893.00/5–2948: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 29—8:45 a. m.]
974. After consultation with Military Attaché,78 we believe Wei Li-huang lacks capability mount offensive against Liaoyuan on scale necessary take that point, Mukden’s 221, May 24. Wei’s primary problem is one of supply for army and civilian population Mukden area. This dictated offensive action southwestward to open land communications with Chinchow. Although bulk of Communist forces were reorganizing north Mukden through 6 weeks’ period just past, Wei categorically stated that he was unable open this line. Recent Communist moves toward Chinchow effectively contain Chinchow garrison and prevent its movement to effect junction with Wei’s forces. Thus, in our opinion, Wei lacks capability take only action which would improve his logistic situation, which is his primary concern.
Changchun garrison, surrounded [by] sixth CCP column plus 12 independent divisions, is being driven into city fortifications and could not participate in coordinated attack on Liaoyuan. Communists have protected Liaoyuan supply base through seventh offensive and can continue to protect it, even though they are now moving forces into Jehol and Chinchow area.
Present airlift supplies Chinchow to Mukden meets less than minimum army needs and fails to alleviate food shortage civilian population. Shortage aircraft and other factors impose practical limits on scale this operation, which only postpones acutely critical material shortages for Wei’s troops. Ministry National Defense states that no reinforcements can be furnished northeast until Communists are driven from central China. While Ministry has 6 months’ timetable for this operation, there is little prospect that it will meet with any substantial success within that, or even longer, period unless there is a complete reversal of present trends.
Although Wei has undoubtedly improved Government’s military position in northeast, limitations imposed on him by shortage of troops and growing scarcity food make him powerless take further action remedy his, strategic position and enforce on him purely defensive role in which his strength is gradually and inevitably reduced by attrition. He can conduct very long-term defense Mukden against forces Communists now able bring against him, and there is no apparent reason why Communists should attempt take Mukden by assault. However, under conditions now obtained and likely obtain through predictable future, there is no likelihood that Government forces south [Page 266] of Wall can come to his relief. It looks to us, therefore, as though Wei has no recourse other than to sit tight in Mukden and await eventual Communist assault when his defenses have sufficiently deteriorated.
Sent Dept 974. Dept pass Mukden as 103.
- Brig. Gen. Robert H. Soule.↩