Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume V

740.00119 Control (Germany)/5–1949: Telegram

The Ambassador in Czechoslovakia (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State ¹

confidential
priority

Praha, May 19, 1949—6 p. m.

niact

741. Reference Hill Jones case. Foreign Minister Clementis sent for me this morning and I saw him and Hajdu from noon to 1:30 with following results:

1. He showed me telegram quoting note Snejderek had received from our authorities in Berlin yesterday² and expressed surprise that our military authorities had threatened such strong action since he had told me that within two weeks or less from date my visit May 9³ he would have favorable news. I replied that he had said my aide-mémoire⁴ provided basis for new consideration of case but he had not given me positive assurance that men would be released within period to which he referred. I also pointed out that Hajdu himself had said matter had been decided by courts and that judicial authorities would have to be consulted.

2. Clementis then said President Gottwald had only yesterday May 18 signed pardon for Hill and Jones and he had actually asked his secretary yesterday afternoon to make appointment to give me good news. He added it was fortunate he had not received Snejderek’s telegram before pardon signed or otherwise it would not have been.

3. Discussion then ensued as to what could be done, both Clementis and Hajdu, especially latter, insisting that our military authorities withdraw their letter. They objected to first part of letter which, while stating I had reported failure obtain release of men, contained no reference to Clementis promise that favorable results might be obtained within two weeks.

4. After this lengthy and at times rather heated discussion, we finally arrived at following modus operandi (a, b, c and d) which I said I would submit to my government for consideration and instructions. It has my approval except as indicated in paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 below. End part one.

[Part Two of Three]

a. Since pardon has been granted, men can be released about next Sunday or Monday.

b. Czechoslovakia authorities unwilling actually hand men over to our military authorities in absence extradition agreement, especially since those authorities are constantly accepting “deserters” from Czechoslovakia whom they claim to be “political refugees”. Men must leave Czechoslovakia but will be permitted to choose where. I inquired whether this was subterfuge to allow men proceed to another satellite country. Reply was “probably not” because of visa difficulties men would encounter in entering such countries. We then hit upon idea of allowing Consul Parry and Capt. McNamara interview men on Saturday morning (if this modus operandi is approved) and arrange with them for their return to Bavaria, most likely via Rosovodov, only existing port of exit. If men agree Foreign Office will then inform Embassy exact date, approximate time and place when men will reach and cross border so our authorities can be ready receive them. According present planning this could be as early as Sunday or Monday, May 22–23.⁵

c. Our military authorities will send another letter to Czechoslo-vakian representative in Berlin declaring that their letter May 18 may be considered as “not having been handed over” and indicating that said letter was based on “misunderstanding” of results of conversation of May 9 between Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia and American Ambassador. Words quoted are insisted upon by Clementis and Hajdu, again particularly Hajdu. I argued, since President of Czechoslovakia had already granted pardon before letter was dispatched, that simple verbal request for return of letter might suffice.

d. There should be no publicity about release prior to agreement on proposed modus operandi and none at any time to threat contained in letter of our military authorities. Clementis and Hajdu also do not want us to publish notes exchanged on this case of statements prepared by Parry and McNamara of their interview with men. End of part two.

[Section Three of Three]

5. Realize foregoing is not exactly to my liking and that both Department and our military authorities will have same reaction. However, since primary purpose our efforts is to get men released, since Czechoslovakian authorities now know from letter of our military authorities we were prepared retaliate, and since full pardon by President of Czechoslovakia, coming so soon after trial, is obvious admission of some miscarriage of justice, recommend, subject to observations in paragraphs 6 and 7 below, approval of modus operandi as most expeditious method of getting men across border into Bavaria by next Sunday or Monday.

6. Since phraseology for withdrawal military authorities letter (paragraph c above) may not be acceptable, possibly could persuade Clementis to accept some such substitute as following (which however should not be sent until men are actually released and in our hands): “Since American Ambassador in Praha has advised that President of Czechoslovakia had actually pardoned Hill and Jones on May 18 prior to despatch of my letter of that date and since I did not know that Foreign Minister Clementis had wished to convey to Ambassador on May 9 a definite promise that favorable action on release of Hill and Jones would be forthcoming within 2 weeks from that date, you can consider my letter of May 18 as never having been sent.”⁶

7. As regards publicity, if we agree withdraw letter, feel we cannot publicize threat contained therein but we could and probably should tell press that military authorities did make representations to Czech representative in Berlin. Also see no need to publicize any of notes exchanged between Embassy and Foreign Office however in interest of justice and to let American public know we made strong effort obtain release these men, feel correspondents here, Germany and Washington might be shown, as background material, text my aide-mémoire handed Clementis May 9 and airmailed Department, Berlin and Heidelberg May 10.

8. If foregoing not approved, only alternative I see is for Department to instruct me to tell Foreign Minister that matter passed from my hands to military authorities as indicated last paragraph my note 334 May 9 which would transfer negotiations to Berlin.

9. Am awaiting instructions before proceeding further. End Message.

Sent Department 741, repeated Berlin 99, Frankfurt 42, Heidelberg 103.

Jacobs

1. Because of its length, this telegram was transmitted in three parts, all of which were received in Washington on the afternoon of May 19.

2. Telegram 760, May 19, from Berlin, not printed, reported that on the previous day Lt. Gen. C. R. Huebner, Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command, presented the following communication to the Acting Chief of the Czechoslovak Military Mission at Berlin, Snejderek:

   “I have been informed by the American Ambassador at Praha of our Embassy’s disappointment at the failure of its patient efforts, extending over a period of 5 months, to obtain justice in the case of 2 soldiers of my command, Clarence Hill and George R. Jones. These men are under long prison sentences in Czechoslovakia on trumped-up and entirely inadmissible charges of ‘espionage’ following what can only be considered a mock trial.

   “I wish to record my own regret at that travesty of justice and to notify you that, if these 2 soldiers are not released promptly, I shall find it necessary to revoke permission for all Czechoslovak officials to remain in the US zone.” (740.00119 Control (Germany)/5–1949)

3. Regarding the May 9 visit under reference here, see footnote 3 to the circular telegram of May 6, p. 400.
4. The aide-mémoire referred to here, handed to Clementis during Ambassador Jacobs’ visit of May 9, was transmitted to the Department in copy as an enclosure to despatch 306, May 10, from Praha, neither printed (740.00119 Control (Germany)/5–1049).
5. American and Czechoslovak authorities subsequently agreed to a plan for the return of Hill and Jones generally following the proposal outlined here. The two soldiers were released at the border check point of Eisenstein (Železna Ruda) on the afternoon of May 22 and were taken into custody by the U.S. Constabulary.
6. Telegram 832, May 26, from Berlin, not printed, reported that Acting Political Adviser for Germany Riddleberger, upon instruction from the Department of State and authorization by Lieutenant General Huebner, had informed Snejderek that inasmuch as Hill and Jones were in American custody, General Huebner wished to withdraw his letter of May 18 as being no longer applicable to the situation. Snejderek, who promised to communicate the information to his government, appeared to indicate by his attitude that the Hill–Jones case could be considered closed (740.00119 Control (Germany)/5–2649).