711.4027/10–449: Circular telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices 1
NSC 15/1 (US Civil Aviation Policy Toward Sov and its Satellites) has been modified by addition new para 2(i) under Recommendations as fol: “In view of the breach between Tito and the Kremlin and evidence at hand that Sov control of Yugo civil air operations has been eliminated, Yugo shld be exempted from the above restrictions so long as the present breach is maintained.”
In view US and UK sponsorship present joint policy (Depcirins Jan 5, 19492) Dept has informed Brit of revised US civil air policy toward Yugo as first step in informing non-curtain “common front” countries of modification previous policy. US and UK have reached agreement concerning air transport aspects new policy and are close to accord concerning manner in which exports civil aircraft and associated equipment shld henceforth be controlled under modified policy. However, since several mechanical details concerning procedures for controlling such exports on common front basis still remain to be clarified, third countries shld not be informed concerning export aspects modified Yugo policy until further instrs recd. Meantime, for info addressee missions only, under new policy all exports, including exports of aircraft and associated aviation equipment to Yugo will now be subj previously relaxed US gen export policy toward Yugo approved by NSC in Feb (NSC 18/23). Latter policy provides that 1–A items, including munitions and aviation equipment, may be licensed for export to Yugo when such licensing serves US natl interests.4
Missions receiving this cirtel for action shld inform govts to [Page 218] which accredited of revised US policy re civil air transport relations with Yugo. Brit FonOff is transmitting parallel instrs simultaneously. US and UK have agreed US and Brit Chiefs of Mission shld consult immed upon receipt of respective instrs re best procedure in approaching third govts. US views follow:
“US believes that as long as relations Yugo and USSR family remain in present state of breach, and as long as no apparent Sov influence Yugo civil aviation, any non-curtain state that believes polit and econ advantages outweigh on balance similar disadvantages inherent therein which might result from exchange civil air rights with Yugo may appropriately exchange civil air rights with Yugo provided however that any such exchange be subj immed termination and that while Yugo air services may be permitted operate to non-curtain states without immed reciprocity such exchange shld clearly provide for full reciprocity. In this connection ‘without immed reciprocity’ means exchange of rights shld include exchange reciprocal rights but non-curtain state need not actually operate to Yugo at the time Yugo commences operations to non-curtain state. Furthermore, US believes any non-curtain state entering air transport arrangement with Yugo shld do so through an exchange of notes and avoid signing usual form of bilateral air transport agreement.
US itself at present time perceives no danger US interest dealing with Yugo on such basis and proposes to implement this new position on ad hoc basis as circumstances may indicate.
However US fully appreciates that certain countries will have own reasons not entering such agreements Yugo which may outweigh aspects of gain from pursuing relaxed policy in certain cases and affirms US position as not favoring exchange rights Yugo by any particular country unless balance all aspects exchanged indicate beneficial result to friendly state concerned.”
While Dept believes all addressee missions “Western Europe” receiving these instrs shld immed apprise countries to which accredited in collaboration with Brit colleagues of revised US policy as indicated above quoted paras, Dept recognizes Near and Middle East missions eonf routed with somewhat different situation. While in Depts opinion Govts Greece and Turkey shld be notified of new policy Embs Athens and Ankara authorized withhold notification if in opinion these missions such notification inappropriate. In such event missions requested inform Dept their reasons therefor. Similarly, while Dept inclined believe Near and Middle East missions receiving these instrs for info need not at present time inform countries to which accredited of revised policy if in opinion any of these missions revised policy shld be transmitted Dept wishes to be so advised with reasons therefor.
- This telegram was sent for action to the missions in Ankara, Athens, Brussels, Copenhagen, The Hague, Lisbon, Oslo, Paris, Rome, Stockholm, and Bern. The message was also repeated for information to 57 other missions around the world.↩
- See editorial note, p. 184.↩
- Not printed; see editorial note, p. 868.↩
- In a circular telegram of October 14, 5 p. m., sent for action to 12 missions and repeated for information to 56 other missions, not printed, the Department of State defined the revised American aircraft export policy toward Yugoslavia. The United States considered itself free to export to Yugoslavia civil aircraft and associated equipment to the extent necessary for the operation of approved airline services at approximately the current level of usage and to allow for the reasonable development of civil aviation communications. The Department assumed that other countries, which had been approached regarding American civil aviation policy toward Yugoslavia would feel free to follow a similar liberalized policy. In order to avoid the indiscriminate licensing of aviation equipment to Yugoslavia, it was requested that each country impose quantitative and qualitative restrictions to the end that aircraft equipment received by Yugoslavia would not exceed the minimum necessary to carry out the aforementioned objectives (711.4027/10–1449).↩