Executive Secretariat Files: NSC 22
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Acting Secretary of State
Subject: NSC Paper on United States Policy Toward China30
In his telegram (Deptel no. 1180 of August 1331—Tab A) to Ambassador Stuart, the Secretary stated that it was not likely that the situation would make it possible for us at this juncture to formulate any rigid plans for our future policy in China. He further said that developments in China were obviously entering into a period of extreme flux and confusion in which it would be impossible with surety to perceive clearly far in advance the pattern of things to come and in which this Government plainly must preserve a maximum freedom of action. The Secretary reiterated these views in his recent telegram to Ambassador Stuart on United States policy toward China.32
In the light of the above-described statements, the NSC paper appears to plot very rigidly and specifically the courses of action we should take in the immediate future. For example, it states as in (a) below:
“Now and for the foreseeable future, the United States should seek to prevent China from becoming an adjunct of Soviet politico-military power. In pursuing this aim the United States should:
- a.
- Furnish limited political, economic and military assistance to those elements which at any particular time appear most likely to resist domination of China by the Communists.”
This recommendation, which does not appear to take into consideration the possible effectiveness of resistance by anti-Communist elements in China, is repeated in two other instances in the NSC paper in slightly varying form. One recommendation suggests that the United States should immediately make plans and preparations to exploit probable developments through support of the remaining anti-Communist forces in the event of a National Government collapse or the formation of a coalition with the Communists. The other recommendation suggests that the United States furnish assistance to such anti-Communist regional regimes as hold out promise of helping prevent Communist domination of China in the event of the National Government’s collapse or its coalition with the Communists.
In this general connection, Ambassador Stuart stated in his telegram no. 2003 of October 2633 (Tab B):
“Any direct military aid to resistance groups on theory that we are fighting Communism all over the world would seem to me unwise. It could only delay their ultimate liquidation and would meanwhile arouse increased anti-American sentiment and expose our nationals in coalition territory to danger. Transportation and other difficulties in reaching these resistance leaders and ensuring proper use of our supplies would be enormous. But chief objection would perhaps be that this is one of negative or vacillating courses which we should at all costs avoid.
“It would seem to me no less undesirable to make any premature announcements as to our intentions or our general opinion of Communism that would endanger our existing national interests in China or embarrass us in future. Whatever influence we may want to exert will be increased if our attitude toward new regime is undefined and flexible.”
It is certainly true that we should, as stated in the NSC paper, seek to prevent China from becoming an adjunct of Soviet politico-military power and the only question is one of the tactics to be followed. While plans and preparations should be made against all eventualities, we should not expect that the United States will be able during the immediate future to exert a decisive influence on developments throughout the whole of China. The above-described courses of action recommended in the NSC paper seem desirable, but they should be subject to approval in the light primarily of our national interests and the then existing circumstances. The fact that a faction in China is anti-Communist is not in itself sufficient. While it may be desirable to support one or more anti-Communist factions should the National Government collapse, we should take particular care to avoid so committing ourselves to a course of action or of becoming so deeply involved in the Chinese scene that we succeed only in prolonging an unsuccessful [Page 189] civil war and in thus further weakening the position of anti-Communist elements in China which might eventually provide the basis for effective indigenous resistance to complete Communist domination of that country. Unsuccessful efforts to support remaining anti-Communist elements would be costly in terms of U. S. prestige and expenditure of further U. S. funds.
In summary, it seems desirable that the recommended courses of action following a possible collapse of the National Government be clearly qualified by considerations of our national interests and the circumstances existing at that time.
- Supra.↩
- vol. vii, 416.↩
- See telegram No. 1490, October 26, noon, vol. vii, p. 512.↩
- Vol. vii, p. 518.↩