861.002/3–549: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union ( Kohler ) to the Secretary of State

confidential

568. Following are our preliminary observations on relief Molotov as Foreign Minister and Mikoyan as Minister Foreign Trade:1

1.
These changes do not indicate that either has fallen into disfavor or that there is any change in their position in the party and governmental hierarchy. Comparisons with Litvinov’s dismissal in 19392 are invalid, as is interpretation apparently given initially by British press to effect “Molotov sacked”. Latter apparently arises from taking literally standard Soviet military-like language used in connection any governmental changes.
2.
We have long expected that Stalin would eventually retire as chairman Council Ministers and Molotov would return to that position which he held from 1930–41, and we see no immediate reason to change this estimate, though we have no idea as to when. In this connection noteworthy that in feature length documentary “Lenin” recently circulating throughout Soviet Union, Molotov obviously built up as second only to Stalin in history party.
3.
If our estimate Soviet intentions re East Europe satellites correct (and this seems supported in economic field by text CMEA agreement reported in Bucharest’s 144 to Department February 24, repeated Moscow 143), our best present guess would be Mikoyan probably relieved in order head up this organization.
4.
However, even if these new jobs should not materialize, both Molotov and Mikoyan still have plenty to do as Deputy Chairmen Council Ministers, members Politburo, etc. In fact they may well remain as policy makers for departments they are quitting, both now headed by persons who do not have real policy making rank and [Page 585] authority. This parallels other moves since end war, which have relieved practically every full member Politburo of active ministerial duties (e.g. Beria from MVD and MGB,4 Kaganovich from Ministry Heavy Industries, etc.5), resulting in Politburo’s becoming super policy making body relieved operational duties and superior to ministerial incumbents.
5.
While we do not believe changes involve any fundamental shift Soviet Foreign Policy, we think timing may have been influenced by desire evoke misinterpretations and sow confusion in West in anticipated [anticipation] contemplated foreign policy moves next month or so, connected particularly with forthcoming meeting UNGA.6 We have for some time been studying possibilities this line and expect report our conclusions at greater length in subsequent messages. Briefly however, we are inclined believe world is about to face a Kremlin-made “spring war scare” of unprecedented proportions, designed to defeat or diminish scope of Atlantic Pact and perhaps set stage for ostensibly broad and concrete Stalin peace offer which Western world would find difficult to reject. This campaign is already in course in form Moscow propaganda supplemented by worldwide efforts stooges and fellow-travellers calculated identify Atlantic Pact with imminent third world war. It will probably be given added weight by military dispositions and planted military intelligence calculated to alarm Western governments. Campaign might be drawn to crescendo by all-out effort Vyshinski, as Foreign Minister and head Soviet delegation UNGA, secure resolution condemning regional military pacts. This would be propaganda effort closely coordinated with concrete peace offer, designed to support it and to bring pressure through the UN on US toward acceptance of “reasonable” tempting offer.7
6.
In summary, our estimate is “no significant change”.8

Sent Department, repeated Paris 72, London 60.

Kohler
  1. The radio and press of the Soviet Union announced on March 4 and 5 that the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the U.S.S.R. had relieved Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov and Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan of their ministerial duties. The Embassy sent a translation of the formal announcement of the changes as carried in the press in its telegram 567 from Moscow on March 5, 1949, not printed. (861.002/3–549) Molotov was succeeded by Andrey Yanuaryevieh Vyshinsky, until then First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Mikoyan was replaced by Mikhail Alexeyevich Menshikov, hitherto First Deputy Minister for Foreign Trade. Both Molotov and Mikoyan were members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and where Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers, which positions they retained.
  2. Molotov, who was Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars at that time, on May 3, 1939, replaced Maxim Maximovich Litvinov as People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs; see Foreign Relations, The Soviet Union, 1933–1939, pp. 757761.
  3. In regard to this document, see Current Economic Developments, No. 188, February 7, 1949, footnote 2, p. 4.
  4. Lavrenty Pavlovich Beriya relinquished his duties as People’s Commissar for Internal Affairs in January 1946, but as a Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers in charge of security it was generally agreed that he subsequently exercised influential control in both this ministry as well as in the Ministry of State Security (MGB). Beriya was also a full member of the Politburo.
  5. Lazar Moiseyevich Kaganovich had given up direct control of the People’s Commissariat of Heavy Industries in April 1938. He was, however, the director of many other associated commissariats and ministries afterwards. He was a full member of the Politburo of the Communist Party from 1930 and a Deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union.
  6. The second part of the Third Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly was held at Lake Success and Flushing Meadow, New York, April 5–May 18, 1949.
  7. For documentation on the United Nations General Assembly’s consideration of methods for the promotion of international cooperation in the political field which resulted in the “Essentials for Peace” resolution, see vol. ii, pp. 72 ff.
  8. A memorandum of March 4, not printed, apparently drafted by Llewellyn E. Thompson, Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs, initialed by John D. Hickerson, Director of that Office, and sent to the Secretary of State, the Under Secretary of State James E. Webb, the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs Dean Rusk, and to George F. Kennan, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, commented on the replacement of Molotov and Mikoyan in terms closely similar to those expressed by Charge Kohler in this telegram. The memorandum remarked that no indication was provided by this change, of personnel “of the future course of Soviet policy.” Vyshinsky was “a master of invective” and a technician, but he did not hold “any position of power within the Soviet political hierarchy”, whereas Menshikov was “considered to be a man of very mediocre ability.” While it could be assumed that “basic Soviet objectives will remain unchanged”, it was also “quite possible that no important change in policy” would occur. This was in part likely because “the work of the Foreign Office and that of the Ministry of Foreign Trade have declined in importance with the tendency of the Soviet Government to carry forward its foreign policies through propaganda and the Cominform (the Communist Information Bureau, founded in 1947; see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. iv, pp. 594616, passim) and as a result of the decline in trade relationships with the West.” (861.00/3–449)

    Both the Department of State and the Embassy in the Soviet Union derived satisfaction from the receipt of comments from several other sources, particularly from the British and the French, whose views coincided essentially with the preliminary observations expressed in the telegram 568 from Moscow and in this memorandum. (These reports are chiefly filed under 861.002.)