393.1163/12–348
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)88
Participants: | Dr. Frank Cartwright | } | China Committee of the Foreign Missions Conference |
Mr. Rolland Cross | |||
Dr. John W. Decker | |||
W. Walton Butterworth, FE | |||
Richard D. Weigle, FE | |||
Fulton Freeman, CA |
Dr. Cartwright, Mr. Cross and Dr. Decker called at their request to discuss the policy of this Government with respect to China as it affects missionary activity. By way of introduction, Mr. Cross explained that the group constituted the China Committee of the Foreign [Page 910] Missions Conference, which represents most of the Protestant mission boards. He explained that the China Committee had held a number of meetings in New York City with representatives of the major mission boards to pool available information on China developments and to determine as far as possible a common policy with respect to their missionary programs in China. Dr. Cartwright stated that the present interview was a result of the desire of this group to obtain such first-hand information as the Department might have available to guide them in their planning. I, in turn, expressed the Department’s readiness to provide upon a confidential background basis information that might prove helpful.
Dr. Cartwright inquired first about the matter of evacuation policy. In reply I outlined the steps which had been taken in issuing the various warning orders and went on to explain that the Department did not expect that such warnings would be construed as requiring the evacuation of individuals with a compelling reason to remain. The Government could not advise Americans to abandon their stakes in business, education or missionary activity, nor could it advise them to remain with possible exposure to physical danger. I further explained the plan of the Department to maintain all of its present Foreign Service establishments in China even though the tide of civil war should pass over them. Female clerks and dependents of Foreign Service personnel were being given the option of transfer and evacuation respectively, but the decision in each case was being left to the individual without pressure being exerted upon him. It would therefore seem that the decision to evacuate or to remain might similarly be left to each individual missionary after he had been made fully conversant with all the facts in the situation.
Mr. Cross asked whether the British were taking parallel action with respect to evacuation of their nationals. He intimated that reports had been received from some missionaries to the effect that British nationals believed this Government was unduly alarmist about the situation. Mr. Freeman thereupon produced a copy of the warning notice issued to British citizens in North China and invited attention to the fact that it predated the American warning by three days. I also mentioned the complication introduced into the general situation by the presence of the large Joint U. S. Military Advisory Group, a quasi-military organization subject to orders and not to voluntary action. The fact that dependents of this group had been ordered out of China by a certain date had perhaps contributed to the uneasiness in Nanking.
The question was then asked as to the probable treatment of American nationals remaining after the Communist take-over. In reply to this I could make no predictions but described the experiences of [Page 911] the personnel in the Consulate General in Mukden. The greatest danger to American lives and property probably would arise in any interregnum period between the disintegrating civil authority of the National Government and the establishing of the succeeding Communist regime. If the experiences at Mukden could be regarded as a reliable precedent, one might envision no very great difficulties during this first phase of Communist occupation. The main question would arise in the second phase when it would be difficult to predict the success of the Communists in executing their vast task of consolidation and administration and their possible attitude toward Americans, both in the field of business and in the area of Christian missionary activity. I pointed out that the Communists as a successor government would be charged with the heavy responsibilities that normally devolve upon the government of a state as it enters into intercourse with other nations. Mr. Weigle suggested in this connection that the need of the Communists for certain materials from abroad might prove a restraining influence in their treatment of foreigners.
Dr. Decker then said that he assumed it to be a corollary of American policy as already described that this Government would not become involved in a military way in the civil war. I acknowledged this to be a cardinal point in this Government’s China policy and pointed to the fact that a Republican Congress and a Democratic President had approved such a policy in passing the China aid provisions in the Economic Cooperation Act.
This prompted a query as to the amount of military supplies purchased under the 125 million dollar provision which had actually been shipped to China, to which I replied with the latest figure of approximately 30 per cent. At this juncture it seemed appropriate to insert the advice which the Department has received from China that the losses suffered at Tsinan and subsequently have been due to a lack of the will to fight on the part of the Nationalist troops, rather than any deficiency in equipment and ammunition.
Dr. Decker asked whether the Communist treatment to be expected in North China would be less severe than that in the Yangtze Valley, which is the traditional seat of the Nationalist Government. I admitted that the people of North China were probably better adjusted to a Communist take-over by reason of the fact that the cards had been on the table for such a long time that all could see the probable course of future events. Shanghai, to my mind, presented the likeliest scene of possible trouble in the interim period because it is a large metropolis containing questionable and lawless elements, as well as a great mass of individuals close to the starvation level. I made it clear that the United States would not undertake, alone or in concert with other powers, to provide a police force during the interregnum period. [Page 912] American naval units stationed at Shanghai have been augmented, however, and an attempt would be made to extend appropriate aid to American citizens in the event of an emergency.
The question was then asked as to the possibility of obtaining passports for various categories of missionaries returning to their stations in China or going out under the mission boards for the first time. I indicated that the Department was at present scrutinizing each request very closely and that a compelling reason would have to be shown before favorable action could be taken. Mr. Cross said that the boards naturally appreciated the illogic of granting passports to prospective travellers to China at the same time major efforts were being expended to evacuate personnel from that country. He indicated, however, that it would be exceedingly desirable to obtain permission for the return to China of certain key personnel and offered to have the Foreign Missions Conference serve as a screening agency for passport requests from the various participating boards. I indicated that this would be extremely helpful to the Department and suggested that Mr. Cross write to Mr. Freeman or Mr. Weigle furnishing the Department with a list of the member boards.
In conclusion, Dr. Cartwright asked whether there were any other way in which the Foreign Missions Conference could be of service to the Department. I responded by acknowledging the helpfulness of certain information which had been furnished the Department in the past emanating from missionaries in the field and hoped that the boards would feel free to forward at any time letters or excerpts from reports which the Department might find useful. Mr. Cross promised to circularize the mission boards in this connection.
- Drafted by the Executive Officer of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Weigle).↩