893.00/1–2048: Airgram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 5—9:16 a. m.]
A–22. Re Changchun’s No. 1 of January 8, 9 a. m. and No. 2 of January 8, 9 a. m. to the Department.88 In view of the active state of hostilities in Manchuria it is obviously difficult to obtain information of developments within Communist areas and even more difficult to evaluate that information. In the light of accumulated experience with Communist parties throughout the world in general, and Soviet activities in particular, the outline presented in the two telegrams from Changchun under reference seems wholly plausible and even probable since it fits the general pattern for which no reliable contradiction has been established in China. The Embassy agrees that direct and active Soviet military assistance probably does continue to be small if it exists at all (apart from the Japanese stores which were conveniently left behind—hardly a negligible factor), but it must be assumed that Soviet military assistance will be forthcoming in such quantity as may be necessary to assure Soviet objectives when, how and if that aid becomes indicated.
The Embassy cannot, however, agree with the statement that the Soviets probably do not desire to see the pace of Communist military success outstrip the pace of their own encroachment and control of the Chinese Communist Party. It seems well-nigh fatuous to the Embassy to assume other than that the Soviets are willing and able [Page 52] to step up the pace of their encroachment to any speed which may be indicated by developments. On the contrary, it would seem to the Embassy that with the apparent approach of increased American aid to the National Government of China it would be entirely consonant with Soviet interests that Chinese Communist victory be hastened by all means possible. The Embassy has complete confidence that the Soviets will know how to establish control over the Chinese Communists to any extent which circumstances may dictate—at least in immediate terms. The same obviously would apply to Changchun’s comments on possible schismatic arrangements in Chinese Communist leadership. There is little reason to believe, for the predictable future at least, that the Soviets will not be able to dispose of opposition elements in accordance with their own objectives, or, for that matter, that the most powerful groups in Chinese Communist leadership would elect to do other than follow Soviet lead.