Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East: China, Volume VII

893.00/5–2848: Telegram

The Consul General at Shanghai (Cabot) to the Secretary of State

Shanghai, May 28, 1948—6 p. m.
[Received May 28—8:50 a. m.]

1207. Chase,⁷⁷ returned from 8-day Fukien trip, reports by way of preliminary summary following outstanding impressions of Fukien Chinese political attitudes based on opinions expressed to him by numerous missionaries, other foreigners in daily contact with natives and on his own personal talks with many officials and other Chinese:

1. Evidence overwhelming great majority people believe Nanking regime as hitherto constituted is utterly hopeless and no alleviation of nation’s ills can be expected until Generalissimo and his reactionary politicians are ousted and until war is ended. Unpopularity of Generalissimo is everywhere apparent and need for riddance of “whole Soong dynasty” was frequently expressed.

2. Testimony without exception indicated general popularity of Li Tsung-jen and strong approval by public and most officials of his election, though some voiced fears he lacks sufficient power to lead accomplishment of needed reforms. Wong Wen-hao’s appointment also very popular. (Some sympathy for Li Chi-shen, with hope of his reaching understanding with Li Tsung-jen, was sensed, though not conclusively established.)

3. Re Communism, most significant factor is not what can be seen of tangible Communist achievements such as guerrilla penetration and student agitation, which seem markedly less advanced than in Yangtze area, but what might be described as nonresistibility to Communism. This characteristic attributable to economic misery, disgust with present regime, susceptibility to Communist propaganda and conviction in superior strength of Communists, appears to have significantly affected thinking among all groups of population from peasants to intellectual and even official circles.

4. There is universal hatred of military conscription and intense desire to end war which is regarded as doomed to failure and cause of country’s entire economic plight.

5. Resultant prevalent mood of province does not yet seem of dynamic character threatening positive action toward overthrow present government. In keeping with province’s traditional overseas orientation and relative isolation from interest in national affairs, it appears to be more a negative and defeatist attitude, which, while not seeking to aid or embrace Communism, feels it perhaps worth trying as offering at least as much as present regime and in any case not alarming enough to justify risk of actively opposing it. This attitude is believed to account for apparent disinterest of officials in facing Communist issue squarely and would probably result in province offering no more resistance than it did to Japs in event of Communist push across Yangtze.

6. Despite disgust with Nanking and war and susceptibility to Communism thought, anti-foreignism is less evidenced than at Shanghai and feeling toward America generally very friendly though many seem to hope for renewed American help in negotiating peace with Communists and/or US–USSR rapprochement

Local officials, while friendly, are generally characterized as colorless, ineffectual and unusually corrupt. Noteworthy exception is governor, whom foreigners regard as able administrator. Influence of CC clique and Kmt generally is much less than at Shanghai.

Sent Nanking 962, repeated Department 1207, pouched Canton and Hong Kong.

Cabot

77. Augustus S. Chase, Consul at Shanghai.