893.00/6–1248
The Minister-Counselor of Embassy in China (Clark) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)
Dear Walt: Although the military situation has been deteriorating at an alarming rate during the past month, the attention of Government leaders has been directed almost entirely to political maneuvering and the election of a new Government.
With the selection of the Premier21 and the Cabinet, Government under the New Constitution has finally come into being. The personnel of the new Government is largely recruited from the old, and the new elements present are so dominated by the groups which held power before that no far-reaching changes in policy are likely.
In general, the reaction of the country to the new Government is most unfavorable. We have heard few expressions of faith that it is competent to improve the situation, and there is much talk that it will soon be replaced. When the National Assembly met, it was hoped by many that somehow, through its deliberations, a political renaissance would be effected, which would culminate in the creation of a strong Government capable of halting the spread of Communism. The Gimo was given extraordinary powers to achieve this end, and his critics offered their advice and their services to assist him. What was wanted of the Gimo was dynamic, effective leadership. The Gimo, however, has failed to respond to this demand. While he has retained his almost unlimited authority, he has come forward with no new program. His rejection of the services of Li Tsung-jen as an advisor, and his continued reliance on incompetent men to head the new Ministries combine to convince most people that his leadership will continue to be uninspired and essentially disruptive. Since it [Page 295] has become apparent that he intends to continue his personal rule, and has no intention of responding to the popular demand for change, widespread dissatisfaction develops, and the Gimo has become more unpopular than at any time in his career.
In view of this increasing dissatisfaction with the Gimo and his Government, it is surprising that there is no apparent popular demand for his removal from office. The opposition elements within the Government talk mainly in terms of supplanting the C. C. Clique and of offering the Gimo better and more disinterested advice. If there were open agitation for the Gimo’s removal, rather than covert dissatisfaction with his rule, Li Tsung-jen and certain groups in the Government would probably respond to it. But there is no popular, open movement in this direction, although the Gimo loses in prestige each day he fails to provide that leadership necessary to rally the people in defense against Communism. The prevailing mood is one of despair and resignation to what is regarded as the inevitable victory of Communism. Furthermore, there is a growing belief that Communism would be a not unattractive alternative to the present ineffective regime, particularly since such a change would bring with it an end to civil war.
As an accommodation with the Communists might be expected to include the removal from the scene of the Gimo with whom the Communists may be expected to refuse to deal, the question of his successor immediately arises and there is no obvious person available. The Gimo has dominated the scene for so long, no one stands out as capable of replacing him. Li Chi-shen of the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee is, of course, “available” yet we have no way of gauging the strength of his support. It might easily be some one within the Kmt itself. Nevertheless, we find it difficult to believe that the Gimo can be removed from the scene except at the expense of national unity. It was demonstrated most clearly in the Presidential election that it is the Gimo that holds this vast country together and that without him it would likely fall apart. Should he leave the scene and should regionalism result, the Communist task would be made much more easy.
In the military field, it is obvious that the Communists continue to gain and the Government appears incapable of saving that part of China not yet in Communist hands. The military position of the Government is deteriorating rapidly and has become critical in several areas. The Government armies in Manchuria are virtually isolated, must inevitably be contained in their present positions by siege and cannot influence the military decision in China proper, even though their capitulation should be long postponed. The Communist offensive in Jehol is succeeding in reducing the local Nationalist garrisons, and Fu Tso-yi finds himself under heavy attack along the Jehol border. [Page 296] While General Fu should be able to stop the initial assault against his northern defenses, the fact that he has large Communist armies on his flanks and his rear makes his situation dangerous. It is probable that, as the campaign progresses, the Manchurian Communists will be able to secure a foothold on the North China Plain.
Except for a minor Nationalist victory in Northern Kiangsu, there have been no Nationalist successes through the past month. A large Communist concentration has crossed the Yellow River without opposition northwest of the junction of the Lunghai and Tsinpu railroads. The Tsinpu has been cut near Taian, isolating Tsinan. Lin-yi, the last Government garrison in Southern Shantung, is now under attack, and is not expected to offer prolonged resistance. The Communists are in sufficient force just north of the Lunghai to besiege Hsuchou, or to by-pass that point and drive toward the north bank of the Yangtze, near Nanking. While their intentions are not yet clear, the latter move remains a strong possibility.
