The Statement leaves little to be desired in the scope of the subject
matter covered or in the comprehensive treatment given the various
facets of our relations with and interest in Rumania. If there is any
cause to take exception to the Statement it might be in the
interpretation of the character of the Rumanian society and institutions
and the occasional seeming failure to evaluate the practical
possibilities of accomplishment or application of our stated
objectives.
I must confess in reading portions of the Statement to a certain feeling
of unreality in the objectives expressed and of a sense of lofty
[Page 536]
idealism unrelated to the
practical prospects of attainment. While, for example, it may be our
sincere desire to provide for the people of Rumania conditions conducive
to the establishment of a true democracy with all its attendant
advantages, it must be remembered that democracy in the accepted Western
sense has never existed in Rumania nor are the people presently capable
of accepting in a full sense its advantages and obligations. It seems to
me therefore that our objectives should reflect these limitations and
that we should concern ourselves with the more practical objective of
providing a regime in Rumania, however faulty in its attainments of
practical democracy, which will at least provide the basic human rights
and freedoms and permit the people of Rumania to live in peace.
Where we may desire to promote such desirable objectives as the
encouragement of passive resistance among the Rumanian people or the
opposition to further Communist encroachment, we should qualify such
aims to the extent of our capacity to bring them to successful fruition.
Otherwise the statements take on the character of pious hopes and dilute
the force of other elements of policy.
The Statement refers at various points to a reliance upon the peasant as
the broad base upon which a truly democratic government in Rumania may
be founded. I fear this overrates the peasants’ concept of or interest
in democratic government. The best that might be hoped for is that the
peasantry could be brought to form the mass support of leaders with
democratic intentions.
There appears a tendency in the mental approach to the discussion of
certain problems to consider Rumania as a component of a group of more
or less identical satellites and to analyze these problems from a
“satellite” viewpoint. It should be borne in mind in any grouping of
treatment that the peculiar geographic position of Rumania, isolated as
it is from the West, makes it possible for the present government to
resist Western pressure much more effectually than certain other
satellites and, without fear of effective reprisal, to conduct its
affairs with almost complete disregard of Western interests.
In the matter of presentation I find the Statement somewhat diffuse and,
in places, repetitious. Similarities of thought and interest occur
between statements under the headings of Objectives, Policy Issues and
Policy Evaluation which, though perhaps unavoidable in some instances,
could better serve clarity and comprehension if consolidated. The value
of the Statement could be distinctly enhanced by a more succinct
expression of our policy and problems, and by a better grouping of
related ideas.
There arises the question of the audience for which this document is
designed. If it is designed for those reasonably familiar with the
Rumanian scene much of the present explanatory matter could be left out
and the Statement drawn down to perhaps three or four pages.
[Page 537]
If, on the other hand, it is
designed to familiarize persons with Rumanian problems then, in parts at
least and particularly in the Political Section, it might be desirable
to reinstate in the discussion of the various objectives and issues
terse statements of the backgrounds and reasons for these
conclusions.
Specific comments on the various sections of the Policy Statement are
treated in the enclosure.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum Prepared by the Legation in
Romania2
[Extracts]
secret
[Bucharest, undated.]
Comments on Policy Statement on Rumania
A. Objectives
1. Long Range Objectives. The Department’s listing of the long range
objectives of American policy appears all inclusive and too
generalized and visionary to be presently practicable. It might be
well to keep in mind that never in Rumanian history have such goals
been obtained and they represent a system which by Rumanian
standards would be little short of Utopian. Our prime long range
objective would appear to be to restore the Government to the people
and worry about its form and policies later.
2. Short Term Objectives.
(1) “Protection so far as possible in the circumstances of
American interests in Rumania and the defense of United States
prestige against a systematic attempt on the part of the present
Rumanian authorities to undermine it”.
No one can argue with this aim and it has been the consistent policy
of the Legation to endeavor to carry out the principles expressed.
However, the Legation has little, if any, confidence in its ability
to “protect American interests” vis-à-vis the present Rumanian
Government and it must be thoroughly understood that our chances of
according effective protection are practically nil. The installation
of an illegal Communist regime in Rumania has taken the matter out
of our hands and our efforts, at best, are merely for the
record.
