893.00/9–949
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Freeman)1
| Participants: | Mr. Dening, British Foreign Office, Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs in Charge of Far Eastern Matters |
| Mr. Meade, Counselor, British Embassy | |
| Mr. Ford, First Secretary, British Embassy | |
| Mr. Butterworth, FE; Mr. Merchant, FE; Mr. Freeman, CA; Mr. Magill,2 CA; Mr. Wright,3 CP |
Taxation of Official Properties by the Chinese Communists
In bringing up this subject, Mr. Butterworth inquired of Mr. Dening as to the attitude of the British Government with respect to the payment of taxes on official properties in China. Mr. Dening responded that the UK was not on very strong ground in refusing to pay such taxes because foreign governments having official properties in Great Britain are in fact required to pay certain taxes. He stated that official British establishments in China have already paid certain house taxes and automobile taxes, under protest, and indicated that they would no doubt continue to do so.
Mr. Butterworth pointed out the difficulty of filing protests with the Communist authorities who refuse to recognize the official [Page 180] character of our representatives in China. He stated that the US will also probably continue to pay, under protest, the taxes which are imposed on us by the Communist regime if the non-payment thereof would seriously inconvenience our representatives or hinder the continued functioning of our establishments in China.
Seating of a Chinese Communist Representative on the UN
Mr. Dening took note of the US view which, contrary to that advanced by the UK, held that the absence of a Chinese representative from the Security Council would not restrict the activities of the SC to procedural matters but would be treated as an abstention. He added, however, that he was not a lawyer and would not endeavor to pass on this question. He stated that, should the question of seating a Chinese Communist representative arise, the matter would first be referred to the Credentials Committee of the SC where it would undoubtedly receive the strong backing of the USSR; from the Credentials Committee, he stated, the matter would be referred to the GA where it would be decided by a two-thirds vote. Mr. Meade added that it should not prove too difficult to defeat such a motion in the GA and that the help of the Latin American nations could probably be counted on in this regard. Mr. Dening concluded that many nations would probably not wish to go on record as opposing the seating of a Chinese Communist representative and that the result of such a move might well be to postpone a final decision for an indefinite period.
Possibility of Chinese Government Bringing Case Before the UN
Mr. Dening inquired of Mr. Butterworth whether the Chinese Government had already placed on the agenda of the UN the question of a possible breach of the Sino-Soviet treaty by the USSR. Mr. Butterworth replied that so far as the Department knew a final decision in the matter had not yet been taken. He stated that one factor making for delay and uncertainty was a likely difference of opinion between the Generalissimo’s group and Acting President Li’s group which would have to be resolved before a decision could be made. He also stated that the attitude of the interested foreign powers would undoubtedly be given some consideration before the item is placed on the agenda.
In response to Mr. Dening’s statement that the British Government had been less reassuring to the Chinese than the US, Mr. Butterworth explained that the US had assured the Chinese only of support in principle, and that the character and degree of our support would depend entirely on the strength and effectiveness of the case which the Chinese would present—a factor which we could not at this time estimate. Mr. Dening added that the Chinese case would have been far [Page 181] stronger had it been presented while the Chinese Government was still an effective government rather than at the present time when it is faced with total defeat.
Mr. Butterworth stated that the Department was still wondering whether there was not some way to divert the character of the Chinese démarche into a channel which would be of more benefit to the western powers as well as to the Chinese Government. He also referred to Secretary Marshall’s statement to the Chinese in Paris when the question was first broached to the effect that the matter was one for decision by the Chinese themselves. Mr. Butterworth added that something by way of censure of the USSR might be desirable in the event that the Chinese are actually in a position to present an effective case.
(At this point the conversation turned to a discussion of the status of Hong Kong.)