760C.61/11–1449: Telegram

The Ambassador in Poland (Gallman) to the Secretary of State

secret

1488. We have re-examined Rokossovsky’s appointment as Marshal of Poland1 in the light of recent developments in Poland and Moscow’s pronouncements on Germany, and find that after this further consideration our appraisal of appointment is substantially the same as that given in our first messages (see particularly Embtel 1444, November 7,2 and Weeka 58, November 103).

We feel that primary, immediate objective of appointment is Moscow’s determination to gain firmer control over Polish Army. Reason it feels this necessary at this time is, however, we believe because of long-range objectives. Under present circumstances Soviet control seems adequate and Moscow minions (both Poles and those Soviets who may have been insinuated into Polish services) are effectively, though slowly, whittling down a sea of unreliability. Present rate of correction may however not be considered sufficient in view of conditions Kremlin may anticipate as result her own future actions.

That Kremlin and Warsaw regime have doubts about reliability of Polish Army has been reflected during past year in retirements and shifts of a number of higher Army officers and in the appointment of Ochab, an old time trusted Communist as Vice Minister Defense, with rank of General, charged with political education of Army (Embdes 271, April 254).

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Because of lack of confidence in Polish Army, Moscow has, as Department knows, kept it relatively poorly equipped. The extent of Moscow’s confidence in Polish Army, and perhaps too the purpose for which she now intends using it, should be revealed in coming months in how she equips it. We will closely watch for such development.

We feel other possible motives internal to Polish, as mentioned in some messages from other missions, can also be discarded. For example, as regards suggestion that appointment be signed as first step towards integration Poland into Soviet Union, we continue of opinion that this likely [unlikely?] in foreseeable future on principal thesis that Moscow can attain same objectives by other means which would not involve acceptance into Soviet Union of an additional obstreperous nation of basically anti-Russian orientation, higher living standards and so on.

We feel that Moscow’s longer range objectives in making appointment have to do with Germany.

Rokossovsky retains command of Soviet troops occupying Poland and apparently as well over Soviet Western Army in Germany. That, it seems to us, puts Moscow in a favorable position to propose the withdrawal of all occupying troops from Germany, a proposal which possibly might be made in connection with a peace treaty offer. Such a move we feel, Moscow could now more easily afford to make. If her offer of troop withdrawal is turned down, she has at least scored a very important propaganda point. But should it be accepted, or should she decide to withdraw her troops anyway, to the discomfiture of the West, she can, in our view, without any apparent real risk withdraw behind the Oder-Neisse Line and with the single command now existing, withdraw and get established in force in Poland with a minimum of delay and difficulty.

The announcement of General Chuikov’s appointment as Chief of the Civilian Control Commission in East Germany5 on the same day as that of Rokossovsky’s appointment, may be significant and may well be connected with plans for the withdrawal of troops from Germany. With Rokossovsky in command on the Oder-Neisse Line, and with a military leader (who previously, and possibly still is, Rokossovsky’s military subordinate) at the head of the Civilian Control Commission in East Germany, Moscow, no doubt, would feel fairly secure.

In Moscow’s longer range planning on Germany some territorial adjustment at Poland’s expense no doubt plays a part, and this, too, [Page 518] must have had a bearing on Rokossovsky’s appointment. No matter when Moscow attempts that, feeling in Poland will run high. Moscow probably concludes, and no doubt rightly, that only with such joint control of Soviet and Polish troops, as now rests with Rokossovsky, could she risk changes on Poland’s western frontier.

In talking with my British colleague, Gainer,6 I found that his Embassy’s estimate of appointment coincides with ours. British Embassy, however, feels that possibility of Polish Government having requested appointment, as was stated in Polish Government announcement, should not be ruled out. Polish Government, so British reason, may have done this in the feeling that with Moscow’s choice Marshal, Poland’s chances of retaining Oder-Neisse Line would be enhanced. It seems to me, however, that with control over Polish Army, and expanded control over Poland generally which Rokossovsky’s appointment gives Moscow, the Oder-Neisse Line, in many respects, becomes western frontier of Soviet Union rather than of Poland, and I do not think that that is relished by even most ardent Polish Communists.

Sent Department 1488, repeated Berlin 201, Heidelberg 10, Frank fort 47, London 146, Paris 174, Department pass Moscow 207, pouched Praha, Bucharest, Belgrade, Sofia, Budapest.

Gallman
  1. On November 7 the Polish Government announced that Marshal of the Soviet Union Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovskiy had been named Marshal of Poland and had been appointed Polish Minister of National Defense. Rokossovskiy had been born in Warsaw. He served in the Russian Army during World War I, in the Red Guard during the Russian Revolution, and in the Soviet Army throughout the inter-war period. He was a leading Soviet army commander during World War II. From 1945 to 1949 Rokossovskiy was Commander of the Soviet Northern Group of Forces, stationed at Legnica, Poland. On November 13 it was further announced that Rokossovskiy had been co-opted to the membership of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party (the Communist Party in Poland). The incumbent Minister of National Defense, Marshal of Poland Michal Rola-Zymierski, was relieved of his duties and was named a member to the Polish Council of State.
  2. Not printed. It observed that the appointment of Rokossovskiy represented the culmination of the trend of the flouting of Polish national sensibilities by the USSR. The action clearly bore out the greatly reduced importance with which Poland was viewed by Soviet leaders following the establishment of the German Democratic Republic in East Germany in October 1949. The most significant aspect of the appointment appeared to be the opening it gave the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from East Germany (860C.20/11–749).
  3. Not printed.
  4. In April 1949 Edward Ochab, alternate member of the Politburo of the Polish United Workers’ Party (the Communist Party in Poland), was named first Deputy Minister of National Defense with the rank of General of Brigade. The despatch under reference here is not printed.
  5. Gen. Vasiliy Ivanovich Chuykov, until then Chief of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany, was named Chairman of the Soviet Control Commission in Germany on November 7. The Control Commission was the successor agency to the Soviet Military Administration. For documentation on the attitude of the United States to the changes in the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany, see vol. iii, pp. 505 ff.
  6. Sir Donald St. Clair Gainer, British Ambassador in Poland.