Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume V

Moscow Embassy Files: 1949 Top Secret File

Conclusions and Recommendations of the London Conference of October 24–26 of United States Chiefs of Mission to the Satellite States¹

top secret

[London, undated.]

Participants²

• Assistant Secretary of State Perkins
• Assistant Secretary of State Allen
• Ambassador Briggs (Czechoslovakia)
• Ambassador Cannon (Belgrade)
• Ambassador Douglas (London)
• Ambassador Gallman (Warsaw)
• Ambassador Jacobs (Czechoslovakia)
• Ambassador Kirk (Moscow)
• Minister Davis (Budapest)
• Minister Heath (Sofia)
• Minister Schoenfeld (Bucharest)
• Minister Bohlen (Paris)
• Mr. Cochran (Budapest)
• Mr. Joyce (State Department)
• Mr. MacArthur (State Department)

Contents

I. Titoism and its Possible Effects in the Soviet Satellite States

II. East-West Trade

III. U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe

IV. U.S. Informational and Propaganda Efforts in Eastern Europe with Particular Reference to the Voice of America

V. Discussion of Whether U.S. and U.N. Relief Agencies Should Continue Their Work in the Soviet Satellite States

VI. Need for National Policy and Agreed Procedures to Deal With Defection From the Soviet World

I. Titoism and its Possible Effects in the Soviet Satellite States

The London satellite conference endorsed unanimously the views of the Paris meeting that Tito’s defection has created a schism within the communist world which should be exploited, and represents a fundamental challenge to Moscow’s control of the world communist movement.³ There was agreement that by raising the basic issue of nationalism, Tito has also challenged the Kremlin’s control and discipline within the world communist apparatus, the instrument of Russian expansionism, and hence his defection has set back the Soviet Union’s initiative against the West. The London group also agreed that an essential element of U.S. policy should be to keep Tito afloat as the inspiration of these dividing forces within the communist world. In the public presentation of such aid as may be given Tito by the West, it was agreed that care must be exercised to avoid the impression that the present Tito regime is in any way a democracy in our sense of the word. On the contrary, we should not endeavor to conceal the fact that the present Tito regime is a communist dictatorship but should take the line that such aid as is given Tito is to prevent the domination and enslavement of the Yugoslav people by the Kremlin, thus, by inference at least, preserving for the Yugoslav people the right, ultimately, to determine their own destiny. In any event, in present day Yugoslavia there was no “third force” which would be capable of taking over and establishing a moderate middle-of-the-road regime between the two extremes of Stalinist and Titoist communism. The choice in Yugoslavia today is between a puppet regime controlled by Moscow and a nationalist communist regime controlled by the Yugoslav Communist Party. A native communist regime such as the one now existing in Yugoslavia imposes hardships and suffering upon the Yugoslav people but should such a regime be supplanted by one controlled by the Kremlin the Yugoslav people would be worse off than they are now.

While the meeting was in agreement that Stalin must make every effort to eliminate Tito, since Stalin’s personal prestige as well as the basis of international communism is at stake, the consensus of opinion was that there were no indications at this time that the Soviet Union would engage in an open attack against Yugoslavia, although the possibility of such action in the future was not excluded. It was believed that a more probable line of Soviet action would be one of subversion, economic pressures, and attempts to disrupt Yugoslavia from within possibly through the use of militant agents and guerillas, and perhaps through an attempt to assassinate Tito. In connection with the latter, Ambassador Cannon felt that the disappearance of Tito would pose a very serious problem in terms of Yugoslav efforts to avoid Soviet domination, particularly since a struggle for power among his principal lieutenants might ensue which would result in the dissipation of any cohesive resistance to the U.S.S.R.

The question of whether the Titoist movement would spread to other satellites was also discussed and there was general agreement that because of geographic and other factors, including the presence of the Red Army and the lack of any organized opposition, there was no prospect at this juncture of a successful attempt to emulate Tito’s action. Despite this, it was agreed that the success of the Tito movement had created a dividing influence within the neighboring satellites which should be exploited by the Voice of America and any other information media at our disposal, stressing particularly on the one hand independence from Kremlin domination that Yugoslavia has attained, and, on the other, the exploitation of the satellite countries by the Soviet Union.

