893.00/9–3048: Telegram
The Ambassador in China ( Stuart ) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 1—4:48 a. m.]
1807. Within past week Government armies have undergone severe reverses and Government’s total military position has become exceedingly critical. Successive Communist attacks have cut through Liaoning–Jehol corridor isolating Fan Han-chieh’s forces in pockets which can probably be reduced in detail. Main weight of attack is against Chinchow-Hulutao pockets, where defenders are outnumbered. Government garrison Ihsien still holding out, but fall anticipated by Sino Supreme Headquarters.
Situation between Kailan mines and Chinwangtao obscure. While [Page 478] Fu Tso-yi46 may regain control railroad, reports indicate it has been badly damaged and may be inoperable for considerable period time. Also, Fu appears to lack capability preventing further disruption rail transport. Kailan mines appear adequately protected at moment, but entire body regular units garrisoning Tientsin have been moved elsewhere leaving only police and local levies. Two Communist columns entering Kueisui area from south have forced Fu to increase his strength that area by moving two armies from Hopei Province. Another Communist attack of unknown weight against Tatung has begun, Government Monday finally admitted loss Tsinan. MND47 privately admits entire Government garrison killed or captured, and that Communists obtained enough matériel equip at least three additional columns. Nine columns which took city are now free for operations elsewhere, giving Communists large strategic reserve which Government totally lacks. While area their employment presently unknown and unpredictable, informed American opinion believes they will be ready for action within 2–3 weeks. Only small fraction this force would be required for reduction Chefoo and Tsingtao. Part of Tsingtao garrison was airlifted to Tsinan for defense that city, and Tsingtao now has only one under-strength brigade.
Government forces disposed along Lunghai railroad from Kaifeng to sea total 26 divisions. Against this Chen Yi can muster 18 columns. Liu Po-cheng,48 in northern Hupeh, can contain Government forces disposed north Hankow and still send three columns against western flank of Government Lunghai line. Also Liu has additional large forces, composition and strength of which are unknown, in area southeast of Kaifeng. Communists have clear capability, in terms numerical superiority alone, to isolate Hsuchow area and by-pass it. Government has no significant reserve to interpose between Hsuchow and Nanking.
At moment most critical sector for Government is Liaoning-Jehol corridor, where it appears that Fan Han-chieh’s main position may be overrun. Generalissimo has directed airlift one army from Mukden to Chinchow but Chinchow airfield lost before move completed. Generalissimo has also ordered Wei Li-huang to move westward to Fan’s assistance with major part his forces and has ordered Changchun garrison to provide diversion by breaking through blockade and marching to Mukden.
Rapid vigorous implementation this plan could conceivably restore Government control over corridor. Wei has ample troop strength and matériel for accomplishment mission. However, on past occasions [Page 479] Wei has refused to take offensive, violating direct orders of Generalissimo, and he may well choose to do so again or may not succeed in moving in time to avert collapse of corridor defenses.
Government situation Hopei Province equally, if not as immediately critical, since Fu Tso-yi faces severe threats in east Hopei, Kueisui and Tatung areas. While he could improve his position slightly by giving up Jehol and Paoting sectors, he is very hard pressed, with all available forces committed to action, and can expect no aid from any adjacent commander. If Communists respond to logic of situation and attack in Hopei with three or more columns now available to them through fall Tsinan, Fu’s position in Hopei will be untenable, and his retreat to Suiyuan would almost certainly follow.
Gravity of Government position along Lunghai is pointed out above. In this sector Communist dispositions such that disengagement Government forces for redeployment elsewhere is tactically difficult and may soon be impossible. Only reserve now available is Thirty-first Army recently finished training Taiwan, but without battle experience, which could be used either in support Hsuchow or as Tsingtao garrison. In neither case would it constitute decisive factor, for Communists can concentrate superior forces either point at will. Government training program not capable producing trained troops in quantity sufficient affect present situation.
Timing, scale, and location next major Communist move not apparent on basis present information. Initiative is theirs and they have capability concentrating decisive strength almost any area without sacrifice any their present positions. While effective employment Mukden garrison could ameliorate South Manchuria–North China picture temporarily and while Government armies along Lunghai are in aggregate a formidable force, our past experience does not entitle us to expect that either of these can do more than stabilize situation locally and temporarily.
On basis data above it would appear that Government armies north of Yangtze are in danger annihilation. Since Government has virtually no regular forces south of river and since replacement and unit training programs operate slowly, it would appear that the cessation of large scale, formal military resistance by Government may be only matter time. Indeed, there are those among our military advisers who believe effective military resistance by Government on any considerable scale limited to less than 6 months. While we must be prepared to accept possibility of Government military collapse, particularly in view rapidly growing numerical preponderance Communist organized units, we regard this possibility as not immediate. Communists, in present locations, still faced with serious supply problem, as well as with necessity for consolidation political control over areas they occupy. Furthermore, there are excellent reasons why they [Page 480] should prefer to exert their major political and military efforts in North China for some time to come.
AAG has participated in furnishing data for preparation above, and General Barr and service Attachés concur in it.