893.00/5–2148

The Consul General at Hong Kong ( McKenna ) to the Ambassador in China ( Stuart )61

No. 3

Sir: I have the honor to refer to previous despatches from this office concerning the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee, and to furnish the Embassy with a summary of an interview on May 10, 1948, between Attaché Frederic D. Schultheis, of the Embassy at Nanking, and Marshal Li Chi-shen. Mr. C. Y. Li of Marshal Li’s organization and Vice Consul R. M. Service of this office, were also present at the interview, which was held at the home of Mr. C. Y. Li at 9 Tungshan Terrace, Hong Kong. The interview was arranged in an effort to avoid Chinese Communist knowledge of its occurrence, and it was hoped that Marshal Li would discuss frankly with Mr. Schultheis the program of the KmtRC.

Marshal Li opened the interview with a 45-minute review of the history of the Kmt and the Generalissimo’s role as dictator of the party and of China. He stressed his own long record of association with General Li Ts’ung-jen, asserting that he and General Li had been in a position to cause the military collapse of Chiang at one time, but that they hoped that he would revive the revolutionary spirit of the Kmt and institute necessary reforms. Marshal Li stated that he has always urged Chiang to consider the interests of the people, but that Chiang consistently has refused to do this, and that there is no possibility that he will change his policy now. He said that conditions within China have become so serious that the Gimo and his close followers are becoming more concerned with their struggle for survival in power than they are with seeking effective means to cope with the rapid deterioration of the economic and military situations. Marshal Li pointed out that growing awareness by Kmt leaders of this selfish preoccupation of Chiang and the CC Clique, and of their inability to command the support and respect of the people in a degree sufficient to save the nation, is paving the way for early renunciation of the Generalissimo’s leadership by the great majority of the party.

As Marshal Li categorically had stated that the Gimo and the CC Clique inevitably will collapse, he was asked if this collapse would occur as the result of Communist military and political pressure, or if the Revolutionary Committee expected actively to participate in bringing Chiang’s regime to an end. Marshal Li assured Mr. Schultheis that the KmtRC plans to take action which will result in the collapse [Page 249] of the Chiang regime and the establishment of a coalition government. He pointed out that everyone desires a cessation of the civil war, and that it therefore is vitally important that the KmtRC take the action which will lead to the re-establishment of peace. This will assure it of recognition and support, and will inspire confidence in the party.

In reply to a question as to the possibility of the resumption of the civil war at some time after the esablishment of the projected coalition government, Marshal Li replied that he did not consider this a likelihood. In discussing this subject, Marshal Li implied that the overwhelming support which the reformed Kmt would receive from the people would so curtail Communist influence that the Communists would be incapable later of waging a successful civil war for the control of China. It was obvious from the Marshal’s statements that he expects to receive very great support from all classes and groups in China. He claimed that a great majority of the Chinese people favor the Kmt, that they fundamentally are opposed to Communism, and that they will rally to the Kmt when it is placed on a revolutionary basis dedicated to the interests of the people and implementation of Dr. Sun’s program. He did not consider relevant in China the characteristic of Communists elsewhere in the world to seek to attain control of individual countries in which Communist organizations function aggressively. While he admitted that the Communists have worked relentlessly in various European countries to acquire dictatorial control through all possible means, he said that the situation in China is entirely different, and that the Communists here are dissimilar in important respects to Communists elsewhere. (Although Marshal Li rejects the possibility that the civil war might be resumed at a later date after the Communists discovered that the rapid expansion of their following had declined or been halted under a coalition government, it must be conceded that a reformed Kmt which was capable of coping with the Communists politically in a coalition government would enjoy greater possibilities of success in a resumption of the armed struggle than does the present Government.)

Mr. Schultheis informed Marshal Li that the Embassy is interested in all phases of political developments in China, and that it desires to be accurately informed of all programs which possibly may affect the Chinese scene. He said that he hoped that Marshal Li would be willing to continue to furnish the Embassy, through this office, with information concerning his program, and assured the Marshal that all such information would receive the most discreet treatment by the Embassy. Marshal Li replied that he appreciated the opportunity to maintain contact with the Embassy through the Consulate General, and promised his continued cooperation.

[Page 250]

In connection with the foregoing account of Mr. Schultheis’ interview with Marshal Li Chi-shen, there is included below a summary of statements recently made by C. Y. Li concerning the KmtRC.

Mr. Li informed Mr. Service that Marshal Li’s understanding with the Chinese Communists dated from conversations which he held with Chou En-lai in Shanghai before the return of Chou to the Communist areas after the breakdown of the Marshall negotiations. According to Mr. Li, General Chou and the other Communist leaders who conferred with Marshal Li on the subject of the establishment of a coalition government promised Marshal Li that he could depend upon Communist support for the position of head of the new government, that the entire question of the purging of party members of the Kmt would be left to Marshal Li and his associates, and that the Chinese Communist and Central Government forces would cease all military operations and would remain in their positions from the moment when the Generalissimo ceased to control the Central Government. C. Y. Li made this statement when he was asked with whom the KmtRC is negotiating at present in their relations with the Communists. He said that the local Communist leadership is well aware of the basic understanding which exists between Marshal Li and the Chinese Communist party.

A few days after Mr. Schultheis’ interview with Marshal Li on May 10, Mr. Li informed Mr. Service that Marshal Li had not spoken as frankly or fully of the actual plans of the Revolutionary Committee as he would have cared to. When asked to explain why Marshal Li had refrained from furnishing Mr. Schultheis with all information which it was possible to release to the Embassy at this time, Mr. Li replied that Marshal Li had told him after the interview that he had hoped to be shown positive credentials establishing Mr. Schultheis’ identity; it appears that the Marshal had expected Mr. Schultheis to exhibit a letter from Ambassador Stuart, or some similar document, empowering him to receive from the Marshal information of the “eyes alone” type for the personal and top secret information of the Ambassador. Mr. Li explained that the Marshal is extremely cautious in making known to the Embassy vital information which, if leaked, would seriously compromise success of the movement. He said that it was his personal impression that the Marshal was willing to furnish Ambassador Stuart with considerably more definite data than had been given thus far, and that he would be willing to give such information to a senior member of the Embassy staff, if such an officer specifically was authorized by the Ambassador to see the Marshal, and was instructed by the Ambassador to transmit the information only to the Ambassador himself. It may be assumed that the [Page 251] Marshal, on the one hand, is desirous of establishing amicable relations with the Embassy, while on the other hand, he is unwilling to take any chances on the premature release of information which might embarrass his movements.

In illustration of the danger of information leaks, C. Y. Li informed Mr. Service that Marshal Li recently has received word from Li Ts’ung-jen concerning one of the last pre-election interviews of Li with the Generalissimo. In this interview the Gimo is alleged to have informed General Li that he (Chiang) had not been opposed to the election of General Li to the position of Vice President until the receipt of written and positive evidence that General Li was pledged to cooperate with Marshal Li and the Revolutionary Committee. The Gimo is alleged to have accused General Li of betraying his party and conspiring to turn the country over to the Communists, and to have assured Li that he would prevent his election at all costs.

Respectfully yours,

James E. McKenna
  1. Copy transmitted to the Department by the Consul General without covering; despatch; received June 9.