823.00/12–2049

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of North and West Coast Affairs (Mills) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Miller)

confidential

You inquired as to what we are doing or should do about trying to see that Haya de la Torre gets fair treatment from the Peruvian Government.1

Our early action in this case was based on the assumption that the Peruvian Government would live up to its international commitments including, we believe, one to respect the right of asylum and grant a safe conduct. All our information in the first two months after Haya entered the Colombian Embassy was to the effect that it was only a matter of time until the safe conduct would be granted. We therefore authorized in advance the issuance of a visitor’s visa (1/12/49) and authorized a consular officer to visit the Colombian Embassy to take [Page 773] Haya’s signatures and fingerprints, on the assumption that it would be impossible for him to visit the Consulate (1/17/49).

Following the decision of the Peruvian Government to delay more or less indefinitely the granting of the safe conduct, we repeatedly informed Peruvian authorities here and in Lima that while the US was not a party to the asylum conventions, we were deeply concerned about the tranquility of the continent. We believed that as long as Haya was kept in Peru there was opportunity and cause for serious friction. (Copies of the Department’s telegrams 40 of February 112 and 54 of March 1,3 which were repeated to our missions in various of the other American republics, are attached.)

Early in March, and at various times before and since, we advised the Colombians to adopt a calmer attitude toward the dispute, in view of the inflammatory telegrams the Colombian Ambassador to Peru was sending to his Government, and of the freedom with which they talked about the possibility of war. During March and April we continued to impress upon Peruvian officials our view that the only practical solution of the problem was to permit Haya to leave.

In March Ambassador Tittmann suggested matters might be helped by an offer of good offices by the Vatican, through either the Papal Nuncio, the Archbishop of Lima, or both. Other mediation efforts proposed and explored at length were discussions among the Ambassadors of the OAR in Rio, Washington, and Lima. Various suggestions were made, with our knowledge and open support or tacit [Page 774] approval, for mediation efforts by individual Ambassadors of the OAR, or by a group of them.* All of these efforts came to naught.

We had informally proposed possible conciliation or arbitration, or judicial settlement. Dr. Victor Andrés Belaúnde4 claims credit for persuading Odría to accept reference of the case to the International Court of Justice (April). The good offices of Ambassadors Tittmann and Faro (Brazil) were largely instrumental in securing the final agreement between Peru and Colombia on submission of the case (August 31). Under the schedule of dates for submission of briefs on the case issued by the Court, it cannot begin to study and rule on the case before June 1950 at the earliest.

Laureano Gómez has said that when he is inaugurated he will maintain the same position Colombia has been following on the case, and will not turn Haya over to the Peruvians.5 His statement removes one possible source of injustice. Action by the Peruvian Government or individual Peruvians forcibly to remove Haya from the Colombian Embassy is always a possibility, but is considered unlikely.

The Peruvian court hearing the Graña case has at long last convicted the ten defendants to varying terms of imprisonment,6 and has started an investigation of Haya’s part as “intellectual author” of the assassination. A special court is still sitting on the Callao revolt7 trials. It is possible that Haya will be indicted or convicted of complicity in both cases before the International Court of Justice takes up his case next June or thereabouts. I believe it unlikely that the International Court will be swayed by such considerations in its consideration of the question of asylum. Since Peru’s principal aim in the case now seems to be to “lose with honor”, I further believe that it will accept and act on the Court’s decision. (This is based on the assumption that the present Government remains in power and is able to maintain order.)

[Page 775]

Conclusion: Since the case is now before the International Court, I do not believe that any useful purpose would be served by further representations by us at present. We should, of course, continue to watch the case carefully, and consult with the OAR or issue a protest if it should appear that justice is to be thwarted.8

  1. On January 3, 1949, Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, leader of the APRA party, whose arrest had been ordered by the Peruvian Government for implication in the unsuccessful revolt of October 3, 1948, took refuge in the Colombian Embassy in Lima. The Colombian Ambassador informed the Peruvian Foreign Minister that Haya had been granted political asylum and requested a safe-conduct for Haya’s departure from the country. On February 22, 1949, the Government of Peru formally denied the request for a safe-conduct.

    Material on the Haya asylum case for the year 1949 in the Department of State files is contained principally in decimal file 823.00.

  2. Not printed.
  3. This telegram read in part as follows:

    “Dept does not intend become involved legal discussions between Peru and Colom re meaning various conventions on asylum. It believes however legal auths most AmReps which recognize asylum wld agree Colom Emb granted asylum Haya in good faith as outstanding polit figure and wld also agree he is bona fide polit refugee.

    “US interest continues be in tranquility and friendly relations among AmReps. Refusal grant Haya safe conduct has threatened such tranquility and Dept considers threat will continue until Haya has left Peru.

    “Dept fully appreciates delicate nature internal polit situation Peru. It wld however be unfortunate if emphasis placed on domestic considerations (urtel 100 Feb 26) were to cause deterioration and aggravation of friendly internatl relations.” (823.00/2–2649)

    In telegram 100, February 26, from Lima, Ambassador Tittmann had informed the Department:

    “Press today reports demonstration by large gathering in Palace of representatives of various social, commercial, political, and labor elements in support Government’s decision deny Haya safe conduct. Odría addressing gathering stated Government convinced it thus interprets properly public sentiment in refusing grant safe conduct to ‘asylee’ against whom rest grave national charges of mass assassinations involving military chiefs, officials, and soldiers, citizens, and publishers and of creating disorder, poisoning mind of youth, and proselytizing labor for own ends. …” (823.00/2–2649)

  4. Cuba threatened to refer its asylum ease to the Inter-American Peace Committee. While it did so (August 2) the Committee never took the case up, as the two Apristas in asylum in the Cuban Embassy escaped about August 15. If the case had come before the Committee, Colombia said it would have to present the Haya case also. [Footnote in the source text.]

    A marginal note in the source text read as follows:

    “It was formally withdrawn by the Cuban Rep—E.A.J.”

    Edward A. Jamison was officer in charge of special political problems in the Office of Regional American Affairs.

  5. Peruvian diplomat and jurist.
  6. Laureano Gómez was President-elect of Colombia. For documentation on the political situation in Colomiba, see pp. 603 ff.
  7. The court’s decision in the trial for the murder of Francisco Graña Garland, editor of the conservative newspaper La Prensa, who had been shot to death on January 8, 1947, was handed down on December 2, 1949 (despatch No. 1130, December 15, 1949, from Lima, not printed; 823.00/12–1549).
  8. Reference is to the unsuccessful revolt of October 3, 1948.
  9. The following marginal note by Mr. Jamison appeared in the source text:

    “There does not at the moment appear to be any useful alternative which would not bring the international procedures into disrepute, but there is an unfortunate irony in the fact that the effect of this will be to keep Haya confined to the Colombian Embassy for a hell of a long time. I am consulting with Miss Whiteman (L/T) on whether there might be any avenue out of the impasse.”

    Concerning the course of the Haya case before the International Court of Justice, see Marjorie Whiteman, Digest of International Law (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1968), vol. 6, pp. 473488. In a series of decisions, the ICJ concluded: “… ‘that the asylum must cease, but that the Government of Colombia is under no obligation to bring this about by surrendering the refugee to the Peruvian authorities’, [and] the Court declined to give any practical advice as to the various courses that might be followed with a view to terminating the asylum, ‘since, by doing so, it would depart from its judicial function.’”( Ibid., p. 486) Ultimately, the two Governments reached agreement for a safe-conduct to be followed by Haya’s expulsion from Peru, which took place on April 6, 1954. After an exile of 3 years, Haya returned to Peru on July 25, 1957 ( ibid., p. 488).