875.00/10–1849
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for European Affairs (Thompson)
secret
[Washington,] October 18, 1949.
| Participants: |
Mr. Hoyer Millar, Counselor, British Embassy1
|
|
Lord Jellicoe, Second Secretary, British Embassy |
|
Mr. Llewellyn E. Thompson, EUR
|
The British Minister came in at my request. I stated that we wished to
inform them of the thinking in the Department on the Albanian
[Page 320]
question in order to be sure
that there was no important difference of view between us. I handed him
a copy of the Attachéd statement and pointed out that this represented
our thinking at the present time, although, of course, it was subject to
change in the light of developments.
Hoyer Millar said that offhand he thought British views were completely
in accord with ours but that he would be glad to check with the Foreign
Office. He said the only point on which he had any question was the last
paragraph with respect to Northern Epirus. While he thought the British
view was the same as ours, he was not sure whether they had ever made
any specific public statement on this point.
[Attachment]
Department of State Policy Paper on
Albania1
secret
[Washington,] September 21,
1949.
I. Basic Long Range US Objective
in Albania
The establishment of an Albania which is free of foreign domination
and whose government is responsive and responsible to the will of
the Albanian people.
Admittedly, no Albanian regime, because of the inherent weakness of
the country, can be free of foreign influence or independent of
foreign support. Moreover, in the foreseeable future, representative
institutions can exist in Albania only in a rudimentary form. It is
in our interest, however, that foreign influence in the country
should not be allowed to take the form of domination, and that it
should be directed toward helping the Albanians to govern and to
support themselves. We would expect that such developments would
make possible good relations between Albania and Greece, Yugoslavia
and Italy, respectively, and would orient Albania toward the
West.
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II. Short Range US Objectives in
Albania
- (1)
- The weakening and eventual elimination of the Soviet-dominated
Hoxha regime.
- (2)
- Cessation of use of Albania as a base for guerrilla operations
in Greece and possibly Yugoslavia.
- (3)
- Prevention of partition of Albania by Greece and
Yugoslavia.
- (4)
- Encouragement of rapprochement between
Belgrade and Athens.
- (5)
- Encouragement of rapprochement between
Belgrade and Rome.
- (6)
- Denial to the Soviets of military rights and bases in Albania
in time of peace which would facilitate the conduct of possible
future Soviet military operations.
Suggested Present Action to Obtain Foregoing
Objectives
- (1)
- Utilization of US, UK and French influence in Athens to
prevent the Greek Army from entering Albania (except in case of
a direct military aggression from Albania).
- (2)
- Direction of present UN consideration of the Greek case toward
condemnation of, and mobilization of world opinion against, the
present Albanian Government in order to weaken its international
position, without however going so far as to support direct
enforcement action under UN auspices.
- (3)
-
Utilization of US, UK and French influence, at the proper
time, in Belgrade to prevent Yugoslav military intervention
in Albania.
On a recent occasion Tito informed Ambassador Cannon that it
was vital to Yugoslavia that Albanian independence be
respected, and that Yugoslavia’s chief concern was the
danger of action on the part of Greece. Cannon replied that
we had given the Greeks strong advice to stay out and that
the US had always stood for the independence of
Albania.2
The US Embassy in Belgrade need not at the present time take
any further initiative in discussing the Albanian situation
with the Yugoslav authorities. If the latter should again
approach US officials on the subject, the reply should be
that the US naturally shares Yugoslavia’s distaste for the
present Hoxha regime, but believes that whatever regime
replaces it should be freely determined by the Albanian
people themselves and not be under the domination of any
foreign power. US officials might indicate that they
understand Yugoslavia’s
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basic interest in the future of
Albania but would take a serious view of any direct Yugoslav
intervention in Albania. They might state that Albanian
political refugees throughout the world, in Yugoslavia as
well as in Western countries, naturally have an interest in
any government which will supplant the Hoxha regime and that
the US believes that these refugees should play an important
role in determining the future of Albania. This would of
course mean that any Albanian group in Yugoslavia, should
they so desire, would be quite free to cooperate with the
recently formed Free Albanian Committee or any other group
of Albanians organized to support the cause of Albanian
independence.
Yugoslav authorities, however, should be given clearly to
understand that the US would be forced to re-examine its
present policy toward the Belgrade Government should that
Government provoke, or be mainly instrumental in
participating in, a situation in Albania which might involve
grave risks of a general conflict in Southeast Europe.
- (4)
- The US and UK Governments should maintain continuing contact
with a view to controlling any action on the part of Albanian
groups, particularly the Albanian National Committee, presently
planning action looking forward to the overthrow of the Hoxha
regime, and to having that Committee be as representative as
possible.
- (5)
- Maintenance, on appropriate occasions, of our present position
in favor of respect for existing frontiers in the Balkans. With
respect to the Greek claim to Northern Epirus, we would of
course be willing, as we have indicated in the past, to have
this claim considered by an appropriate international body at
some later time. We should not permit this issue to interfere
with the more important immediate objective of ending the
guerrilla menace and establishing more normal relations between
the two countries.