(2) “An effort within the limits of practicability to obtain
implementation of the Treaty of Peace”.
[Page 538]
Since the drafting of the policy statement there have been further
developments in this field and the Legation’s position was stated in
its telegrams Nos. 136 of February 20, 159 of March 2 and 168 of
March 5, 1949.3
Briefly, we feel despite meager prospects of obtaining either Soviet
or Rumanian cooperation in the matter, we should press for treaty
observance of the political, military, and economic clauses and
failing to obtain satisfaction here, should refer all phases of the
question to a world organization. We can hardly justify branding
Rumania as a treaty violator if we have not made every conceivable
attempt with the machinery supposedly available to us to force
compliance.4
(3) “Removal of the justification for retaining Soviet forces in
Rumania by the earliest possible conclusion of an Austrian
settlement”.
While the conclusion of an Austrian settlement5 entailing an
obligation on the part of the Soviet Union to remove the troops it
now has in Rumania purportedly to maintain “its lines of
communication” might be salutory here, the Legation has little
reason to suppose the Soviets would in fact remove all of their
military personnel. The secret military protocol to the
Rumanian-Soviet Mutual Assistance Treaty, envisages the presence of
Soviet Military personnel and it seems almost certain that the
Rumanian Government would request the Soviets to maintain forces
here if they felt it desirable from the point of view of internal
security. The Legation is inclined to believe that the present
regime would, in fact, make such a request. Once the Rumanian army
is sufficiently infiltrated with Soviet agents and commanded by only
trusted internationally minded Communists, the uniformed Soviet
troops might be permitted to depart.
(4) “Support the morale of the preponderant majority of the
Rumanian people by keeping alive their faith in the values of
western civilization, et cetera”.
The Legation agrees with the aims expressed here but feels that in
the long run with no material improvement in the present situation
here, our efforts may become increasingly less valuable as
opposition gives way to resignation and resignation eventually to
acceptance. Our aim at the moment should be to express constantly to
the Rumanians our interest in their welfare over the Voice of
America and continue our efforts to show them they have not been
forgotten. It must be made clear, however, that the Rumanians must
work for their own
[Page 539]
deliverance and that liberation will not be handed them on a silver
platter without effort on their part.
(5) “Encouragement of passive (but not abortively overt)
resistance by the Rumanian people to the totalitarian system and
to the Communist ideology which is being imposed upon them”.
Without being exactly sure what the Department has in mind on this
point, the Legation is inclined to believe we should proceed
cautiously in the encouragement of any resistance, passive or
otherwise. It is important we start nothing we are unwilling to back
up and carry all the way through. In a police state such as Rumania
has become with both the state apparatus and the many organizations
of the Rumanian Workers (Communist) Party controlling each and every
activity of the entire population, it is not very easy for the
people to offer even passive resistance and what resistance is left
will not, as mentioned above, last forever. If, as mentioned in
point (4) above, we continue to point out to the Rumanians the
advantages of democracy over dictatorship and to show them the
criminal nature of the present regime here, we would seem to have
gone about as far as is presently possible in encouraging passive
resistance. Any embroilment in Rumanian politics at the present time
on the part of the United States Government would only make matters
worse unless we are prepared to offer material assistance to the
resistance.
(6) “Development of such trade between Rumania and the West as
can be adequately controlled to serve the interests of European
recovery et cetera.”
The Legation concurs in this principle but feels an increase in
Rumania’s trade with the West will have no effect on the
“stranglehold upon Rumania of the USSR”. Rumania is at the moment
ruled by Communists who are fully trusted agents of the Kremlin and
whose policy is the development of international Communism, not the
recovery of Rumanian prosperity. They are interested in Rumania’s
economy only insofar as it promotes their political ends and the
prosperity of the Soviet Union and economic considerations are most
unlikely to make them relax their grasp. The present rulers of
Rumania will trade only when it suits them and not in the commonly
accepted sense of international trade.
B. Policy Issues
The six broad policy objectives appear to cover the situation
although they appear to be little more than pious hopes, vaguely
expressed.
1. Political.
The Department’s short summary of the political situation here
accurately reflects the shape of things in Rumania although for
persons
[Page 540]
not fully
acquainted with the situation it appears to lack details of the
manner in which Soviet control was established.
