893.00/5–2248: Telegram

The Ambassador in China ( Stuart ) to the Secretary of State

928. Inauguration of new President was held on the morning of May 20 at a simple but impressive ceremony. The Generalissimo delivered a brief inaugural address in which he said nothing to which anyone could take exception and whose content, if carried out, would go a long way toward solving the internal problems of China. The only flaw in the ceremony was that Li Tsung-jen was largely ignored and was kept in the background at presentation of Diplomatic Corps.

Meanwhile, impasse over Legislative Yuan is entering a new and more serious phase. Chang Chun abandoned all pretense to the office by departing for Chungking May 21. Chen Li-fu had previously informed the Generalissimo that Chang Chun could have no expectation of securing vote of confidence in Legislative Yuan. Two leading contenders now are T. V. Soong and Ho Ying-chin, both of whom are uncertain they can command sufficient majority in Legislative Yuan to persuade them yet to accept office even though Soong is CC clique candidate.

The struggle now seems to have passed beyond the stage of personalities and into the realm of a major rebellion within interior party circles to leadership of Generalissimo. The failure of Soong as CC clique candidate to obtain assurances of large majority is one [Page 252] indication thereof. Another indication is that May 20 the Generalissimo ordered a certain motion passed by CEC62 and lost it. He blames Chen Li-fu for this failure and has ordered him to resign from the CEC. Embassy will attempt to ascertain nature of motion. Evening May 20 Generalissimo entertained CEC at tea party. Less than two-thirds of members showed up. Disobedience of such a request, which normally would have been considered as a royal command, combined with inability to form Cabinet, is reported to have Generalissimo in highly nervous and irresolute state of mind.

Present course of action devised by CC clique has Generalissimo’s approval:

(1)
Ho Ying-chin to be given a final offer of Premiership and made to make his position very clear. Greatest possible pressure will be used on Ho.
(2)
If Ho refuses it will be offered to Soong. He will accept if he feels he can command sufficient majority of the Legislative Yuan.
(3)
If Soong refuses, Ho will be ordered to assume it and take his chances with the legislature, thus attempting to force CEC opposition to Generalissimo into the open. Soong might well then be put in charge of administering the American aid program. In light of developments during past week, prognostication of future developments is, of course, open to revision without notice.

This intra-party rebellion is doubtless more serious than that which the Generalissimo faced in the election of Li Tsung-jen because it is a rebellion in the inner circle on which Generalissimo has for years based his strength. If he fails at this juncture it will be difficult for him to reestablish his control. It must also be admitted that Chen Li-fu has given a good account of himself in the face of enormous odds. Confronted with a major revolt throughout the entire length and breadth of the party he still holds a major hand and he plays it well. Unlike many other party leaders he is demonstrating ability to play politics in the open as well as behind the scenes.

The activities of Li Tsung-jen during this period are still obscure. As far as can be ascertained at the moment, he seems to be largely passive. This may be partially due to a nervous let-down after a strenuous campaign. It may be also partially due to a weakness of leadership. He has stated privately that he does not know what to do now because the Generalissimo controls the Army, the Government finances and the party machine. For a brief period he even appeared to have given some consideration to going to the US on the grounds that he could accomplish more there than here.

Another development of some importance is the report, apparently true, that General Wang Yao-wu is being relieved of his military [Page 253] command63 and his governorship of Shantung. He would be a serious loss to the National Government because he is one of the ablest military commanders in China and has had a highly successful and distinguished record as Governor of Shantung, which is his native province. There is one factor against him. It must be known by the Central Government by this time that Wang, for almost a year now, either directly or through trusted lieutenants, has been considering the establishment of an autonomous regime in Shantung under his own leadership; that he has discussed this question with various Americans, and that in recent months he has approached American officials on the possibility of obtaining American financial and military support for his regime should he feel developments in Nanking warrant such action on his part. The situation in Shantung is hardly improved by the possibility that Wang would be succeeded by General Teng Wen-yi64 who has never commanded troops and has been a conspicuous failure as military spokesman in Nanking, but is Whampoa and completely loyal personally to the Generalissimo. Telegram has just been received from Shantung Provincial Assembly requesting financial and military aid for Shantung apart from that for National Government.

Stuart
  1. Central Executive Committee (Kuomintang).
  2. Second War Area.
  3. Director of the Information and Civil Affairs Bureau of the Chinese Ministry of National Defense.