501.BB/9–649: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
1060. Hickerson from Ross. I called on Tsiang, Cadogan, McNaughton and Chauvel this afternoon in that order (reDeptels 453 and 454, September 2) and discussed proposed China GA item on basis reftels, as follows:
Tsiang. I read Deptel 453 to Tsiang with minor appropriate variations. With regard to last two sentences of numbered paragraph 3, I mentioned possibility of recommendation that members refrain from aiding Communists as in Greek case, indicating, however, that this was one idea which had occurred to Department and I was not at all sure Department would necessarily consider this as advisable. I then added in personal way that it would seem essential to prove there has been recent substantial Soviet aid and that there might, of course, be some question whether this could be proved.
Tsiang then commented as follows: He first repeated what he has told us before about importance of this question, describing it as biggest event since Japanese surrender and observing that GA and [of?] UN, which was supposed to have something to do with peace and security, could not close its eyes to this event. He then went on that Chinese Government has resisted bringing this case to UN on ground, first, that countries which wanted to help China would do so and those which did not want to help China would not do so regardless of any UN action. Furthermore, in the nature of the case proof was not complete; positive, absolute proof was impossible.
His Government had asked his advice (he implied very recently) about bringing case to UN. He had refrained from indicating any personal opinion as to whether case should or should not be brought. He advised, however, that if it were decided to bring case to UN it should be brought to GA and not to SC. Second, he advised that before any final decisions were reached he should consult influential members of UN. He went on to say that he had not heard anything from anyone except US before this morning when Cadogan told him that it was most likely that UK would go along with objective number 1 [Page 170] but could not make any promises with regard to objectives number 2 and 3 (Cadogan later confirmed this). Meanwhile, Tsiang said, Chinese cabinet had decided last week that they should go ahead and put case on GA agenda.
This last bit of information indicates considerably more fluidity in Chinese position than seemed to be the case. Tsiang previously definitely stated to us as well as to Cadogan, Chauvel and McNaughton that he had been instructed by his Government to propose case for GA agenda and he left strong impression with all of us that there was no question about it.
Tsiang then shifted his ground substantially with regard to 3 objectives (Cadogan indicated later Tsiang had taken same line with him). Tsiang said he was afraid he had not made clear what he had in mind with regard to second objective concerning nonrecognition of Communists. He said he had this in mind as an indirect objective which he had not intended to present formally. By indirect objective, he went on, he meant that if Assembly accepted recommendation of moral and material aid to Nationalist Government it would follow more or less automatically and logically that member governments would withhold recognition from Communists. Tsiang added in this context that he liked idea of Assembly recommending that members refrain from aiding Communists.
This was very definite shift in Tsiang’s emphasis on their objectives which he originally put up to me exactly as I reported in mytel 1001, August 26. Only explanation of this shift which occurs to me is that Tsiang on reflection, or possibly on basis of attitude reflected by Cadogan, Chauvel and McNaughton, reached conclusion his chances with objective number 2 were very slight while he might have a better chance with objective number 3.
Tsiang then went on to long general discourse about affairs in China and his role, summarized as follows for what it may be worth to Department: He said he had carefully read White Paper and he felt people working on problem of China in State Department underestimated contribution which Generalissimo might make and his influence, and they overestimated influence of liberals. He said it was very clear that Chinese people should have a “new deal”. He said we should not lose sight of pre-war accomplishments of Nationalist Government, referring in this connection to cotton (with help of American and Chinese scientists China had become self-sufficient by 1937); rice (Nationalist Government against great odds had achieved 12 percent increase in productivity); irrigation (in northwest of China); health (no epidemic during Japanese occupation and civil war). He then somewhat inconsistently talked about role of liberals and their importance. He said that great moral weakness of Kuomintang was that [Page 171] the early ministers were very young people who had grown up in office without providing any opportunity for younger people to achieve office and positions of responsibility. He said the Kuomintang revolutionaries in late twenties had tended to constitute an exclusive club which had lost touch with the people. There was very great need for fresh blood and younger people in government and some way must be found to bring about cooperation between liberals and Generalissimo. He said there were large numbers of younger people in China who had been out of office and who were very independent-minded and could form the nucleus of a coalition government in which liberals might hold majority or plurality. Drawing on his own experience, Tsiang spoke at some length of having recruited a lot of these people to assist him when he was director of 650 million dollar UNRRA relief program in China.