In discussing the attitude of the Rumanian Government toward United
States officials in Rumania, it might be well to point out that the
Rumanian Government obviously desires to hamper the Legation with
its endless restrictions and to keep its personnel small by
withholding visas and declaring persons personae
non gratae on the flimsiest of pretexts. The Rumanian
Government apparently is not at this time prepared to take the
initiative in breaking off relations with the United States but it
is determined to make sure that such representation as it permits
the United States to have in Rumania is rendered ineffective.
In the paragraphs dealing with the actions taken by the United States
to cope with the situation, the Legation agrees that the United
States should from time to time let the Rumanian Government know
exactly where we stand and what we think of its conduct. While the
constant sending of diplomatic notes which bring no visible results
may tend temporarily to lower our prestige vis-à-vis the Rumanian
people, the Legation feels it is important not to let the Rumanian
Government violate any of its international commitments without
protest, act towards United States officials in any manner but that
normally prescribed in relations between states, and to make it
entirely clear that we intend to implement our protests through any
machinery that may conceivably be available. In dealing with an
organization such as the Rumanian Government, the Legation believes
that “dignified vigor” is usually appropriate but that, if
necessary, dignity might on occasion be dropped in favor of a more
forthright if less palatable manner of driving our points home.
Without wishing to make any recommendation that the United States
break off relations with the present Rumanian Government, the
Legation feels certain of the considerations listed by the
Department as prompting the maintenance of relations are a bit
ephemeral: The following are the Legation’s comments on the
individual points raised:
- (1)
- Protection of American interests: Even with a diplomatic
representation in Bucharest, the Rumanian Government has to
date been successful in totally destroying American economic
interests in Rumania. While settlement of the matter may
drag on for many years, the presence of a diplomatic mission
in Bucharest is not an essential in continuing our efforts
for compensation. Our protection is at best a paper
protection and our efforts consist of protests for the
record rather than effective action capable of obtaining
immediate redress.
- (2)
- Implementation of the Peace Treaty. The Legation agrees
that no thought should be given to any rupture in relations
until all possible steps have been taken in Rumania to
compel compliance or at least to document our position. Once
the matter has been removed from the Bucharest scene and
thrown into the machinery of the United Nations, this
consideration would no longer apply.
- (3)
- Information. The intelligence activities of the Legation
and of other United States Government agencies represented
in Bucharest have declined markedly in the past year and
this trend has been accelerated since the passage by the
Rumanian Government in January, 1949 of a law providing
capital punishment for persons conveying state secrets to
foreign powers.…
- (4)
- The avoidance of formalizing an open separation between
East and West. The Legation agrees that the United States
should not be the one to instigate a break and realizes the
unfortunate repercussions this might have in the overall
world picture and the possibility that a break in relations
with one Iron Curtain country might start a chain reaction
leading to a break with all.
- (5)
-
Contacts with the Rumanian people. There appear to be two
sides to this question, both deserving of consideration:
(a) A break in relations
would remove the pitifully few remaining contacts we
have with the Rumanian people and might make the
Rumanians feel we had lost interest in them and had
thrown in the towel. Our continued presence in Rumania
would show we were continuing our attempt to bring about
an improvement in the situation and to make the present
Rumanian Government live up to its international
commitments, and (b) It is
possible a rupture in diplomatic relations might show
the Rumanian people we were no longer willing to stand
for repeated insults, we were withdrawing recognition
from a detested tyranny, and we would be permitted to
aid the Rumanian people in manners not possible while we
still accord recognition to the present Government.
The Legation feels both considerations should be taken
into account whenever the Department periodically
reviews the problem of continuing diplomatic relations
with Rumania. While there might be some temporary loss
of prestige with the democratically inclined mass of the
Rumanian people, if we break relations, in the long run
if, over the Voice of America and by our actions in the
United Nations and elsewhere, we show the Rumanians we
have not lost interest, we would suffer no permanent
damage from the point of view of prestige.