It was agreed that the principal danger to the security of the United States was the Kremlin’s control of the world communist movement as the chosen instrument for Russian expansionism. The military discipline which Moscow is endeavoring to impose on communist parties throughout the world means that such parties operate as Soviet fifth columns which accept unhesitatingly and without question orders emanating from the Kremlin. Any and all movements within world communism which tend to weaken and disrupt the Kremlin’s control within the communist world represent forces which are operating in the interests of the West and therefore should be encouraged and assisted.

It was also agreed that, barring unforeseen developments, the most critical period that Tito faces is the next six to eight months, during which the economic situation in Yugoslavia will seriously deteriorate—with grave social and political consequences—unless economic aid is forthcoming from the West. It was therefore agreed that not only the United States but the other western democracies should all be encouraged to study at once what steps can be taken to keep Tito afloat. Such a study should include the supply to Tito of certain military stocks, should he request them, to enable him to continue his resistance should the Cominform resort to large scale guerilla operations to liquidate his regime. Such across-the-board assistance would also have the added advantage of making it more difficult for hostile propaganda to portray Tito solely as a U.S. stooge.

II. East-West Trade⁴

It was the general consensus of opinion of our Chiefs of Mission to the satellite states that the restrictions on east-west trade which have thus far been exercised have either contributed to a reduction of industrial output or have tended toward preventing the expansion of industrial production in the satellite countries. Another secondary but nonetheless very important contribution to the restrictions on exports to the Soviet Union and satellite states has been the fact that the satellite states, unable to obtain certain vital materials from the West, have called upon the Soviet Union to supply them. This has placed the U.S.S.R. in the position of having to refuse on the grounds of unavailability or of making promises which it does not keep. This causes an adverse reaction in the satellite states to the general effect that the Soviets are unable, or unwilling, to contribute to their economic well-being, and hence contributes to increased economic strain between Moscow and the satellites.

It was felt that fullest appropriate exploitation of economic controls should be pressed during the present period. Satellite economies are still suffering from war devastation, shortages, and forceful reorientations directed from Moscow. Their dependence on imported capital equipment and industrial raw materials is so great that, when related to communist promises to the people of economic benefits from communist rule, there is a broad field for effective action provided the countries of the West can concert. Also pertinent in regard to timing is the fact that western European governments may be more willing to cooperate at this time than they may be in the future when pressures to find markets for European production will have increased.

As for long-term policy, the meeting agreed as to the need for the U.S. to make an exhaustive study of the over-all problem, giving consideration to the necessity for west Europe to exchange its heavy industry products for raw materials somewhere; the possibility of positive action by west to develop alternate sources of supply of items, such as food, timber, etc., essential to Europe and now obtained from the east; and other basic elements. If the cold war is protracted, west Europe should endeavor to reach a condition where it is not dependent on the east for certain vital imports but in fact the east becomes increasingly dependent on the west. In other words, development of alternate sources of supply will strengthen the security of the west since it will make the west less vulnerable should the Soviet Union suddenly embargo shipments to the western European democracies. At the same time, development of such alternate supply sources will also increase the economic bargaining position of the west versus the east and will tend to relieve some of the present pressure to ship items or materials of strategic importance to the Soviet orbit.

The point made and generally agreed to was that it would not only be probably impossible of attainment but also undesirable to endeavor to cut off trade between the East and the West in Europe. Nevertheless, our policy and the policy of our friends in western Europe should be directed in such a manner that economic exchanges between the Soviet orbit and the West should result in a net advantage to the West. In other words, certain advantages would accrue to both sides, but our policy and controls should constantly be directed to ensure that the net relative advantage in the long run should reside in the West.⁵

III. U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Satellite States in Eastern Europe

The S/P top secret paper of August 29, 1949,⁶ regarding U.S. policy toward the Soviet-satellite states in Eastern Europe was discussed at length by the group which unanimously endorsed the conclusions in the August 29, 1949, paper. These conclusions were:

“Our overall aim with respect to the satellite states should be the gradual reduction and eventual elimination of preponderant Soviet power from Eastern Europe without resort to war.

