Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East: China, Volume VII

893.00/2–648

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Minister-Counselor of Embassy in China (Clark)²⁶

[Nanking,] February 5, 1948.

I called today to pay my respects to Mr. Shao Li-tsu.²⁷ After a preliminary exchange of pleasantries I remarked to Mr. Shao that when I left China ten years ago²⁸ the Northern Expedition had been completed, China was becoming unified, and progress was being made in many lines, but now that I had returned to China, I found disintegration and deterioration. In this connection I asked Mr. Shao his opinion as to whether there was anything behind the recent disturbances in Shanghai—whether there were any Communists involved. Mr. Shao replied that there were three recent incidents, one involving students, one involving dance hostesses, and the third involving workers. He said that these must be considered separately. With respect to the incident involving dance hostesses he felt that there were no Communist elements behind it. As for the students’ affair he felt that while there were some Communist elements involved the majority of students who took part were not Communists. With respect to the workers’ riot he believed there were a small number of Communists implicated.

I told Mr. Shao that since my return from my trip to the South I had been disturbed at hearing a number of reports that people within the Kuomintang are advocating some sort of accommodation with the Communists and asked him whether there was such a group within the Kuomintang. Mr. Shao replied that the basic problem facing China today is the Communist problem. Referring to my remark concerning the contrast between the progress being made ten years ago and the deterioration evident today Mr. Shao stated that the difference is that at that time China was unified while today it is divided, very seriously divided. He said that there is within the Kuomintang a group of persons who feel that the military effort to overcome the Communists and destroy their armed forces has failed and they are, therefore, advocating a peaceful solution. He himself felt that a peaceful solution would be desirable but does not believe that attainable at the present time because the Communists are not willing to talk peace. This is apparent from Mao Tse-tung’s December speech in which he reviled all elements within the Kuomintang, not merely those advocating a military solution. Mao also reproached those within the Communist party who favored agreement with the Kmt, accusing them of being supporters of Chiang Kai-shek and opponents of the peoples’ revolution.

I asked Mr. Shao what he considered were the reasons why General Marshall²⁹ and Ambassador Stuart’s efforts to mediate had ended in failure. Mr. Shao replied that people held different opinions on this point. Some felt that General Marshall had not thoroughly understood the Chinese situation. However, he himself believed that the failure was due rather to mistaken estimates on the part of both the Central Government and the Communists. The Central Government had over-estimated its own military strength and had, therefore, believed that the failure of the peace talks would be of no great importance since the Communist armies could be smashed by military means. The Communists, on the other hand, under-estimated the strength of the Central Government, believing that it could be overthrown within a short time. Now both sides should re-assess their estimates. The Central Government should take a realistic view of its military strength and the Communists should realize that the Central Government is not easy to overthrow. Mr. Shao added that he had talked with Ambassador Stuart last year and also with Mr. Sprouse³⁰ when the latter was in Nanking as a member of General Wedemeyer’s³¹ mission and pointed out that the matter of first importance was to strengthen the Central Government armies. Only then would it be possible to solve the Communist problem. Mr. Shao remarked that one possible alternative would be a resolution of the differences existing between the United States and the Soviet Union following which the China problem could be solved. I asked whether Mr. Shao meant that the Soviet Union would act as mediator and Mr. Shao replied that the United States and the Soviet Union could jointly assist in solving the problem.

I commented to Mr. Shao that one thing that had disturbed me with respect to the possibility of building the National Government forces up to the point where the Communists requested to negotiate was that the Communists might take advantage of this opportunity to negotiate on the one hand while at the same time strengthening their position. Mr. Shao admitted that this was a possibility and it could not definitely be said that this would not take place.

26. Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in China in his covering despatch No. 53, February 6; received February 19.
27. Chinese State Councilor. The Third Secretary of Embassy (Clough) acted as interpreter at the conversation.
28. Mr. Lewis Clark was Second Secretary at Peiping until 1935.
29. General of the Army George C. Marshall, Special Representative of President Truman in China, December 1945–January 1947.
30. Philip D. Sprouse, Assistant Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs.
31. Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer, President Truman’s Personal Representative in China, July–August, 1947.