Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East: China, Volume VII

893.00/11–2148: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

Nanking, November 21, 1948—2 p. m.
[Received November 21—9:28 a. m.]

2273. In view of the Secretary’s impending return to Washington and the continuing deterioration of the Nationalist position in China despite the temporary respite granted by developments around Hsuchow, Embassy believes recent changes in Chinese Communist position and political attitudes as shown in recent statements deserve serious consideration.

North Shensi broadcasts of October 30 and November 6, 9 and 10 not only seem to demonstrate complete ideological affinity between CCP and Moscow, but also represent a significant change in CCP policy as it was announced last winter by Mao Tse-tung and Jen Po-ta (reported in various Embassy despatches). Whereas at that time there were signs of conciliation to non-Communist groups and the US, the emphasis now is entirely in accord with Soviet line.

Broadcast October 30 (summarized Embtel 2049, November 1³⁷) reported and commented on alleged establishment of American anti-Communist espionage organization in China in style which suggests possible Soviet authorship. Perhaps most interesting feature of this broadcast is revelation of CCP fear that even after total defeat of Nationalist armies center and left wing trade union organizations will, under American stimulus, example, and economic pressure, resist absorption into CCP domination government. The statement that “it behooves camp of left to answer American secret police provocations with further consolidation of its own unity” betrays major CCP problem. It also suggests fear that American aid will be a growing factor in course of civil war. Article, though not without some factual basis, also gave us more credit than is due. Second broadcast (summarized Embtel 2259, November 18^37a) which contained Mao Tse-tung’s article commemorating thirty-first anniversary of October Revolution³⁸ expressed clearly basis of CCP international relations and support by stating “we have aid of Communist Parties and working classes of whole world”. Manifesting CCP ideological subservience to Moscow was flat statement that revolutionary forces everywhere “must organize anti-imperialist front headed by Soviet Union and pursue a correct policy. Otherwise there can be no victory”. In lingo of international communism four little words “pursue a correct policy” are hard to distinguish from “comply with Soviet policy”. In two places in his article Mao Tse-tung lists two major tasks of the CCP in following order (1) to oppose American aggression and (2) to overthrow Kmt rule. One conversant with Commmunist jargon would hardly doubt that [apparent omission] deliberately have first priority to opposing United States and second priority to crushing Kmt. Complete and unconditional loyalty of CCP to Soviet segment of this divided world was expressed in statement that “has history of 31 years not proved utter hypocrisy and thorough bankruptcy of all those who are neither satisfied with imperialism nor with Soviet Union and of all so-called ‘middle roads’ or so-called ‘third roads’ attempting to stand between counter-revolutionary front of imperialists and people’s revolutionary front against imperialism and its running dogs in various countries?”

Within field of CCP political theory, most interesting of all is condensation of article by Liu Shao-chi, leading member of Central Committee of CCP, which was featured in broadcasts of November 9 and 10 and is being transmitted to Department under cover of despatch.³⁹

Thesis of this labored but well thought out article is essentially that monopoly capitalism causes bourgeois nationalism which is responsible for imperialist aggression recently manifested by Germany and Japan and now by reactionaries of US and US-dominated countries. Opposing this aggressive force are USSR, Communist Parties and working masses of world who are intent only on achieving world unity and preventing enslavement of oppressed peoples.

In this article we discern three clear thoughts definitely establishing complete ideological affinity of CCP to Soviet Marxism:

(1) China’s liberated areas are thrice explicitly included in anti-imperialist camp which is allegedly composed also of USSR, Mongolian People’s Republic, Korea, East Germany, as well as people already liberated in Vietnam, Indonesia, Greece, etc;

(2) CCP reliance and faith in USSR is best expressed by following quotation: “Obtaining aid of Soviet Union, of world proletariat and Communists is most important condition for victory of all nations in winning liberation from imperialist oppression and defending national independence”.

(3) That CCP has selected its side in this divided world is established by following quotation: “If you do not stand in imperialist camp helping American imperialism and its stooges to enslave world and your own nation, you must stand in anti-imperialist camp helping all oppressed nations of world win liberation or struggling for liberation of your own nation, opposing American imperialism and its stooges in various countries—the reactionaries of various countries. This, at same time, helps Soviet Union and new democratic countries of eastern Europe, helps people’s democratic forces of America and all countries in world. Neutrality—standing neither on one side nor on other—is impossible”.

