875.00/6–2849
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director, Office of European Affairs (Thompson)
| Participants: | Guy Menant, French Minister to Panama |
| Armand Bérard, Counselor, French Embassy | |
| Llewellyn E. Thompson, EUR | |
| Tom Betts | |
| Mr. McCarger |
M. Menant who is in this country for a few days en route to his new post in Panama came in at our request in order to give us a first hand account of his impression of the situation in Albania where he has until recently served as French Minister.
M. Menant began by saying that while he would not assume to criticize our decision not to maintain our mission in Albania, he felt it had been most unfortunate that we had not been represented there particularly during the past year. He stressed the importance of Albania both from a strategic and from a political point of view. He said that the Albanian people looked to the United States more than to any other country and said that despite the efforts of the present regime, the Albanian people were very friendly disposed toward the West and toward the US in particular. In his opinion Albania was not capable of an independent existence without the strong support and virtual management of an outside power. He pointed out that this had always been the case in the past. He said the Albanians had strongly resented Yugoslav management of their affairs because of the callous and brutal way in which it had been carried out. Although ignorant and unskilled, the Albanians are a proud people and the Yugoslavs have been very intolerant of their sensibilities. He felt that the brutal way in which the Albanians had supported the Cominform against Tito was a reflection of this feeling and it was even possible that they had acted without waiting for any directive from Moscow.
The Minister described the present situation by saying that the Albanians had jumped from the frying pan into the fire and that the internal situation was now disastrous. People were suffering bitterly from the lack of supplies of all kinds. The regime had never been genuinely popular and now the opposition to it included almost every [Page 306] one not immediately involved in the regime. He said the regime was maintained chiefly by the secret police who were well cared for personally, at least on a relative basis, and therefore willing to support the regime. The loyalty of the army was more in question but was strictly controlled both by the police and the Russians. When he had first arrived in Albania the army was in a most dilapidated condition, many of the soldiers not having uniforms and sometimes not even shoes. The Russians had given them supplies and they were now led by Russian officers and presented a good appearance.
Although the Minister felt that the United States had a most important role to play he warned that we should be extremely cautious as the situation was both delicate and complex. He thought the government might like to reestablish diplomatic relations with us in the hope of obtaining supplies but said he assumed we would not consider such a step this time.
I said that although there were some indications that the Albanians were thinking along these lines, we felt we could not consider such a matter at this time because of the Greek situation, apart from any other reasons. I inquired what the reaction of the Albanian people would be to the reestablishment of relations. Would they interpret this as meaning that we were supporting the present regime and that they would have no hope of ridding themselves of it.
The Minister replied that the Albanian people would be overjoyed and while he agreed that the Greek situation would prevent such a step now, he felt that if this were out of the way it would still be important that we attach conditions to recognition which would enable us to make clear to the Albanian people that it was the regime which had backed down and not the United States.
The Minister observed that he had not been allowed to travel recently in Albania and had even been refused permission to lay a wreath at the French military cemetery not far from Tirana. He said the reason for this was the assistance to the Greek guerrillas which he had observed on his earlier trips. He said he was continually under surveillance as were all members of the Albanian Government. It had never been possible for him to talk to a member of the government alone. While he thought it would never be possible for the West to do business with Hoxha, he thought that the Vice-President would eventually succeed him and was a man who had not been compromised to an extent which would make it impossible for us to do business with him. With reference to Hoxha he referred to the number of people who had been accused and convicted of acting as our agents and the many other false charges brought against us.
When I inquired what his impressions were of the real feeling of the Albanian people toward the Yugoslavs and Greeks, the Minister replied that this varied in the different parts of the country. He [Page 307] thought that a great many of the people would welcome a division of Albania between Greece and Yugoslavia since they realized the country could not stand on its own feet and anything would be better than the present situation. He said that most of the people were fiercely individualistic and were invariably opposed to the government. He mentioned one tribal leader who had about 5,000 followers whom the regime kept in line partly by a daily ration of a gallon of alcohol. In reply to a question he said that most of the tribesmen had arms.
I referred to a report that considerable numbers of Albanians had crossed the frontier to Yugoslavia for asylum and particularly a report that virtually a whole village had gone over. The Minister thought this unlikely since the government had created a no-man’s land along the frontier which was very difficult to cross.
On the Greek question the Minister said he thought it would be fatal if the Communists were ever allowed to be legally reestablished in Greece. The Communists had stronger leadership and discipline and would exploit the weakness of the average Greek politician and quickly get control of the government.
On the question of Yugoslavia he thought it very possible that Tito1 and Stalin would eventually work out a deal, and he gave some credence to the possibility that the rift was a put-up job. I pointed out that the amount of dirty linen that had been washed in public over this affair seemed to me to be strong evidence to the contrary. He agreed with this but thought that in any event some form of reconciliation was possible and stressed that Tito remained a staunch Marxist.
- Marshal Tito (Josip Broz), Yugoslav Prime Minister and Minister of Defense; Secretary General of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.↩