840.20/3–1749: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kohler) to the Secretary of State

secret

us urgent

672. ReDeptel 160, March 16.1 We do not believe Soviet Union will make any aggressive move with armed forces this year likely to embroil it in major hostilities with west powers. Kremlin will, however, organize, support and supply so-called local and liberation forces, notably Greco-Macedonians in north Greece and south Yugoslavia. Barzani Kurds in Iran–Iraq, North Korean bands in South Korea, etc., all calculated to weaken local governments and contribute to worldwide war scare.

However, we do not anticipate any major effort in Iran,2 and particularly do not see any likelihood invocation 1921 treaty3 and occupation Azerbaijan. That such move relatively useless and advantage incommensurate with risk major clash involved doubtless impressed on Moscow by previous unhappy experience under comparatively favorable conditions. While local native disturbances might be organized in Azerbaijan we think target any eventual future Soviet aggression towards Iran will be control Central Government and capital in order obtain mastery entire country.

We believe Soviet intentions would be little affected by statement of nature suggested, since these surely already take account our previously demonstrated positive interest. Propaganda reaction would be strong, along established lines of damning American aggressive imperialism, but this now rather shopworn. On whole we consider statement useful supplement Atlantic Pact, which inevitably draws public attention to west, and believe issuance would be useful reassurance to peoples on southern periphery as well as timely reminder to Kremlin that we are not dropping our guard anywhere. Any statement should certainly include Iran, since our stronger direct support Turkey and Greece, which make these countries less vulnerable spots, to large extent speaks for itself. However, we believe statement should be most carefully worded to avoid any implication we are accusing Soviet Government of intending launch armed attack on countries named. Thus, for example, we would suggest saying that “continued independence [Page 597] and integrity” Greece, Turkey and Iran matter grave concern to US, rather than that “attack” on them would be grave. Finally we consider almost essential British join in issuance statement, since American British solidarity in Near East area seems to us matter of great practical and psychological importance, both in region itself and in Moscow.

Sent Department 672, passed London 66.

Kohler
  1. Not printed.
  2. In telegram 160 the Department mentioned that it had “under consideration possible issuance at time conclusion North Atlantic Pact of statement expressing interest US in security all areas world and especially security Greece, Turkey and Iran. Statement would probably say attack on those three countries would be ‘matter of grave concern’ to us.” There was some fear that such a “statement might provoke aggressive Soviet action against Iran,” and the Embassy was asked to express its views on the probable reaction of the Soviet Government to a declaration of this nature (840.20/3–1649).
  3. Treaty of Friendship between the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic and Persia, signed at Moscow on February 26, 1921; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. ix, p. 384.