893.00/6–1448
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 21.]
Sir: I have the honor to report on the most recent political trends in this country. These continue to be so indeterminate that I tend to postpone such comments, knowing also of the messages that are being constantly sent from here by radio.
The crucial problem is still the personality of President Chiang. He is fully cognizant of the current deterioration. He listens patiently to warnings as to the inevitability of disaster unless new policies are adopted and to suggestions regarding these. He seems sincerely determined to act in accordance with the theory of his new office and under constitutional procedure. But there is actually very little change in his methods.
I had been hoping that with the appointment of General Ho Ying-ch’in as Minister of National Defense the military operations would be delegated to him with real authority and that General Barr could work closely with him. I had urged this course upon the President and had received his assurance of agreement provided only he were kept constantly informed. I had also discussed the matter more than once with General Ho who heartily concurred in the advisability of this plan and promised that he would do his best. Yet the President has just issued an order that all operations are to be carried out under instructions from him through the Chief-of-Staff—the incompetent Ku Chu-t’ung!
General Pai Ch’ung-hsi had been relieved of his post as Minister of National Defense, presumably for helping in the election of Li Tsung-jen. He was then offered the important task of commanding the troops in the five provinces between the Yellow and Yangtse Rivers and after long hesitation accepted, only to learn that he would [Page 299] not be allowed to organize local militia in this area—a feature which he has always strongly advocated—and that certain regions, such as that surrounding the Wu-Han cities, would be out of his jurisdiction. He thereupon withdrew his acceptance and left in disgust for Shanghai. The President showed no regret and remarked that this was of no importance. He seems suspicious that the Kwangsi Clique have designs against him and is thus alienating, or at least losing the effective cooperation of, men who by every test have been loyal both to him and to the national cause.
A few days ago I received by safe hand a letter from Marshal Li Chi-shen in Hong Kong expressing the desire to get in touch with me and intimating that the Communist issue was not impossible of solution. After some hesitation I showed the letter to the President who queried as he read it how much influence Marshal Li really had with the Communists. I replied that I was not so much concerned with the Communists as with the importance of all non-Communists getting together in the face of a common danger, sinking their personal animosities or political disagreements and putting the country above all else. I added that he should take the lead in this effort. He assented as usual and authorized me to use my discretion in following up the opening Marshal Li had given but to avoid sending him a letter signed by myself.
These instances of recent happenings will seem grimly familiar to you. I have more than ever a sense of frustration in endeavoring to influence the President’s thinking. I have an easy access to him and am invited to say anything to him without reserve. No Chinese dares to say to him what many even among his closer associates are now thinking and they are looking to me with a pathetic expectancy. And yet I feel impotent to accomplish anything that helps to reverse the downward trend. I sometimes wonder how much of his obduracy is due to temperament or habit and how much to suspicion or fear, especially of Russian and Chinese Communism. Of one thing we can be certain. If we could assure him that we would stand by him against his enemies and detractors, while insisting point by point that he observe his promises, we could get him to agree to almost anything. But of course this is out of the question. Meanwhile we are attempting the fine art of advising or urging without getting as deeply involved as he would gladly permit. General Barr has worked out quite a detailed memorandum which is now being confidentially translated and will be given to him in a day or two.
In this matter of giving advice we have, however, an internal problem among ourselves which is becoming more pressing. Admiral Badger is a capable and energetic officer who is fully aware of the present dangers and is anxious to help in the effort to improve things. [Page 300] The President and other Chinese have been quick to sense this and are most attentive to the Admiral who responds cordially. But this is proving quite embarrassing to General Barr and can easily encourage the Chinese to pit our Army and Navy against each other in their bid for assistance. Perhaps the basic anomaly is that the Admiral thinks primarily in terms of preparations for a possible war with Russia and outranks General Barr, while the latter is working under a restricted directive dealing only with a civil conflict in China. … Admiral Badger is due here tomorrow and I shall insist that I accompany him this time in any calls he makes upon the President. This is a temporary expedient which will indicate that Barr is the only American free to give over-all military advice in his own right and should protect against the expression of conflicting opinions among ourselves. I shall also try with Mr. Clark’s help to strengthen friendly personal relations between two men whose combined judgment ought to be very beneficial to the Chinese.
The Chinese appointed to deal with the American aid seem to be well chosen. The Premier, the Minister of Finance and the Governor of the Bank of China are all ex officio, but Wang Yun-wu and O. K. Yui were appointed respectively to these two positions at least partially with this in view. The other member of the Commission who alone will give full time is Dr. C. K. Yen, a man of exceptional ability and character. I have been urging alike with the Chinese and the Americans that they function as nearly as possible as a single team thus reaching composite conclusions, and that they put the emphasis upon getting results rather than being too much concerned with procedure. Even matters of honesty and efficiency will be taken care of if the objectives are kept steadily in mind and fortunately these are recognized by both groups to be identical.
Rural reconstruction, which has been my own “pet” interest, has its peculiar problems. The first of these is Dr. Yen24 himself. He is the ideal promoter, but is not so good as an administrator. He antagonizes Chinese colleagues by his manner and attitude. Entirely apart from any defects of his own he suffers from the jealousy of another’s success which is one of the most unlovely and characteristic Chinese traits. More specifically various Government agencies have shown themselves extremely anxious to get complete or partial control of this fund for their own needs, and the Party leaders will undoubtedly try to exploit it for political purposes. There is trouble already in trying to select the Chinese and American members of the Commission, and in finding a phraseology as to the relation of the Commission to the Administrator which does not infringe on Chinese [Page 301] sovereignty. But if it can be wisely organized it has immense possibilities for reforming the Kuomintang policies in the most crucial and most vulnerable feature of local administration.
There is very wide-spread anti-American sentiment crystallizing in protests against our efforts to strengthen Japan. This is being revealed by the vehement attacks upon my message to the students. It is rather puzzling to account for this phenomenon. To explain it as due entirely to Communist or Soviet instigation is an over-simplification. This has of course helped to create it by skilful propaganda and to organize it by agents planted both among faculties and students. But there must be a receptive need to have produced so general a response and among so many who are normally pro-American. This is perhaps caused in large part by a fear of Japan which began in the closing years of the last century and has become instinctive as well as deeper than we can readily imagine. It is aggravated by distorted reports of our activities in Japan, including those from Chinese official sources, by misconceptions and false inferences, by the publication of the Draper and similar reports, by the cynical assumption that we would not hesitate to sacrifice China in preparing for our private war with Russia, and of course by deliberate, unremitting and malicious propaganda. Another very real factor is the all but universal dissatisfaction with the present Government and the irrational but easily understandable association of America with its existence or its failings. The students, more highly sensitized than other elements of the population, are utterly dispirited and with no proper outlet for their patriotic urgings. An agitation against America for restoring their old enemy to a position of becoming again a potential menace has a curious appeal under these depressing circumstances. Apart entirely from these forebodings and their utilization by Communist and other anti-Government factions are the selfish and shortsighted commercial or industrial groups which seek to avoid Japanese competition. The extremely profitable and perhaps none too efficient Shanghai textile industry, for instance, wishes to maintain for itself the Chinese and Southeastern Asia markets. Thus strangely enough the extreme left and crassly capitalistic interests unite in disapproving our intentions in Japan. We cannot be too careful in carrying out those intentions to give no slightest cause for reasonable misapprehension.
Respectfully yours,
- James Y. C. Yen, General Director, National Association of Mass Education Movement.↩