This is in our view major contribution to clarification of ideological position of CCP. We still know too little about actual domestic practice of Chinese communism as distinct from its theory even to be sure how fully CCP leaders are themselves sold on their own words for domestic practice as opposed to foreign relations. However, we are inclined to believe that correct treatment foreign missionaries and relief workers have received in CCP territory⁴⁰ and our Consulate General in Mukden⁴¹ are expedients during a transition period. We suggest likelihood CCP has adopted temporary policy of accommodation to foreign and domestic capitalist elements similar to that best exemplified by Lenin’s new economic policy in USSR from 1921 to 1927. Present indications from Mukden and Tsinan already indicate a tightening up in accordance with the familiar Communist pattern.

There are several possibilities as to why Chinese Communists, who until 2 or 3 months ago had been pursuing a distinctly conciliatory and moderate line much in the vein of the original new democracy, have now adopted a far more extreme position.

(1) In face of threat of Titoism toward which Chinese Communists adopted ambiguous attitude, Soviets may have directed Chinese Communists to make their international position conform more closely to Soviet views. As Soviets suffer continuing defeats in Europe, it must be expected that they will make all endeavors to consolidate as far as possible the Asiatic bloc.

(2) US has now made its position on communism so abundantly clear that Chinese Communists [may?] well have come to the conclusion that they have no hope of conciliating US either if they take over entire country or if they are leading member in coalition. They, therefore, may feel themselves compelled to improve their relations with their ideological brothers.

(3) This seems out of conclusion that rapprochement with US is impossible. Chinese Communists have been making strenuous endeavors to attract any groups in Government China which are in opposition to Generalissimo and right wing Kuomintang. These groups are increasingly bitter against the US either for what they believe to be its failure to provide sufficient aid to destroy Chinese Communists or because they believe American aid has simply prolonged the civil war. Appeal to anti-American sentiments in these groups would tend to draw them to Communists and further alienate them from ruling group in Government.

(4) These new statements do not necessarily indicate a basic change in attitude and policy. It may well be that development of events is now simply forcing them to state publicly what they have really believed all along. With their continued and expanding victories which now can reasonably give them hope of final success in China, Chinese Communists for first time become a major factor in world politics. Decisions on international relations which previously could be deferred must now be reached. If they hope to fill a recognized role in world politics, they must act accordingly. The boy, having become a man, must act like one. However reluctant they may be to face these decisions, it is no longer possible to evade them. Seeing no possibility of any kind of sympathy from US, they must make friends where they can find them. If the above reasons are correct, it can be expected that the pro-Soviet clique will in the future have greatly increased influence.

It seems likely to us that the Chinese Communists have probably made these public commitments with considerable reluctance. Straight Soviet line can hardly apply any more dogmatically in China than it has, say, in Yugoslavia and CCP must realize the difficulties which its implementation will create for them in China. Even granted the facts of international communism, the revolution which it is seeking to exploit in China will inevitably be conditioned by the social context in which it is operating. If Soviet activities in eastern Europe indicate anything, it is that they failed to realize this basic fact of politics. Chinese Communists in their internal politics can be expected to follow their own ideological interpretations as far as their capacity permits. On the other hand, Chinese Communists are not yet sufficiently strong to stand by themselves and must therefore accept a minimum of Soviet conditions in return for support. Foreign policy emphasis of recent statements indicate Communist conviction that their international relations must for the time being take precedence over other considerations.

Sent Department 2273; Department pass Moscow 85.

Stuart

37. Not printed.
38. Not printed.
38. Coup d’état on October 25, 1917 (November 7 by Gregorian calendar) whereby Bolshevik seizure of Government took place in Russia. For correspondence on the Russian revolution, see Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia, vol. i, pp. 224 ff.
39. Liu Shao-chi was Deputy Chairman of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party; despatch No. 486, November 29, transmitting text of article on “Nationalism and Internationalism” not printed.
40. For correspondence, see vol. viii , “Evacuation of Americans from China” (Ch. I).
41. See pp. 809 ff.