893.00/6–3048
The Minister-Counselor of Embassy in China (Clark) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)58
Dear Walt: From your letter of June 1, 1948, I gather that we have not made ourselves too/clear on the subject of Marshal Li Chi-shen. The truth of the matter is we have no real idea as to the extent of his support in China, nor as to how much support he could attract were he to come to the mainland and set up an opposition. On the other hand, he and his supporters in Hong Kong speak with such assurance and in such positive tones as to indicate the possibility that there is something behind the movement. Li has even gone so far as to name names and to claim that his supporters in China include Fu Tso-yi, Wang Yao-wu, Yen Hsi-shan, Ma Hung-kwei,59 and Liu Wen Hui, the latter being Governor of Hsi-K’ang, who is said to be a great proponent of regionalism and provincial autonomy. Naturally we are using discreet methods to check whether there is foundation to Li’s claims in this regard. As you will have seen from our telegrams, it was Fred Schultheis60 who was originally impressed when he visited Hong Kong with the possible importance of Li and the KmtRC. Accordingly, I asked Fred to draft me an answer to your letter, and this he has done in a memorandum dated June 23, the original of which I enclose.61
I discussed Li Chi-shen and the KmtRC with T. V. Soong when I was last in Canton and found him most positive in brushing aside both Li and the Committee as of no consequence. He said any one who would pay sufficient money into the KmtRC till could be appointed Lieutenant General and he had within recent months arrested three such Lieutenant Generals whom he had not even bothered to execute.
As I see the situation at the moment, the Generalissimo is concentrating more and more authority into his own hands and no one else is permitted to do anything in any field without the Gimo’s prior consent. It is even reported that he was running around Kaifeng the other day like a Sergeant issuing orders hither and yon and interfering generally with the efforts to recapture the city. He himself seems utterly incapable, however, of taking the action necessary to improve conditions in China and there is a resulting impasse which [Page 332] is bringing the Government into increased disrepute and must inevitably result in its fall if something is not done to improve the situation. Nevertheless, those who speak of the inevitable fall of the present Government never seem to include the possibility of the removal from the scene of the Generalissimo. There is evidence, however, that the Generalissimo may envisage this possibility and he has of late been gathering about him henchmen he can trust fully, such as Ku Chu-t’ung, Yu Han-mou,62 and now Chen Yi who has just been appointed Governor of Chekiang. The venality and incompetence of those mentioned is well-known, but they are loyal to the Generalissimo and he can trust them to support him in his obvious determination to remain in power, come what may. Yet, should the Generalissimo stay in power, I see no prospects of improvement until the situation has first gotten much worse. It may conceivably get so bad that the Gimo may, by one means or another, be removed from the scene. Yet the Gimo seems to be the only element holding this vast country together, and should he go there would be a very strong chance that we would see a return to regionalism, making the pickings much more easy for the Communists. As we have reported, Li is the only visible successor to the Gimo who is actively campaigning to succeed him. Li Tsung-jen is a failure in this regard. After his election he saw the Gimo two or three times a week, yet they talked about nothing but the weather. The Gimo refused to consult with him on any matter of importance and Li was powerless to do anything about it. I have seen Li Tsung-jen several times since his election and he gives me the impression of being a bright young boy who has slipped unobserved by his parents into the company of his elders, is surprised to find himself there, and is at a loss to know what to do.
As I see it, what is needed, and what is needed most desperately, is inspired leadership or some measure, or measures, by the Government which will rally the people to its support and give them hope that at some time there will be an end to their present desperate situation. The people are rapidly reaching that mental stage where anything appears better than their present plight and there is an accelerated growth of opinion that an accommodation can be reached with the Communists which will bring peace and prosperity without Communist domination. In the meantime, the Government, confronted as it is with a rapidly deteriorating situation, seems helpless to do anything about it. It is befuddled and very much like the man whose house is on fire and he does nothing but wring his hands when he could call the Fire Department to his aid. It is a most dark picture and unless we can find some way to do the impossible, the Communist [Page 333] advance may be expected to continue practically unresisted. Except for Fu Tso-yi, Nationalist Government troops are just not fighting. Fu Tso-yi is a bright spot in the North and if we can find some way to encourage, and possibly aid, him, he should be able to stabilize that situation for an indefinite period. One other bright spot, yet one confirming the gloomy picture I have painted, was T. V. Soong’s63 most frank remark to me recently that he was begging, borrowing, buying and stealing all the arms and ammunition he could get his hands on in his efforts to make Kwangtung impregnable. He had been offered large authority in Fukien, Kwangsi and Hunan, but said he had refused until he could make Kwangtung impregnable. Once that had been done, he was prepared to enlarge his authority gradually, but only as he was able to defend such a larger area against all comers. In the meantime the defense of Kwangtung has top priority in his bailiwick. Incidentally, he gives the impression of being quite successful in that task and the AAG is just now beginning to establish in Kwangtung three training centers, at each of which a Division will be trained. T. V. Soong says he already has the arms. Who knows but that we may once again find ourselves witnessing a march north from Kwangtung reconquering the country from Communism as the Kuominchun recovered it from the war lords of yesteryear. All of which brings me to what I believe is the basic ill in our China. When the Kuominchun made its victorious march north, taking over from the war lords, it was young, inspired, and well led. Those leaders have now grown old, have waxed wealthy and soft. Their main interest is to preserve what they have acquired. The youth, inspiration and leadership are now being supplied by the Communists and they are going to win if leadership and inspiration are not provided to oppose them.
Very sincerely yours,
- Copy submitted by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs to the Secretary of State, and initialed by him.↩
- Lt. Gen. Ma Hung-kuei, Deputy Military and Political Affairs Director for the Northwest and Governor of Ninghsia.↩
- Frederic D. Schultheis, Attaché of Embassy.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Commander in Chief of Chinese Ground Forces.↩
- Governor of Kwangtung.↩