Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East: China, Volume VIII

Executive Secretariat Files: NSC 22

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Washington,] December 16, 1948.

Subject: NSC.22/2⁹

It is not believed that any change in the present measures of implementation or priority should fee made in the program of aid under the $125 million grants unless (1) the Chinese Government should collapse or withdraw from Nanking, (2) the Generalissimo should resign from the Government, (3) the Chinese Communists should occupy the ports at which the matériel is to be delivered or (4) the continued implementation of this program would be contrary to United States interests.

In considering (4) above it should be noted that the Chinese Government has requested that 60 per cent of the shipments now being made be delivered at Taiwan. Since the bulk of these shipments may not be available during the struggle for the capital for the Government’s use, the advisability of making all this matériel available to the National Government should be reviewed. In the event of a sudden collapse of the Chinese Government, the matériel might fall into the hands of a Communist or Communist-dominated government, merely strengthening the Chinese Communists militarily or providing an additional reservoir of arms which could be circulated elsewhere in the Far East. Attached as Annex 1 is a tabulation of the shipments of arms being effected by the Department of the Army under the $37.8 million transfer from the $125 million grants. The Navy and Air Force are likewise providing matériel and services to the Chinese Government.

It is recommended that the following action be taken with respect to the matériel and services being provided by the National Military Establishment:

(1) the National Military Establishment be requested to obtain from the Director of JUSMAG, China, his comments on the advisability from a military point of view of continuing the delivery of matériel now en route or being prepared for shipment;

(2) the Department of State obtain the comments of the Embassy, Nanking, on the advisability, from a political point of view of continuing the delivery of matériel, with particular reference to the deliveries alt Taiwan;

(3) in arriving at a final decision with respect to this matter, the National Security Council give consideration to the potential usefulness in other programs of military aid to which this Government is committed of the arms and matériel now Being prepared for shipment to China or presently en route in US Navy vessels.

[Annex]

Shipments to China of Arms and Ammunition Under $37.8 Million Transfer From $125 Million Grants

Ship	Sailing Date	Cargo	Arrival Date
2 LSTs	Nov. 4 & 7 Japan & Guam	LT 1300 (approx.) small arms	Tsingtao Dec. 7–14
USS Algol	Nov. 9 West Coast	LT 4974 or MT 3742 Ammunition	Shanghai Tsingtao Dec. 7
USS Washburn	Dec. 1	LT 3712 Ammo—small arms (120,000 rifles)	Due to arrive Taiwan about Dec. 21
SS Virginia	Nov. 8 Hawaii	MT 1360 Explosives	Due to arrive Taiwan about Dec. 10
USS Yancey	Will sail Dec. 16 West Coast	LT 2808 or MT 7500 Rifles, Blankets, Medical Supplies.	Due to arrive Taiwan about Dec. 30

[At its meeting on December 16, the National Security Council noted and discussed NSC 22/2 and the comments thereon by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and agreed that (1) the Department of the Army should obtain the views of the Director, Joint U. S. Military Advisory Group, as to the advisability, from the military point of view, of continuing to expedite military aid to China; (2) the Department of State should obtain from the U. S. Embassy at Nanking the political viewpoint on this question, particularly as to the desirability of sending military equipment to Taiwan; and (3) the National Security Council should consider, in the light of the replies to (1) and (2) above and of the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whether the military equipment in preparation for shipment to China could be more usefully employed in other theaters or whether it might be more useful to have such equipment in Taiwan provided the Chinese National Government is not established there.]

9. Supra.