of the News Division.)