Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume V

740.00119 Council/11–749

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Secretary of State ¹

top secret

[Washington,] November 7, 1949.

There are attached a copy of the summary record of the meeting of the Ambassadors in Paris² and of the conclusions of the London meeting of the Ambassadors from the Satellite countries³ of which a brief summary by topics follows:

[Here follows Section I, European Integration.]

II. The Yugoslav-USSR Controversy. The Paris and London conferees both unanimously agreed that Tito’s defection represents a challenge to Moscow’s control of the world Communist movement, and that it should be an essential element of U.S. policy to keep Tito afloat. It was emphasized, however, at both conferences that we should avoid conveying the impression in any way that the present Tito regime is a democracy in our sense of the word. It was the consensus of the London conference that there is no indication that the Soviet Union will engage in an open attack against Yugoslavia and that a more probable line of Soviet action would be one of subversion, economic pressure, and attempts to disrupt Yugoslavia from within. It was agreed at both meetings that in such an event the West should be prepared if and when Tito requested it to replenish his military stocks. The conferees believed that, barring unforeseen developments, the most critical period that Tito faces is the next 6 to 8 months during which the economic situation in Yugoslavia would seriously deteriorate unless adequate economic assistance is received from the West. In discussing the question of whether the Titoist movement would spread to the other satellites, the London conferees in general agreed that at present there is no prospect of a successful attempt by another satellite to emulate Tito’s action, but that the encouragement of the Tito type of “heresy” in the other satellites should be one of our principal objectives in the cold war.

III. East-West Trade. It was generally agreed at the Paris meeting that present U.S. policy on East-West trade should be reviewed to determine if it would be feasible to obtain greater effectiveness and it was the consensus that action must be concerted multilaterally, with the U.S. participating, if the most effective results are to be obtained. Mr. Harriman pointed out, however, that while controls and restrictions on the export of strategic items and materials to the Soviet area was of utmost importance, we can not afford to stop all trade between the Western world and the Soviet world since this would prevent Western European recovery. This conclusion was endorsed by the meeting of the Ambassadors from the satellite countries in London. The London conferees agreed that the restrictions on East-West trade have contributed to a reduction in industrial output or have prevented the expansion of industrial production in the Soviet orbit and have further had the effect of forcing the satellites to call upon the Soviet Union to supply them, which it has on the whole been unable to do, thus increasing the economic strain between the USSR and the satellites.

The London conferees were of the opinion that the fullest exploitation of economic controls should be pushed now and that the U.S. should make a study of the overall problem of East-West trade giving consideration to the need for western Europe to obtain alternative sources of supply for its raw material needs. The development of such alternative sources would not only greatly reduce the dependence of the West on the Soviet controlled area but also might bring about a situation in which the East would become dependent on the West for supplies.

IV. U.S. Policies Toward the Soviet Satellite States. The London Conference agreed with the conclusions of a Departmental paper concerning our policies toward the Soviet satellite states which are:

1. That we should aim at the gradual reduction and eventual elimination of preponderant Soviet power from Eastern Europe without resort to war.

2. That we should seek to achieve this through fostering Communist heresy and encouraging the emergence of non-Stalinist, even though Communist, regimes as temporary administrations.

3. That we should aim at the eventual replacement of these regimes by non-totalitarian Governments.

4. That we should seek to bring about a retraction of Soviet military forces behind the borders of the USSR, foster increasing isolation of the confirmed Stalinist from the nationalist elements of the Communist party and from popular support in the satellite states, attack the dogma of satellite subservience to the USSR, encourage nationalism, and bring fully to bear the economic forces which we control or influence.

V. U.S. Informational and Propaganda Efforts in Eastern Europe. It was the strong and unanimous opinion of the London conferees that in the satellite countries the Voice of America is the most effective means of reaching the people and hence represents in that area one of our best available weapons in the cold war.

VI. Announcement of Soviet Atomic Bomb Explosion. The Paris conferees all agreed that the Soviet atomic explosion has made no appreciable impression in their countries and Ambassador Kirk stated that the Soviet people also seemed largely unmoved and prepared to accept the Soviet Government’s explanation that it has possessed the atomic secret since 1947.⁴

[

George W. Perkins

]

1. A note attached to the source text indicates that the original of this memorandum and its attachments were left with President Truman by Under Secretary of State Webb on November 10. At his meeting with President Truman on October 31, Under Secretary Webb informed the President that excellent results had been realized from the recent meetings of Ambassadors in London and Paris and that the President would shortly receive a full report. The President appeared to be very pleased at the outcome of the meetings (Memorandum by the Under Secretary of a meeting with the President, October 31; Secretary’s Memoranda, Lot 53 D 444). In a brief memorandum of his meeting with the President on November 10, not printed, Under Secretary Webb observed that the President had taken the materials on the meetings of Ambassadors at London and Paris and said he would read it with great interest (Secretary’s Memoranda, Lot 53 D 444).
2. A meeting of principal United States Ambassadors in Europe was held in Paris, October 21–22, 1949. The discussions centered on German problems; questions of Western European cooperation in the military, political, and economic fields; and an appraisal of progress and setbacks in the cold war including such issues as the Yugoslav-Cominform controversy and East-West trade. For summary record of the meeting, under reference, and related materials, see vol. iv, pp. 472 ff.
3. Ante, p. 28.
4. On September 23 President Truman announced that the United States had detected a Soviet atomic explosion. A statement by the Soviet news agency Tass a few days later indirectly confirmed the event. For documentation on this event, see vol. i, pp. 419 ff.