501.BB/10–449: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
secret
priority
priority
New York, October 4, 1949—4:23 p. m.
Delga 54. I have received following views from delegation staff re your Gadel 24 and 25 of October 1 dealing with Soviet resolution.
- 1.
- Staff is inclined in the light of the present tactical situation to agree that our objective should be to defeat the Soviet resolution and to prevent its amendment by presenting, or having presented to the Assembly, a substitute resolution which could be adopted by an overwhelming [Page 95] vote but which would contain statements or principles so directly opposed to Soviet methods that Russians could not exploit it and presumably would have to vote against it.
- 2.
- As staff analyzes situation, in Assembly, we will be confronted with group of members desirous of passing vague, high-sounding resolution which can be accepted unanimously as in case of Mexican resolution last year. In this atmosphere Vyshinsky might be expected to put forward superficially attractive idea of mutual nonaggression pact among Big 5 powers foreshadowed by Daily Worker articles. He might propose that such a pact include a series of simple points such as: agreement not to join alliance directed against other signatories; agreement not to interfere with sovereignty of other powers through use of bases, troops on foreign soil, etc.; agreement not to use atomic bomb against other signatories; agreement to foster trade among signatories.
- 3.
- Should such a proposal be presented, it seems doubtful that resolution suggested by Department Gadel 25 will be sufficiently broadly-based or striking to serve as an adequate substitute. Staff would suggest that substitute resolution might appropriately stress steps directly related to attainment of peaceful relations among nations, and not be limited to reformulation of positions we have pushed through GA on a series of individual problems.
- 4.
- Proposed staff resolution which is now being drafted, will probably include reference to need for observance of charter principles, proposals of the type mentioned in Ambassador Jessup’s memo to Ambassador Austin on procedures for the maintenance of peace,1 and generalized standards of conduct which could be worked out so as to reflect by inference on Soviet conduct in various areas such as Yugoslavia. One of the points to be included might be a suggestion that peace can best be achieved if all powers will carry out GA recommendations such as those mentioned in Gadel 25.
- 5.
- Reaction to first consultations undertaken pursuant to Gadel 24 indicated that most delegations have not yet given serious thought to this question. However, Romulo and a few others appear to be leaning in direction of a resolution which could be passed unanimously, rather than along lines objective set forth in paragraph 1 above. Speeches on debate re position of Chinese item on Committee 1 agenda indicated some small delegations also leaning in that direction. Therefore, if objective listed in paragraph 1 is to be sought, staff believes it essential it be brought most promptly to attention broad group of delegates. If this is not done, there is danger of repetition 1947 warmongering situation.
- 6.
- My personal preference is that we should inform other delegations that our main objective is that the Assembly should denounce the fraud of the Soviet proposal and defeat it without amendment and, if possible without substitute. The staff is inclined to feel that it is probably not feasible under present circumstances to persuade the Assembly to follow this course. In order to move ahead with the consultations which we all agree must be undertaken immediately, would you agree to my talking privately to Romulo, Padilla Nervo and McNeil,2 exploring the prospects along these lines. If these talks confirm the opinion of the staff, we would then proceed immediately with broader consultations along the line of paragraph 1.
Austin