Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East: China, Volume VII

893.00/11–1748: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris, November 17, 1948—5 p. m.
[Received November 17—3:19 p. m.]

Delga 791. For Lovett from Rusk.¹⁷ Following is text memorandum of conversation between Tsiang (China) and Jessup.¹⁸ With reference to Tsiang’s statement as to attitude of Secretary, Secretary confirms that he presented the views substantially as reported by Tsiang.

Department’s comments and instructions are urgently needed as basis for reply to Tsiang. As personal opinion, believe matter such great importance Department should estimate situation without reference to possible temporary effects here during closing days of Assembly. Principal effect here would be further discouragement to those governments already deeply concerned over tense situation; on other hand, no one is under illusions about gravity China situation and full public recognition of world wide character present struggle might be distinct advantage. Suggest Butterworth carefully weigh question of proof of Soviet action in China since availability of proof would greatly affect general strength of China’s case before SC and before world public opinion.

Text memorandum of conversation follows:

“Tsiang called on me this morning to ask my personal advice concerning instructions he had just received from his government. They contemplated appealing to SC, probably under chapter VII, with reference to action of Soviet Union in assisting the Communists in war in China. Their appeal would be based on three points:

(1) Hindrances imposed by Soviet Government on re-entry Chinese into Manchuria after Japanese surrendered, which hindrances prevented Chinese Government from anticipating and meeting advance of Communist forces there;

(2) Russian assistance to Communists through supplies and military advisers during civil war;

(3) Impairment of independence of Outer-Mongolia.

Tsiang said that so far as matter of proof was concerned, they could clearly establish Soviet obstructions to re-entry into Manchuria, that in regard to aid to Communists, they could prove there was some aid but probably could not definitely prove extent of that aid; in regard to Outer-Mongolia, the treaty of 1945¹⁹ provided for subsequent diplomatic discussions which were to constitute part of treaty. The Soviet Union sent a note suggesting agreement on proposition that Mongolian people should be allowed a plebiscite to determine whether they wish to be independent. In the Chinese reply this was agreed to but the Chinese added a provision that the Soviet Union would respect the political integrity and independence of Outer-Mongolia; the Russians never replied to this additional Chinese point.

Tsiang said the maximum program they had in mind in the SC would be a resolution under chapter VII which would find that a threat to the peace exists as a result of Soviet action complained of and would call upon the Soviet Union to desist from its acts. The minimum program would be a generalized resolution which would not contain a finding of a threat to the peace or of Soviet aggression but would merely call upon all parties not to obstruct the Chinese Government in its lawful activities and not to aid those fighting against the Chinese Government. Tsiang said that frankly the thing which worried him, and he had so advised his government, was whether this appeal to the SC would interfere with US aid to China. He anticipated that it might be argued that once the matter was placed before the SC, the US should not ‘by-pass the UN’ and therefore should hold up any action until the SC dealt with the case. He said that on the other hand his government regarded the appeal to the SC as a matter of very great importance in convincing the Chinese fellow-travellers that the independence of their country was at stake. He also admitted, in reply to my question, that one of their prime objectives was to bring the Chinese situation into the world struggle against communism and to make people aware that the Chinese situation was just as important as the situation in Greece or elsewhere.

I told him this was a very grave question and I would not undertake to express a personal opinion. He then referred to his conversation with the Secretary and told me that the Secretary had given him to understand that while he could not undertake to advise the Chinese Government as to whether it should appeal to the SC, if they did make the appeal the US would support them in the SC.

He then discussed on a friendly, personal basis the various pros and cons. Tsiang agreed the two important elements were:

• 1st: Whether they could make a convincing case in the SC which would lead a majority of the Council to support some Chinese resolution;
• 2d: Effect on American aid to China.

Tsiang said he would be devoting his full time to this matter now and would not participate in the Palestine question in either the GA²⁰ or the SC.

Tsiang asked me to give the matter further thought and talk with him again.”

• [Rusk]
• Marshall

17. Dean Rusk, Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs.
18. Philip C. Jessup, Deputy U. S. Representative in the United Nations Security Council (SC).
19. Signed at Moscow, August 14, 1945; United States Relations With China, p. 585, or United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 10, p. 300.
20. United Nations General Assembly.