831.00/11–2248
Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of North and West Coast Affairs (Mills) to the Director of the Office of American Republic Affairs (Daniels)
VI. VENEZUELA
Subject: Background of Present Venezuelan Crisis.
The present situation has been building up over a period of months; indeed, the first rumors of military dissatisfaction were reported even before President Gallegos was inaugurated1 and were intensified with the announcement of his cabinet which included only one military man: Lt. Col. Delgado Chalbaud, the Minister of National Defense.
The Army justifies its desires for participation in the Government on the grounds that the revolution which put AD in power was carried out by the Army. The Army called in AD to run the administration, but it feels responsible for seeing that AD does a good job. This argument overlooks the fact that, since the revolution, AD has received [Page 127] two overwhelming endorsements from the people in popular elections; as distinct from the ex-Revolutionary Junta of Government, presided over by Betancourt,2 Gallegos feels he owes his position entirely to the people and that the Army should limit itself to the role of defender of constitutional government.
Alleged causes of Army discontent are: 1) Graft and inefficiency in the Government; 2) failure of Government to check rising cost of living; 3) failure of Government to curb labor demands for higher salaries; 4) failure of Government to outlaw the Communist party; 5) monopoly of Government by AD to the exclusion of opposition elements. An additional, but usually unvoiced, source of Army unrest is the ambition of some of its leaders for high civil office which would give them prestige, or money, or both.
Opposition has apparently centered around the Chief of Staff, Lt. Col. Pérez Jiménez, but the most recent reports indicate that even Delgado Chalbaud, long considered the most loyal supporter of the administration, has joined in demands that the Government act more vigorously against the Communists, “crack down” on labor and probably include more military men and representatives of the opposition in the Government.
Army discontent came to a head towards the end of September. A source outside the Government indicates that Delgado Chalbaud discussed the Army’s views with Betancourt after the latter’s return to Venezuela; Betancourt reportedly indicated understanding and some measure of agreement, but asked that the Government not be required to take action until after the adjournment of Congress. Congress adjourned November 9, 1948, but the Government didn’t make any changes. (It hardly had time to.) All sources agree that the Peruvian revolution had a great influence on the thought of the military men in Venezuela, and it is significant that Pérez Jiménez is said to be a personal friend of General Odria, the Peruvian provisional President.
Against this background the current crisis assumes a more serious aspect. Acción Democrática must either satisfy the demands of the majority of Army officers or resort to the dangerous expedient of a general strike to try to force the military to recede. If the former, the way will be opened for increasing military interference by the Army in civil affairs and a fundamentally unstable situation caused by a division of power and responsibility. A general strike, on the other hand, would be disastrous for the country’s economy and might easily result in civil strife and bloodshed.
The present situation is confused. Both the Army and the Government are making great efforts to keep the details of their arrangements [Page 128] secret, and the press has been forbidden to speculate about them. The President’s Executive Secretary told the Ambassador that an agreement had been made, but did not disclose its basis. Delgado Chalbaud, talking with our Military Attaché Saturday afternoon, denied that the Army had demanded any changes in the administration or that any changes were contemplated. Nevertheless, the crisis has not abated; the latest reports indicate increasing nervousness on the part of Government officials and mention unconfirmed reports that the “agreement” between the Army and the Government has not been accepted by a dissident group of Army officers, who are demanding a coalition, or “national” government instead of 100 percent AD control.
- For press release of February 2, 1948, on United States diplomatic representation at the inauguration of President Romulo Gallegos on February 15, see Department of State Bulletin, February 15, 1948, p. 222.↩
- Romulo Betancourt, President of the Revolutionary Junta of Government, October 1945–February 1948.↩