“We should, as the only practical immediate expedient, seek to achieve this objective through fostering Communist heresy among the satellite states, encouraging the emergence of non-Stalinist regimes as temporary administrations, even though they be Communist in nature.

“It must, however, be our fixed aim that eventually these regimes must be replaced by non-totalitarian governments desirous of participating with good faith in the free world community.

“More specifically, bearing in mind all of the qualifications set forth in the analysis of this paper, we should:

a. seek to bring about a retraction of Soviet military forces behind the borders of the U.S.S.R.;

b. endeavor to cause an increasing isolation of the confirmed Stalinists from the nationalist elements of the party and from popular support in the satellite states toward the end that their power be reduced;

c. attack the Stalinist dogma of satellite subservience to the U.S.S.R. and encourage nationalism;

d. bring fully to bear on the Soviet-satellite relationship the economic forces which we control or influence.”

It was the consensus of opinion of our chiefs of mission from the satellite countries that the execution of the tactical plans to implement the above conclusions was of the greatest importance. While it was fully recognized that the tactics in the different Eastern European satellite countries might differ, it was recommended that our plans should be worked out carefully both by the Department and by the individual missions in the field with the maximum practicable coordination. The mission chiefs agreed that at the present time economic pressures against the Soviet-satellite states, coupled with proper use of the Voice of America and possibly other informational media, were the most readily available weapons. It was also agreed that tactical planning and implementation of such plans as are developed is a matter of great urgency and should be receiving the immediate attention of the appropriate elements of the U.S. Government.

IV. U.S. Informational and Propaganda Efforts in Eastern Europe With Particular Reference to the Voice of America ( VOA)

It was the strong and unanimous opinion of the conferees that, in the satellite countries, the “Voice of America” at present is the most effective means of reaching the people and hence represents in that area one of our best available weapons in the cold war. It was pointed out that in police-state regimes such as those in the satellite area, information carried by the VOA, while not published, is nonetheless passed on from individual to individual by word of mouth and that the VOA has on occasion been successfully used to force the government to admit certain news items about which it would otherwise have remained silent.

In furtherance of our basic objective of loosening the hold of Soviet power on Eastern Europe, it was emphasized that the VOA should continue its efforts to encourage “heresy” of the Tito type within the satellite countries. In this connection it was urged that the twin themes of (1) the state of vassalage and (2) the total economic exploitation of the satellites by the Soviet Union be emphasized and contrasted, where appropriate, with the international liberty of action the Yugoslav communist state enjoys as a result of its independence of the Kremlin. In following such a line, however, it was emphasized that great care should be taken to avoid implying in any way that Tito’s Yugoslav state is a stooge of the western democracies.

It was also agreed that the closest liaison between the VOA and the individual missions was required to insure proper acccuracy, timing and method of presentation of material.

The group felt that great caution should be exercised in using prominent political exiles or refugees in VOA broadcasts, since many of them have not only lost all touch with current opinion within their country but may, in addition, be completely discredited.

It was also agreed that in addition to the foregoing considerations it was of utmost importance for the VOA:

1. to establish a reputation for reliability and accuracy of factual reporting;

2. to be most careful in its choice of material and, where possible, to broadcast more information about events within the satellite countries;

3. to differentiate in broadcasts between the people and the Stalinist regimes which govern them, being careful, however, to avoid excessive criticism of internal events and too fervent and high flown moral eulogies on the boons and benefits of democracy.

