893.00/2–1148
The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 2.]
Sir: I have the honor to enclose as of possible interest a copy of a memorandum of conversation of February 5, 1948,39 between myself and two Soviet consular officials in respect to the general subject of events in Europe and Asia. The memorandum covers those elements of the conversation which had particular reference to American policies in respect to the two areas and other related matters of interest.
The attitude of the two consular officials, Consul General Kourdukov of Tientsin and Acting Consul General Tickvinsky of Peiping, in respect to the character of American policies in the two areas offered nothing of either novelty or special interest: they followed the established Soviet line that American policies constituted “intervention” and that those policies would be of no benefit to the areas concerned.
I invite the attention of the Department, however, to the circumstance that both of the Soviet officials purport to believe that the establishment in China of a “coalition government” would be beneficial to the country, it being their observation that the Chinese Communists would not be in a position in the foreseeable future to establish their control over the whole of the country. Reference has been made in previous communications from this office to the presumed readiness of the Chinese Communists to reach some sort of a truce agreement which [Page 89] would give them a breathing spell in which to consolidate their gains. Current events in Manchuria and North China, where in the first instance the Communist armies are getting ever nearer to their goal of complete conquest of Manchuria, and in the second instance there is appearing evidence of difficulties met by the Communists in respect to the matter of carrying through their land reform program, and in the third instance there are frequent reports of some important purge now in process in the Communist-controlled areas, seem to support that assumption. The attitude expressed by the above-quoted Soviet officials would appear likewise to indicate that Moscow itself believes that the Chinese Communists will require some time for consolidation of their position in Manchuria and North China before they will be able to undertake the subjugation of the rest of the country—this belief presumably being predicated upon a determination, nevertheless, to achieve military and political domination in Manchuria and North China as well before such truce would become effective.
It would appear obvious on the basis of past Soviet performance that their concept of a “coalition government” would be of a political organization in which the Communists were in a position to play first an important “legitimate” role and then in due course to take action by virtue of which they would eventually be enabled to dominate that coalition government. All reports that this office has been able to obtain locally indicate that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his immediate lieutenants are determined to suppress the Communists by force. It seems hardly open to doubt that the more substantial the form of American assistance to the National Government the more determined that government will be to carry through with that policy. This office proposes in a separate despatch soon to analyze the practicality of suppressing revolution in China by those means. It is felt pertinent to point out at this time, however, that there are elements in China itself within the non-Communist camp and even within the Kuomintang camp who are unconvinced of the feasibility of wiping out Chinese Communism by military force alone. Some of those elements are probably at this time undertaking to establish closer liaison among themselves to the end that in the event of important political collapse on the National Government side they will be able to succeed to power. It is pointed out further that the Chinese people are definitely war-weary and desirous of peace, and that this circumstance, coupled with the continuing deterioration of the Chinese economy, leading to an increase instead of a decrease of their suffering, is an added factor operating to prepare the ground for some “peace movement” favoring at least a temporary settlement. In those circumstances it is felt appropriate to make the following observations: (1) the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, [Page 90] who fully displayed the dogmatic and even medieval character of his mind in his book China’s Destiny, will probably prove inadequate to lift the nation from the political and economic mire in which it finds itself, for all the belief held by some of the Generalissimo’s “indispensability”; (2) the Chinese Communist Party—if Communist policies as proven time and again have any value as precedent—are assuredly bent on ultimate conquest of China as a whole; (3) both Nationalist and the Communist elements at the present time, with foreign aid tapered off and the Japanese wealth which was found in this country on V–J Day largely consumed, are cognizant of approaching exhaustion and increasing difficulties are alike desirous of at least a temporary cessation in the fighting; and (4) it would seem apparent that it is too late (if there has been a time) to save Manchuria for the Nationalists, given the existing political situation. Most of North China also is already in Communist hands, and the remaining points and lines can hardly be held for long in the event of Communist victory in Manchuria. The successful withdrawal to North China of those Nationalist forces now in Manchuria would of course contribute some military stability—valuable even if only temporary—to the former area. Present developments, where it is already so late, however, would seem to indicate that the withdrawal intact of the Nationalist Manchurian garrison over a line of retreat where the rail communications have been destroyed and where there are strong Communist forces deployed all the way from Taling River to the outskirts of Sinmin, would be an extremely difficult and hazardous undertaking.
In the existing circumstances, it would appear evident that only a fundamental reorganization of the National Government, in a manner in which power and authority would no longer be left concentrated in the hands of one man and his small supporting clique as at present but would be distributed and shared among various outstanding leaders and groups who are now potentially dissident (if still nominally in the Nationalist camp), with a concomitant major reorientation of the National Government with respect to the outstanding political and economic problems of the times, would suffice to meet the demands of the present critical situation. The present practical political task, it is submitted, is now the second-best, minimum, task: to stabilize and strengthen the political situation south of the Lunghai Railway line to such a degree that a rejuvenated National Government would be able to undertake economic and social reforms of the type long promised but to date unaccomplished, for the strengthening of the Government’s popular support at the same time that economic sanity was restored and productive processes nurtured, with one projected end-result being that the non-Communist part of the country should [Page 91] be brought into a position to meet the Communist challenge from Manchuria and North China. The proposition is tentatively advanced that the Presidential (and Vice-Presidential*) elections scheduled for the coming spring, offering as they do conditions favorable for the termination of the present dictatorship—projected though they may be against the reluctance of that dictatorship to relinquish its hold—will have their major importance in the power moves that will probably attend them. They should incidentally show reasonably clearly whether the Generalissimo and his political machine are working toward the establishment of constitutional government on a broad political base, or whether they constitute obstacles on the road to that democratic goal.
Respectfully yours,