Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere, Volume II

IO Files: US/A/C.1/1213, also US/A/1832

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John C. Ross of the United States Delegation Advisory Staff (Austin)

secret

[New York,] October 3, 1949.

Participants:	General Carlos P. Romulo, President of the General Assembly
	John C. Ross, United States Delegation

[Here follows discussion of the “Russian Resolution”.]

Yugoslav Candidacy for the Security Council

Romulo said he wanted to talk to me about the action of the United States in indicating that it intended to vote for Yugoslavia. He said he thought we should not have done this, at least not so soon. I asked the General why he had this view of the matter. He replied that he felt the question of election of Yugoslavia to the Security Council was very unimportant. On the other hand he felt it would increase tension substantially in the United Nations. He said that these were all Communist countries and it did not matter which one we elected to the Security Council. He thought there was no way of telling whether within a very short period the Yugoslav Government might not patch up its differences with the Soviet Union. He said moreover the election of Yugoslavia would break up the United Nations.

I told the General I would, of course, report his views to the State Department which had given most careful consideration to this matter before we had made our decision known.

Expressing my personal view, I went on to say that I felt it was a mistake to adopt a timid posture when confronted with Russian opposition to some measure. I said that I was aware of Mr. Trygve Lie’s views with regard to this matter and that it did not seem to me that we could solve any of these problems by running away from them. I added that I did not for one moment believe that the election of Yugoslavia to the Security Council would break up the United Nations.

I went on to say, still speaking personally, that there seemed to me to be two reasons underlying our decision to vote for Yugoslavia. First, on the merits and leaving aside any broader political considerations, it was quite obvious that if the choice were between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia we could certainly count on a more independent attitude on the part of Yugoslavia. This did not mean that I deluded myself in the slightest degree with regard to Yugoslavia’s Communism, nor did I imagine that we could count on their support in the Security Council. Second, from a broader point of view, before the Yugoslav Government had decided to present its candidacy we had a strictly neutral position; if anything, we tended to discourage the idea of a Yugoslav candidacy. The Yugoslav Government, however, apparently after most careful consideration, having decided to put its candidacy forward, we were confronted with a new situation involving the principle of the independence of States, particularly the independence of small States, from great power domination.

Romulo asked me what I thought of the idea of electing Yugoslavia to the Economic and Social Council instead of the Security Council. He said he had in mind talking with Vishinsky and suggesting this idea to him, and try to get a “price” out of Vishinsky in return. I asked Romulo what price he had in mind. Romulo said he had not settled on this point but, for example, thought he might show him the Mexican redraft of the Russian Resolution and try to get Vishinsky to go along with this redraft in return for switching Yugoslavia to the Economic and Social Council. I made no comment on this suggestion other than to say I would report it together with the rest of the General’s views to the Department.

In concluding our discussion of this subject, the General said that we could not get a majority vote. He said the United Kingdom as well as France would vote against Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia would get only four or five Latin American votes and very few others. He said the only Asiatic vote they would get would be the Philippines. Even China, he said, despite their present difficulties with the Soviets, would not vote for Yugoslavia.

The comments made by the General in this regard struck me as in general almost directly contrary to the information we have been getting from our own sources, and second as an effort to scare us out of our announced decision to vote for Yugoslavia for the Security Council. His comments also tended to confirm my suspicion that the Secretary-General is probably lobbying very actively against the Yugoslav candidacy.