811.42700 (R)/5–1749: Telegram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kohler) to the Secretary of State
1276. Deptel 333, Mar 13. In our view Kremlin cannot abide anything less than absolute 100 percent control of spiritual (as of physical) nourishment Soviet peoples. By all odds greatest breach in this control was VOA and BBC broadcasts profiting by freedom of air. This confirmed first by their willingness combat thus advertise VOA in mass circulation media, now by prodigious and for time being almost entirely successful efforts to obliterate. Kremlin has invested lot of money people and material in that effort and we think ultimate answer must be in our willingness and ability invest more of same. To do less would be abandon any real hope of reaching Soviet peoples, of impeding their complete perversion and delaying or preventing catastrophe to which their despotic rulers would lead them.
Thus we think so [Soviet?] jamming program a basic long-range project. Though timing initial operation possibly motivated by desire withhold from Soviet population knowledge phenomenal success airlift and Soviet diplomatic surrender on Berlin (see Embtel 1215, May 111), it may have been only usual Soviet effort complete project as present for Stalin by May 1. Anyhow major fact is Soviets must have spent year or more building and staffing jammers, and behind this lie 30 years proof that few aspects Soviet power more jealously guarded than sovereignty over minds. This our ground for belief Soviet jamming tactical but strategic operation directed at mastery of air which will not merely rest on present victory but seek keep constantly ahead in radio race, Also Soviets likely extend jamming to [Page 614] VOA satellite programs and eventually even to non-satellite areas if able and deemed in Soviet interest. Hence important not consider Soviet intentions in merely “defensive” terms. Drive for air mastery is vital part of drive for world mastery.
Radio race therefore matter of decades, not years, and victory on this front depends ultimately on research for new techniques, while mid-range improvement our relative position calls for mass application existing techniques. While we are ignorant technical aspects, believe essential target next few years is build enough outlets to saturate air and make impossible for Soviets to broadcast for selves, unless also listen to us. We feel closest collaboration with British and other like-minded nations probably essential such project. At same time urge that long-range research be given equal importance. Our relative superiority over Soviets is greater here, time on our side if best US and British brains resources pooled as in development A-bomb. Since armed forces also vitally concerned and have great resources, recommend joint project under a central research agency. This urged by Army, Navy, Air.
Though Soviet radio plans strategic, important be prepared for sudden tactical shifts. Possible, e.g., they cease jamming entirely some months if CFM results lead them assume mask of friendlier relations, or in order defeat supplementary appropriations for VOA. But Soviet long-range planning and building would certainly continue; and enable them attack us in greater force when ready.
Little evidence yet gained on effect jamming on Soviet people. We believe large audience genuinely regret loss of sole source most world news, but this cannot conceivably become strong enough factor persuade Kremlin abandon policy. Only counter-measures which reduce Soviet communications to chaos likely bring Kremlin to terms, if ever. Though they at present extremely dependent short wave for internal communications, believe they will increasingly convert to medium wave and wire, and generally go to great expense and suffer severe inconvenience in order maintain information monopoly.
Meantime we believe sound policy continue VOA BBC bombardment all available transmitters all possible hours. Kremlin tends be more aggressive when resistance weakens. If VOA 100 percent blanked, people constantly reminded of voice seeking reach them with information which Kremlin fears.
Since presently getting through only rare intervals of few minutes, recommend programs highly condensed items so any break through will reward listener and spread by grapevine. Now unnecessary make program last 30–60 minutes.
Kremlin so far has not admitted or explained jamming to Soviet, public. Believe explanation will be difficult, perhaps not attempted as in case many MVD practices. But we do not favor extensive VOA. [Page 615] feature re reasons jamming, view need make every minute intensely interesting. Occasional statement of facts, as at present perhaps even brief er, should suffice.
Urge immediate action on proposal move close to Soviet broadcasts including Tass News (Deptel 288, May 2; Embtels 1098, April 30, 1157, May 6, 1973 [1173], May 8).2
We able make fairly technical reports when needed since experienced electrical engineer available consultation on MA staff.