Observers report no improvement in the morale of the Nationalist forces, now at a dangerously low ebb. Field Commanders and troops are unwilling to fight, except as a last resort, and large-scale defection of combat elements confronted with battle can be expected to continue. While the Government’s military situation has probably not yet become critical in the sense that a general military collapse is imminent, only inspired and dynamic military leadership can long postpone, let alone avert, that eventuality, and there are no officers having such qualities in positions of authority.
The general public is well aware of the continuing deterioration in the political, military and economic spheres and is disillusioned and despairing of improvement. In this situation, the notion that stability can come only through the cessation of the civil war has become an idée fixe, the currency of which spreads rapidly. Thus, the people of Nationalist China become less and less inclined actively to resist Communism. In this state of mind, our China Aid Program is condemned, even by its direct beneficiaries, as a factor prolonging the civil war. Since the Government prohibits anti-civil war propaganda, this condemnation of our aid is sublimated and transferred into an attack on our policies in Japan by student groups and other elements of the population. This nascent anti-American feeling is, of course, exploited and fanned by Communist propaganda organs, and is further fostered by some elements of the Government-controlled press, which uses this means to distract attention from the Government’s own shortcomings. There is inherent in this situation a very grave danger to the American position in China. We still have in this country a large backlog of good-will, particularly among the educated classes. However, in their present suffering the people [Page 297] of China do not discriminate between friend and enemy. Nor do they clearly perceive where their interests lie. In the eyes of many Chinese, we bear the onus for supporting and keeping in power an unpopular regime which does not have the interests of the country at heart. We are blamed for preventing its replacement by a government which promises, as they see it, to be an improvement. And we are further condemned because the regime we support patently fails to meet the minimum requirements that any people asks of those who rule it. This state of mind, we believe, is playing no small part in the present student anti-American campaign.
On the other hand, recent reports from Communist territory indicate that the Communists have difficulties of their own. The principal of these is a shortage of qualified administrative personnel for political posts, and a lack of personnel with the more advanced economic skills. Their revolutionary program and propaganda are now designed to secure the support of potential administrators, but the violence and brutality which has characterized their political activity continue to alienate many. However, in appealing to administrators and to persons possessing knowledge of advanced agricultural, industrial and commercial techniques, the Communist leaders have had to jettison their practice of economic egalitarianism. This costs them at least some of the support of the agrarian and industrial proletariat which forms the mass basis for their revolution. Although the Communists have been spectacularly successful in the military sphere, their victories have been over a most incompetent opponent. Should the efficiency of the Government armies be restored, even to its wartime level, the Communists could no longer hope for cheap victories. Indeed, as the military situation now stands, the Communists may be forced to undertake campaigns involving formal, positional warfare. The Communists have yet to win a battle under such conditions, and should the Government armies dictate the conditions of battle, as they are capable of doing, some large Communist defeats can be anticipated.
It is a black picture, yet in the final analysis, we incline to the belief that the situation of the Government, critical though it is, is not entirely beyond repair. The adoption of only a few positive policies would improve its position immensely. What the Government now suffers from as much as anything is that its own personnel and its own supporters have no confidence in it. To cite a single instance, General Kuo.22 commanding the Combined Service Forces, has told one of the staff officers of AAG23 that the Executive Yuan [Page 298] is refusing to provide funds for certain military expenditures on grounds that the civil war is already lost.
We are doing what we can to bolster morale in Government circles and we are leaving no stones unturned in our efforts to assure that advantage will be taken of the respite afforded by the Aid to China Program to institute the reforms and find the leadership necessary to rally the people and encourage them to resist Communist expansion. If those vast numbers who do not want to be Communists can be given even one ray of hope it may yet be possible to turn the tide though time is rapidly running out.
Yours very sincerely,