Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East: China, Volume VIII

393.1115/11–3048: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Shanghai (Cabot)⁸⁵

Washington, December 2, 1948—6 p.m.

2078. Priority questions re “last minute evacuation or repatriation” urtel 2580 Nov 30 rptd Nanking 1946 raise basic question continuing availability transportation facilities until moment Comm entry which Dept not in position answer. Dept fails perceive, however, why assurances or guarantees extended to US business and missionary personnel should be any broader than those extended Dept personnel who remaining their posts. We cannot, for example, guarantee Caltex Tientsin that in event personnel fail take advantage evacuation facilities presently offered there will be any “last minute” facilities prior to Comm takeover. On contrary, as soon as airfield is threatened there will be no means of providing additional evacuation facilities without incurring danger of armed conflict with Comms which is not policy of this Govt to promote. Nor can we assure Shanghai Power Co. of “full protection”, which would by definition include armed intervention, following Comm occupation Shanghai. US businessmen and missionaries in China have long recognized that there are certain risks incident to their professions not shared by persons similar professions in US. Dept does not, however, believe present risks in remaining China comparable to those existing 1941. Statement reftel that Americans “consider situation not essentially different today” without justification from past experience other areas China.

Indication reftel that American businessmen consider present and possible future US aid program to Nationalist Govt and rumors re revival AVG as prejudicing their position vis-à-vis Comms appears inconsistent when viewed in light their statement that assurances retention US consulates “not sufficient since they feel ConGen personnel may have some official immunity”. As ConGen aware, Chi Comm anti-American propaganda has been directed against US “imperialistic” Govt and authorities and not against American people, and individual US citizens have for most part reed courteous and correct treatment in Comm territory. Would therefore appear risk sustained by US consulate personnel (who lack diplomatic immunity) in remaining considerably greater than private US businessmen and missionaries.

For your info, question of additional aid to Nationalist Govt beyond present commitments under China Aid Bill⁸⁶ one for Congressional decision as no such authority presently exists. Possibility of revival AVG has not been broached to Dept and US Govt support or tacit approval any such scheme extremely unlikely.

Re Shanghai Power Co., Vice Pres John Kopelman called at Dept recently to discuss question evacuation or retention American key personnel and was informed in confidence Dept’s thinking along lines Deptel 1691, Nov 23 to Nanking rptd Shanghai 2004. Kopelman informed Dept’s attitude toward possible trade relations between US and Comm areas China not yet crystallized, but it was pointed out that trade between US and Comm countries in Europe is taking place. Kopelman informed Dept in subsequent telephone conversation Bullitt⁸⁷ had stated in conversation with Hopkins [of] Shanghai Power Co. that Comm occupation Shanghai would result in US Govt adopting “blackout policy” re trade relations. As indicated above Dept has not yet determined policy this regard and no foundation exists for Bullitt’s alleged statement. Moreover, Dept has not approached oil companies re possibility embargo oil shipments areas occupied by Comms as indicated reftel. You are aware from your experience in Yugo of conditions under which East-West trade is being conducted.

Dept also understands British ConGen Shanghai has informed key Brit personnel of detailed plans for concentration all Brit subjects in semi-protected compounds in event mass rioting for temporary period during threat violence. Dept assumes ConGen has prepared similar plan and recommends it be made known to key American citizens immediately irrespective possibility circulation such info might convince few “non-essential” Americans no need to evacuate. Pls report urgently.

With above considerations in mind, Congen authorized orally assure key American citizens (by name if desirable) in US business, educational and missionary organizations they will be given identical consideration with regard to evacuation in extremis or repatriation following Comm occupation as Consulate staff in any arrangements which may be made. However, it is not expected there will be any last minute evacuation of Consulate staff even though as in Mukden rioting and disorders in one form or another are to be anticipated. You may also assure them Congen will extend protection all American nationals remaining Shanghai insofar as possible but that such protection may be limited to protection now afforded to US citizens (i. e. representation with local authorities) and may not include armed intervention. We will seek to avoid in every possible way resort to armed force for this purpose. If, as you indicate, unrest expected during turnover “relatively unimportant consideration”, assurances that key US personnel will be accorded same consideration re evacuation or repatriation as Congen personnel should have effect of reducing apprehensions entertained by essential businessmen and missionaries re existence under Comm occupation.

Lovett

85. Repeated to the Ambassador in China as telegram No. 1757. Notation on the original: “Cleared with Sec. Marshall.”
86. China Aid Act, Title IV, approved April 3, 1948, 62 Stat. 158; for correspondence on this subject, see pp. 442 ff.
87. William C. Bullitt, consultant to U. S. Congressional Joint Committee on Foreign Economic Cooperation and former Ambassador in the Soviet Union and in France.