V. Discussion of Whether U.S. and U.N. Relief Agencies Should Continue Their Work in the Soviet Satellite States

The London meeting of U.S. Chiefs of Mission in the Soviet satellite countries discussed the question of whether the continuation of the work of the U.S. and U.N. relief agencies in the Soviet satellite countries was in the interest of the United States. After considerable discussion the general conclusion was reached that this question was not one to which a general answer covering all the satellite countries could be given. On the contrary, there was agreement that the matter must be examined on a country basis with particular reference to the relief agency involved, weighing very carefully the possible propaganda advantages derived from humanitarian activities as against the possible bolstering of the economy of the satellites resulting from such activity. (For example, enabling the satellites to obtain additional dollar exchange which would otherwise be unavailable.)

In conclusion, it was agreed that this particular problem was not one of great urgency since some of those relief agencies, such as UNICEF, which are still operating will probably cease functioning as of June 30, 1950 because of lack of appropriations. It was also agreed that while no general policy covering the area as a whole should be adopted at this time, it should be recommended that the Department consult the individual missions whenever a case in point arises.

1. This report appears to have been prepared on October 26 by those conference participants who remained in London following the four substantive conference sessions on October 24 and 25. It was submitted to the Secretary of State on November 7 and to President Truman on November 10 under cover of a memorandum by Assistant Secretary of State Perkins of November 7 (p. 36) summarizing the highlights of this conference and the meeting of Ambassadors in Paris, October 21–22. Conclusions and recommendations of the conference were also set forth in a number of telegrams transmitted by Assistant Secretary of State Perkins from the Embassy in London on October 25 and 26. Of these, telegram 4277 is printed on p. 35; telegram 4269, October 25 (on East-West trade), appears on p. 169; telegrams 4268, October 25 (on defectors), and 4278, October 26 (on Yugoslavia), are not printed. A copy of the minutes of the Conference, comprising 30 pages of typescript, is included in London Embassy Files, case 350 United States.

2. The minutes of this conference, cited in the previous footnote, indicate that Ambassador Harriman and Colonel Bonesteel attended the portion of the conference devoted to East-West trade problems; Francis Deak, Economic Officer and Attaché” at the Legation in Switzerland (also assigned to eleven other European posts including London), and Ernest A. Lister, Attaché at the Embassy in the United Kingdom, attended the portion of the conference dealing with civil aviation matters. Other officers attending the conference were: Mallory Browne, Counselor of Embassy in London, John H. Bruins, First Secretary in London, William B. Hussey, Attaché in London (and assigned to 29 other posts in Europe and Africa), James C. Sappington, 3rd, First Secretary in London, and Oliver M. Marcy, Second Secretary of the Embassy in Warsaw.

   Most of the participants listed below have previously been identified in these pages. Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs George V. Allen was named by President Truman on October 27 to succeed Cavendish W. Cannon as Ambassador to Yugoslavia. Ambassador-Designate Ellis O. Briggs was en route to Praha to succeed Joseph E. Jacobs as Ambassador to Czechoslovakia. Minister-Designate Nathaniel P. Davis was en route to Budapest where Counselor of Legation William P. Cochran, Jr. had served as Chargé since February 1949.

3. The “views of the Paris meeting” under reference here were those set forth in telegram 4424, October 22, from Paris, p. 973. In his telegram 4278, October 26, from London, not printed, Assistant Secretary Perkins reported that the London Conference fully subscribed to the conclusions set forth in telegram 4424 from Paris (860H.00/10–2649).
4. For additional documentation regarding the policy of the United States with respect to trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, see pp. 61 ff.
5. According to the minutes of this conference (identified in footnote 1), the conferees engaged in an inconclusive discussion of civil aviation operations in Eastern Europe. Particular attention was devoted to the efforts of the British to extend their air service to Eastern European countries and their disinclination to preclude Eastern European civil aircraft from operating in Western European countries. For additional documentation regarding United States civil aviation policy in Eastern Europe, see pp. 184 ff.
6. The reference here is to document P.P.S. 59, August 25, p. 21, subsequently circulated as UM D–56, August 29.