I shall be pleased to communicate further with you when I have received
from the Governor of the Panama Canal his report on the additional
investigations in the Republic of Colombia which are discussed in my
letter to The President.
[Enclosure]
The Secretary of the Army (Royall) to the President of the United
States
Dear Mr. President: I respectfully submit
my observations on various interoceanic canal routes and alternative
methods of transit, made during my trip of inspection in Mexico and
Central America in February, 1948. In addition to inspecting the
present Panama Canal and discussing with the Governor and his
assistants the conversion of the existing lock canal into a sea
level canal, I looked into the matters covered in the following
paragraphs.
Isthmus of Tehuantepec: From my aerial
reconnaissance, flying at low level over the Isthmus of Tehuantepec,
it seemed apparent that it would be impracticable to construct a
lock or sea-level canal on this route at reasonable cost. This
observation is in accord with the report of the Governor of the
Panama Canal which shows that a lock canal at Tehuantepec would be
three times as long as the Panama Canal, would cross a divide which
is twice as high, and would cost over 13 billion dollars. The report
makes no estimate of cost for a sea-level canal at Tehuantepec, but
shows that such a canal would involve about six times as much
excavation as would be required to convert the present Panama Canal
to a sea-level project.
The Tehuantepec route has been considered repeatedly since 1880 as
the location for a ship railway, but all engineering studies have
shown that a railway capable of transporting modern shipping across
the isthmus would be impractical and very expensive. A project of
this kind would involve such unprecedented problems of design and
construction for foundations, road-bed, bridging, and rolling stock,
that its capacity would undoubtedly be limited to small ships. It
would be extremely vulnerable to destruction by sabotage and aerial
bombing.
The existing single-track railway across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec
has heavy grades, numerous curves, light rail (60 pounds), and
inadequate terminals on the Gulf of Mexico and Pacific Ocean, and is
totally inadequate as a modern means for trans-shipment of cargo.
Reconstruction to provide adequate facilities would be very
expensive, and even an improved rail line with adequate terminals
could not compete with the existing Panama Canal for commercial
traffic since any savings of time due to shortening of the ship
route would be more than offset by the time required for unloading,
handling and reloading of cargo. Furthermore, the use of pallets or
standardized shipping cases would not eliminate the necessary delays
of trans-shipment, and would
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not be practicable for general and miscellaneous cargo, and would
in addition probably require ships with especially constructed holds
and cargo hatches. The value of such a railway in time of war would
be limited, as it would serve only as an emergency means for passage
of cargo across the isthmus in the event of blocking of a canal, and
like a ship railway, it would be vulnerable to attack and
destruction.
Nicaraguan Route: This proposed canal route
lies in part along the boundary between Nicaragua and Costa Rica. It
is a feasible route for a lock canal, although the cost involved
would be about one billion dollars more than conversion of the
Panama Canal to sea level. A sea level canal along this route would
necessarily pass close to Lake Nicaragua, which lies about 110 feet
above sea level. Separation of the lake from the canal would involve
serious problems of see page, and stability of embankments and
channels. Such a project would have an extremely heavy cost, even if
all engineering difficulties could be overcome. Both Nicaragua and
Costa Rica would be involved in a canal along this route and
political difficulties would be increased by the necessity for
dealing with two countries.
Panama Parallel Route: One of the routes
which has been studied provides for construction of a new sea level
canal parallel and closely adjacent to the present Panama lock
canal. This proposal would cost about 900 million dollars more than
conversion of the present Panama lock canal to a sea-level project.
While it is of interest, as it could be built and operated so as to
provide the continued use of both the lock and sea-level canals, the
advantages are not as real as they appear at first glance. Both
canals would have the same harbor and terminal facilities, damage to
which would affect both canals at the same time. Further, the
continued existence of Gatun Lake required by the lock canal would
constitute an additional hazard to the sea-level canal. A breaching
of the dikes and dams separating the two canals, by either sabotage
or bombing, would flood out the sea-level canal and choke it with
large quantities of earth. A sea-level canal thus damaged would
probably require a longer time for repair and reestablishment of a
navigable channel than would the proposed sea-level conversion
canal, not subject to this additional hazard. In addition, during
the years of peace, there would be the continued cost of maintenance
and operation of a lock canal which would not be needed by
commercial traffic.
Atrato–Truandó Route: The valleys of the
Atrato and Truandó Rivers in Colombia have been studied as a
possible route for a ship canal during the present investigation and
in a number of previous explorations. This route is 95 miles long as
compared with the 51-mile length of the present Panama Canal. Data
on the elevation of the divide on the Atrato–Truandó Route,
determined by previous reconnaissance
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surveys, is not as reliable as that available
for some of the other routes, but is sufficiently accurate to
indicate an elevation of about 930 feet above sea level. The route
appears feasible for either a lock or sea-level canal; although
present estimates prepared by the Governor of the Panama Canal
indicate that the cost of a sea-level canal along the Atrato and
Truandó would be about two billion dollars greater than the cost of
converting the Panama Canal to sea level.
Aerial reconnaissance of the Atrato–Truandó Route indicates, however,
that terrain on the Atlantic side is particularly suitable for canal
construction as excavation through the alluvial valley of the Atrato
should be relatively inexpensive. Problems involving control of
floods and handling of alluvial deposits might be met by
constructing a canal paralleling the lower river to a terminus
separate from the mouth of the Atrato and its delta. Further
reconnaissance would determine the exact height of divide and the
best alignment for a canal. Low excavation cost in the lower reaches
on the Atlantic side might offset costs involved in greater length
and greater height of divide. In view of these considerations, it
would be desirable to make some further field investigations to
obtain more specific data on alignment, elevations and geologic
formations. The expense of such investigations can be kept to a
minimum by use of available small craft and planes of the Army and
Navy; and it is understood that the Governor of the Panama Canal has
sufficient funds for such a reconnaissance.
The additional investigation described above would, of course,
require the approval of the Republic of Colombia. I have
communicated with the Secretary of State with a view to presenting
the matter to the government of the Republic of Colombia.
Sincerely yours,