I was rather impressed by Tsiang’s sincerity in the intellectual effort he is apparently making to try to find what he termed “a positive solution”. I felt, however, that he was not getting very far very fast. To the extent that he has any influence with the “liberals” in China he might be useful if given proper guidance.
I asked Tsiang if he had worked out any precise formulation of the item his Government was thinking of presenting. He dictated the following: “The question of Soviet violations of the Sino-Soviet treaty of friendship and alliance of 1945 and the resultant threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of China and the peace of the Far East”. I made no comment.
I told Tsiang that we had respected his confidence and shared his view that premature publicity would be disadvantageous. I told him that since he had mentioned discussing matter with Cadogan, Chauvel and McNaughton, I had discussed matter with them but that we have carefully refrained from discussing it with others. I added, however, that depending on circumstances and in particular whatever decision his Government finally reaches, assuming that his intention remains to defer action until opening of Assembly, we might feel it necessary to consult certain other delegations. I asked him if he had any plans in this regard himself. He mentioned India, saying that he understood Sir Benegal Rau1 might be here late this week. He said he had also been thinking of Australia. On one hand he did not want to offend Evatt2 by not taking him into his confidence. On other hand, he implied that he could not see much useful result from discussion with Australians.
[Page 172]As our interview concluded Tsiang remarked that he thought objectives which his Government would seek would be a finding of Soviet violations of treaty and recommendation that member governments refrain from aiding communists. This comment also indicated to me more fluidity in Chinese position than seemed apparent earlier; it also indicated that Tsiang has quite broad discretion.
In course of our conversation Tsiang said he had received this morning telegram from his Foreign Ministry indicating he would be head of Chinese delegation to GA and that following would be associated with him:
(1) Liu (Sze-hsun), representative on TC, formerly Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs and Ambassador to Canada; (2) Kan (Chieh-hou), adviser to Acting President Li and now in Washington; (3) Chen (Tien-fan), Chairman of Foreign Relations Committee of the Legislative Yuan; (4) Chang (Dr. P. C), representative on ECOSOC.
Cadogan. I read to Cadogan both reftels and gave him gist of my conversation with Tsiang. In addition to information indicated above I gathered that UK present view coincides very closely with ours as set forth in Deptel 454. In light of degree of fluidity in Chinese position indicated by my conversation with Tsiang, question of whether any effort should be made to dissuade Chinese came up. I ventured opinion that since Department feels decision properly one for Chinese Government to make it would seem to follow that we do not feel that any effort should be made to dissuade Tsiang from putting item on agenda. Cadogan said he felt this would be view his Government
I should appreciate it if Department would confirm whether my assumption with regard to last point is correct. In view of coolness reflected by Cadogan, Chauvel and McNaughton, I think there is better than even chance we could persuade those 3 Governments to join us in attempting to dissuade Tsiang from putting item on agenda. There is bare chance that if our 4 Governments were agreed to take parallel action in this regard on ground that Nationalist Government stood to lose more than it could gain, Tsiang might be persuaded to advise his Government against putting item on agenda. Such course would however, risk considerable embarrassment for us and would run counter to position Marshall took last fall that Chinese Government would have to make own decision.
Cadogan raised 2 points on which I said I would try to get further clarification. First, he was puzzled by our concern re possibility Soviets would request Chinese Communists be heard by UN. He thought precedents would not particularly support this since he did not recall case wherein GA had heard people in revolt against a duly constituted government. Second, Cadogan wondered what Department had in mind concerning usefulness of finding of Soviet violation as justification [Page 173] for Chinese unilateral abrogation of treaty. He did not quite see the bearing of one on the other and he wondered where Chinese unilateral abrogation of treaty would lead us.
McNaughton and Chauvel. I read reftel 453 and gave gist talk with Tsiang. Neither had new comment except that McNaughton also raised question of treaty abrogation. Both expect Tsiang will approach them again tomorrow. Neither has instructions. McNaughton will be evasive. Chauvel will be evasive and cool to whole idea. [Ross.]