893.24/12–1848
Summary of General Barr’s Telegram No. 871 OAGA of December 18
After appraising the military position and capabilities of the principal Nationalist armies and weighing the basis in south China for continued resistance by the National Government, General Barr concludes: “Only a policy of unlimited aid, including the immediate employment of United States Armed Forces, which I emphatically do not recommend, would enable the Nationalist Government to maintain a foothold in Southern China against a determined Communist advance.”
Turning to the political situation, General Barr states that the Generalissimo will continue to resist efforts to have him resign because he is convinced that only he can command a sufficient following to continue to resist the Communists. In this he is correct. Should his constitutional successor, Li Tsung-jen, come into power, he would immediately negotiate peace. Any negotiated peace will result in a Communist government notwithstanding the term “coalition” in connection with it.
General Barr reaches the following conclusions: (1) The Nationalist armies will be defeated in the immediate future and the Government forced to leave Nanking or be overthrown. (2) If the Generalissimo remains in power, the Government will move to South China and then to Taiwan. Its influence will be negligible, and it will be a government in name only regardless of military and economic aid. (3) A Communist government will be established, which will attempt to extend its control over all of China. (4) Further military and economic aid will have little effect now or in the future but should not be withdrawn abruptly as long as the National Government continues in existence.
General Barr concludes his telegram with the following recommendations: (1) Military and economic aid to Taiwan and South China should be continued as long as “any significant portions of these areas” continue in Nationalist hands.: (2) Military and economic aid now en [Page 237] route should be sent to Okinawa or some other suitable checkpoint for onward transportation in the light of existing circumstances, and shipments now loading should be dispatched only after a detailed appraisal of the situation. No military or economic aid should be permitted to enter areas occupied or immediately threatened by Communists. The kinds and amounts of aid to other areas should be in direct proportion to the needs of the areas. Every effort should be made to prevent any considerable stockpile of ECA or military aid where they are likely to fall into the hands of the Communists.