893.00/2–548: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 6—4:50 a. m.]
232. Symptomatic, we believe, of the increasing unrest and of disillusionment with the present Chinese Government were the recent disturbances in Shanghai. More than other races, the Chinese are inclined to look for a scapegoat when things go wrong and this case we have noticed an increasing tendency to blame the Generalissimo and to seek for an alternative to his regime.
Within 5-day period, January 29 to February 2, there were three major civil disturbances in Shanghai culminating in outbreaks or mob violence with destruction to property and loss of life and injury to both police and members of the mob. The Government’s explanation of these events was given in press conference of Shanghai Mayor on February 3 in which he stated that disturbances were “Communist stage-managed” and that “Shanghai is main objective of organized red mass uprising headquarters for the Yangtze valley area”.
We feel that question of Communist participation in these civil disorders is in large degree academic. While Communists undoubtedly eager exploit events to own ends, these situations are intrinsically manifestations of Government’s alienation of popular support through administrative ineptitude which has now progressed to a degree endangering Government’s stability. In each instance of civil unrest, an organized group appeared convinced that Government had acted unreasonably and arbitrarily against group’s economic or political interests. Government made no adequate arrangements for orderly settlement of points at issue, leaving group no alternatives except to abandon demands or present them through mass action. Government policing of individual situations was inept and exacerbated mass feeling to point where group became mob bent on violent retaliation for real or fancied wrongs. Police unable, or possibly unwilling, to restrain mob until after acts of violence had been committed.
These specific, local situations faithfully mirror Government’s predicament on national level, which is also largely of Government’s own making and for which Government’s sovereign remedy has so far also been force ineptly applied. In most of China north of Yangtze, principal elements opposing Government are Communist organized. In remainder of the country still under its control, Government’s futile attempts to eliminate all opposition and compel support and its failure to devise and implement adequate constructive policies for improvement in its position is rapidly bringing it to the verge of severe crisis which it can hardly hope to survive. Increased urban civil unrest on [Page 77] a large scale may well be the factor precipitating crisis, which the Communists obviously are prepared to exploit.
Growing pessimism and despondency of high Chinese civil and military officials with regard to economic, political and military deterioration has long been apparent. Recently there seems to have developed a sharper awareness of the fact that the Government may soon lack the minimum of popular support necessary for its survival. This trend approaches conviction on the part of most that the Government lacks capacity to extricate itself from the plight without foreign assistance and fear on the part of many that the Government’s position is hopeless even though foreign aid is forthcoming.
In this situation several types of response are taking shape. The Generalissimo and those most loyal to him favor strategy of continued resistance to the Communists and repression of other dissident or potentially dissident elements, while effecting such minimum reforms as are possible without antagonizing the most reactionary groups. This group hopes to sustain itself with whatever aid it can get, believing that in the final analysis it will be saved by a Soviet-American war.
Another indefinite grouping responds to the situation with the idea of seeking a negotiated peace with the Communists through the mediation of the Soviet Union, hoping to retain dominant influence and authority in a coalition government which would result from this mediation. Recent reports, unconfirmed but from credible sources, indicate that this group is gaining many adherents among the military and is already exploring means to contact the Soviets to negotiate mediation. While this group may not have yet achieved status of an anti-Government movement, probably because of lack of firm leadership, many factors strongly favor such development. Since the military elements in the group are preponderant, the possibility of defection among the armed forces cannot be overlooked.
The situation is very definitely one to cause pessimism. If American aid should materialize in adequate measure and palatable form, the tide may turn quickly in our favor. On the other hand, when details of American aid are announced, they will be weighed carefully by all, factions and if our plans are deemed to be insufficient, or unpalatable, or unlikely to be effective, it is more than likely that disaffection of some elements now in the Government may ensue. Such disaffection may well result in the replacement of present dominant elements with the group desirous of effecting union with the Communists through the good offices of the Soviet Union. As we have previously reported, the Generalissimo is unalterably opposed to such a move and if those favoring an arrangement with the Communists [Page 78] came into the ascendancy, his retirement from the scene would be inevitable.