501.BB/9–349: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Charge in China (Strong)

secret

Telcan 662. Re Cantel 1063.1

1)
Statement of Ch Govt charges against USSR in reftel indicates shift in emphasis from exclusive reliance on Soviet treaty violations to indirect aggression in contravention of UN Charter. This would materially increase difficulties of proving case.
2)
Re Charges 1 and 3 as experience in Greek and Czech case shows, satisfactory case indirect aggression by USSR almost impossible to establish. Dept regrets it has no confidential info not already in possession Ch Govt which it could convey to strengthen Ch case.
3)
Charge 2 and to lesser extent other charges wld be based upon [clear]2 finding Soviet violations of treaty. Dept feels such finding possible of attainment but would depend on strength evidence presented. However, any such case would be weakened (a) if it were necessary to rely principally on violations which occurred some time ago; (b) if case rested on provisions of treaty open to differing interpretations. (We have in mind, e.g., possible argument that in absence Jap peace treaty, the “peace time” provisions for excluding Dairen from P[or]t Arthur Base regulations not yet applicable.) (c) If Soviets could show that alleged violations arose as result of inability of Nationalists to carry out treaty or if they were able present strong countercharge of Nationalist violations. Substance foregoing conveyed [Page 182] Tsiang NY Sept 63 who had indicated GA finding of Soviet violations would be basis of case.
4)
As to proposed recommendations, first would, of course, be appropriate provided above difficulties in proving charges could be overcome.
5)
Re recommendation that UN Members be called on to aid Nationalists, Dept feels and so advised Tsiang this seems inappropriate since it appears unrelated to case and its possible rejection by GA would harm Nationalist cause.
6)

Re recommendation that Members not recognize Communists Tsiang was advised that this seems open to serious question on fol grounds: (a) Soviet violation of treaty is unrelated to any recommendation that Members not recognize communists; (b) recommendation would deprive Members of future freedom of action and would probably be resisted on that ground; (c) recommendation would probablly be rejected by GA with consequent harm to Nationalist cause; (d) believe in general inappropriate for GA to recommend recognition or non-recognition in specific cases. Tsiang then shifted ground substantially in discussions with both US and UK and stated that nonrecognition of Communists was only “indirect objective” which he did not intend to present formally but which would follow from recommendation of aid to Nationalists.

Ur info only Dept advised UK views coincide closely with foregoing; that they have so advised Tsiang and that French will make clear they are cool to whole idea.

7)
Dept agrees with Ch Govt case should not be presented to SC. Of reasons given, 2, 4, and 5 would apply with equal force to presentation GA.
8)

In summary Dept continues to believe that the decision as to whether the matter should be brought before the GA is one for Ch Govt to make. Dept. believes most effective case would be based exclusively Soviet treaty violations and does not believe second and third objectives either appropriate or possible of attainment. If Chinese decide to present case, extent of US support will depend on extent to which Ch can develop effective case.

You may in ur discretion discuss substance foregoing Depts views on recommendations with FonOff, bearing in mind possibility Ch Govts intention to pursue them may have shifted as result Tsiang conversations.

Acheson
  1. September 3, p. 167.
  2. Brackets appear in the source text.
  3. See telegram 1060, September 6, p. 169.