501.BB/9–749
Memorandum by the Ambassador at Large ( Jessup ) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State ( Rusk )
The plan of the Chinese National Government to bring before the General Assembly their case against the Soviet Union at present takes a form which the Department cannot support. The Chinese propose to raise the breach of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 and further to ask the General Assembly to adopt resolutions against recognition of the Chinese Communists and in favor of further aid to the National Government.
On the practical side, it is very unlikely that the necessary majority in the General Assembly would vote for the latter two Chinese proposals. On the political side, the United States should not become involved in this type of support for the National Government. The question is whether any modification of the Chinese submission would be advantageous. The Department is generally committed to supporting the Chinese submission of their problem subject to the major reservation that we have refused to commit ourselves in advance on detailed proposals until we know the exact nature and strength of the Chinese case.
It is believed that, if the Chinese case is developed along the following lines, there would be definite advantages outweighing the disadvantages:
- 1.
- The Chinese should be persuaded to make as their initial submission to the General Assembly the question of Soviet violations of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945 and accompanying agreements and understandings. The focus should definitely be on Manchuria. The Chinese might state in the presentation of their case that they believed that these violations by the Soviet Union justified them in denouncing the Treaty. They would further state that they were however willing to have the legal question of the breach of the Treaty submitted to any judicial consideration agreeable to the Soviet Union, for instance to [Page 174] the Permanent Court or to a special committee of jurists. If the Russians refused to consent to any such submission, the Chinese might ask the Assembly to request the International Court for an advisory opinion. If the Chinese Government was eventually in a position to denounce the Treaty, the Chinese Communists would have to carry the onus of restoring special Russian rights in Manchuria.
- 2.
- After the submission of the Chinese case, the United
States should be prepared to argue along the following
lines:
- a.
- The United States has always believed that any state is free to bring a matter of this kind before the General Assembly.
- b.
- Before considering the merits of the Chinese case, the United States feels that, in view of the disturbed conditions in China and other countries of the Far East, it would be appropriate for the General Assembly to adopt a resolution reaffirming the principle of the “Open Door”.1 We would submit a resolution which would utilize the concepts of the Nine Power Washington Treaty of 1922 including the principle that states should not take advantage of disturbed internal conditions to impair the territorial integrity of China or other countries. Appropriate reference to Korea could be included. The implications for Southeast Asia should be made clear. The resolution should be carefully drafted to include condemnation of any kind of special arrangements such as the Russians are making with, local regimes in Manchuria, Sinkiang, and Inner Mongolia. If the Russians agreed to such a resolution, it would still be advantageous to have it adopted. If it were adopted over Soviet opposition, our general position would be strengthened. The focus should be kept constantly upon the Russian attempt to split Manchuria from China.
- c.
- It may be assumed that the Soviets would counter by attacking alleged United States intervention in Chinese internal affairs and alleged United States designs upon Formosa. The first of such charges should be answered on the basis of the traditional right to assist a government at its request to put down local revolt. Presumably this line would appeal to the Latin Americans and to the states of Southeast Asia. In regard to Formosa, we should explore with Tsiang, the Chinese Representative at the United Nations, the possibility that the Chinese at this point would propose that the UN send a commission to Formosa to safeguard its integrity and ultimate disposition. They would point out that, while they maintain their claim to Formosa which was recognized by the Cairo Declaration,2 they acknowledge its exact legal status rests upon the conclusion of the peace treaty with Japan. If the Chinese made such a proposal, the United States would support it strongly in order to disprove the allegation that we were seeking to take over Formosa for ourselves. We might advantageously suggest that the Soviet Union should be a member of the UN Commission for Formosa. The Soviet Union, if it followed the precedent of the Balkan Commission and the Korean [Page 175] Commission, would decline to take its seat. The presence of a UN commission in Formosa might have a stabilizing effect and deter a Communist takeover. It seems doubtful Whether the Generalissimo would agree to any such plan, but this doubt would not prevent the discussion of the matter with Tsiang.
It is recognized that the introduction of this item on the General Assembly agenda would lead to considerable Russian “mud slinging.” The China White Paper would undoubtedly be used in extenso. It is suggested that the United States position should avoid recriminations, should stand on our right (which is mentioned in the White Paper) to support the recognized Government, on the Russian pledge in 1945 that they would do the same, and on our offer to join with all other members of the United Nations in a new pledge to respect the administrative and territorial integrity of China.
A final point may be mentioned. If the Department definitely discourages the Chinese from putting this item on the agenda, we will be subject to new attacks from the supporters of the National Government in Congress and throughout the country. If the United States supports the kind of “Open Door” declaration which is here recommended, this would help in our general problem of meeting the Chinese situation in terms of domestic opinion.
- For the Open Door “Notes” of 1899, see Foreign Relations, 1899, pp. 128–143.↩
- For White House release on December 1, 1943, of Cairo communiqué, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, p. 448.↩