840.50 Recovery/1–749: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Sweden 1

top secret

28. From State and ECA. Ref Repto 95 to Stockholm;2 Torep 199 from Stockholm;2 Embtel 24, Jan 7.3

(1)

If Swed establishes controls over exports East, without satisfactory consultation with you, extent to which such controls meet our [Page 65] security objectives would require careful study by Dept and other agencies in light of:

(a)
Possible development Sov mil potential;
(b)
Reaction other OEEC countries which are cooperating fully or are expected to.
It would, of course, be hoped such controls might be extensive enough to satisfy our requirements but problem explanation to other countries would be difficult any event.

(2)
If no prospect reasonable solution this problem we might have to scrutinize US exports to Swed from security standpoint. Such scrutiny would relate to US exports supporting Swed trade with East and might therefore affect also Swed arms production. You may wish consider possible use this point at appropriate moment Negots.
(3)
We do not consider advisable at present withholding ECA assistance as weapon of bargaining or retaliation in connection East-West Trade Negots. [State and ECA.]

Lovett
  1. This telegram was repeated to Paris for W. Averell Harriman, United States Special Representative in Europe for the Economic Cooperation Administration, as Torep 2850.
  2. Not printed.
  3. Not printed.
  4. Supra.