The above views have been cited not to indicate the Legation believes
the time has come for a break in diplomatic relations with Rumania
but to point out that in the Legation’s opinion, there are few
compelling reasons against an eventual break if it should be felt
advisable for reasons of high policy to make it. To recapitulate,
the Legation believes (1) no consideration should be given to
terminating our recognition of the present Rumanian Government until
we have exhausted all hopes of compelling Rumanian compliance with
the Peace Treaty with the means available to us locally; (2)
intelligence available in Rumania is small at the present and is
decreasing all the time and (3) that a break would have both
favorable and unfavorable repercussions vis-à-vis Rumanian public
opinion.
The points discussed in the remainder of the chapter on political
matters, the Peace Treaty, the Voice of America, the encouragement
of passive resistance, and the gathering of intelligence have been
covered in the various points already raised.
[Page 542]
[Here follow Section 2, Economic and Part C Relations with Other
States.]
D. Policy Evaluation
The Legation is inclined to the belief that the statement “there may
well be local elements (such as the anti-Soviet feeling of the bulk
of the Rumanian people) which will afford possibilities for
retarding the communization of Rumania and for eventually
undermining the Soviet subjugation of that country” minimizes the
rapid progress already made towards communization and the fact that
a regime imposed by force can only be removed thereby. It does not
seem possible, as seen by the case of Russia, to retard the progress
of Communism once it has seized power merely by adverse public
opinion. The United States may conceivably be able to improve the
Rumanian situation by the use of the United Nations and other
international agencies but there is little hope of effecting
improvement through purely Rumanian agencies.
The Legation’s comments on the Department’s numbered “problems of
prime concern to the further development of United States policy”
follow seriatim:
- (1)
-
The recent creation of the Council of Mutual Economic
Assistance indicates some sort of Eastern Federation
will come into existence in fact, if not in name. The
Legation does not believe any federation can spring from
the peasants of the Balkans who without exception are
too restricted in viewpoint, suspicious, nationalistic,
and uneducated.
The rumors of impending absorption of Rumania into the
Soviet Union have been quiescent for some time and the
Legation does not feel it is probable in the immediate
future.
- (2)
- The establishment of a violent and repressive rightist
counterrevolution would seemingly only be possible if the
overthrow of the present regime was caused by purely
internal factors. The Legation does not believe it is
possible for the present Communist regime to be overthrown
by Rumanians alone unless there should be an unforeseen
relaxing in the Soviet grip on Rumania and believes external
assistance to be essential. In the event of a war such a
regime might emerge in the confusion but it could hardly
hope long to survive in either a free or a Communist world.
Moreover the Legation doubts that the future of Rumania
rests with the peasants and feels rather that it depends on
leaders who can use the peasants as mass support.
- (3)
- Rumanian anti-Semitism is a real and tangible thing and
must be taken into consideration in any long range plans for
the future. Should the present regime be miraculously
overthrown, it is hard to see how a pogrom could be
averted.
- (4)
-
The Legation does not take quite such a gloomy view of
possible future leadership of a democratic Rumania as
does the Department. After years of Hitler,
Schumacher6 and others emerged in post-war
[Page 543]
Germany and de
Gasperi7 and his
associates in Italy followed the even longer
dictatorship of Mussolini. A skeleton organization of
the National Peasant Party is known to exist, and the
National Liberal and Independent Socialist Parties have
never been formally suppressed although they are lying
dormant at the moment. While the regime may eventually
“liquidate” vast numbers of political prisoners the fact
that only a handful of fiery Communists are loyal to it
makes it seem unlikely all possible future leaders could
be disposed of in this manner.
The Legation agrees with the Department’s remark that
although King Mihai was popular in Rumania, there is no
assurance that the Rumanian people would necessarily
desire the return of the House of Hohenzollern
Sigmaringen once the present regime is overthrown. An
unconfirmed report has recently reached the Legation
that Iuliu Maniu from prison has indicated his
opposition to any reinstitution of the monarchy.
However, if King Mihai should by his words and deeds
while in exile demonstrate to the Rumanian people that
he is doing everything in his power to effect their
liberation, he might be able to regain his throne if he
acted quickly once the liberation came.
The Legation agrees with the Department’s opinion of the
present political figures among Rumanian refugees abroad
and does not feel they offer much hope of future
leadership of a democratic Rumania which will have to
come from persons now within Rumania.
