Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East: China, Volume VIII

Executive Secretariat Files: NSC 22

Draft Report by the National Security Council on United States Policy Toward China^29a

[Washington,] November 2, 1948.

1. In the light of recent developments in China, the National Security Council Staff has prepared, as a matter of urgency, the following draft conclusions as a basis for discussion by the National Security Council at a special meeting on November 3, 1948.

Conclusions

2. The United States should continue to pursue the following traditional long-range aims with respect to China:

a. To encourage the development of a unified and stable non-communist China friendly to the United States.

b. To encourage international respect for the independence and integrity of China.

c. To prevent threats to our national security which would arise from the domination of China by a hostile military power.

d. To promote equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of nations throughout China.

3. In the light of existing circumstances and probable developments in the foreseeable future, these long-range aims of the United States with respect to China cannot be achieved for some time to come.

4. Now and for the foreseeable future, the United States should seek to prevent China from becoming an adjunct of Soviet politico-military power. In pursuing this aim the United States should:

a. Furnish limited political, economic and military assistance to those elements which at any particular time appear most likely to resist domination of China by the communists.

b. Maintain flexibility in implementing its policy towards China, avoiding irrevocable commitments to any one course of action or any one faction.

c. Regard assistance to China as subordinate to efforts to stabilize conditions in areas of greater strategic importance to the United States.

5. While the Chinese National Government continues to be the major anti-communist force in China, the United States should:

a. Continue to recognize that government.

b. Continue to furnish assistance to that government on the basis of programs now authorized.

c. Avoid for as long as feasible taking action which would indicate withdrawal of U. S. support from that government.

6. The United States should immediately make plans and preparations to exploit probable developments, through support of the remaining anti-communist forces in the event that the National Government should distintegrate or form a coalition with the communists. The United States should also prepare itself to aid at any time local non-communist regimes, possibly even before final collapse of the National Government, or its coalition with the communists.

7. In the event the present Chinese National Government is transformed into a coalition government which includes the communists, the United States should:

a. Pursue policies toward such a coalition government calculated to weaken and eventually eliminate the communists from the coalition.

b. Withhold any economic or military aid to such a coalition government, except as aid would contribute to the purpose set forth in sub-paragraph a. above.

c. Withhold recognition of any such coalition unless circumstances existing at that time indicate clearly that the United States would benefit from such recognition.

8. After a collapse of the Chinese National Government or its coalition with the communists, the United States should:

a. Furnish limited political, economic and military assistance to such of the non-Communist regional regimes as hold out promise of helping to prevent communist domination of China and to weaken and eventually to eliminate communist forces in China.

b. Encourage coordination, collaboration and eventual unification of the regional non-communist regimes.

9. With respect to communist-controlled areas of China the United States should:

a. Conduct aggressive political warfare designed to develop and increase rifts among the various factions in those areas, to the end that the Popular Front be fragmented and the minority Stalinist control isolated.

b. Pursue policies toward those areas calculated to weaken and eventually eliminate communist control.

c. Not accord recognition.

d. Not furnish assistance.

1. The National Security Council at its meeting on November 3 referred this draft report back to the NSC Staff for revision in the tight of the discussion at the meeting.