893.00/5–348: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received May 4—6:42 a. m.]
798. The National Assembly which was convoked solely to elect the president and vice president developed quickly into something far more basic. Success of Generalissimo’s 1948 version of the retreat to Fenghua16 confirmed him in power personally, but struggle over vice presidency ended in rejection of his policies. Unquestionably the vice presidential race was the most significant development in the Assembly. There can be no question but the balloting was above the slightest suspicion of fraud. Sun represented the dead reactionary aim of the party machine and his election would have meant the unchallenged continuation of the old political policies, preservation of vested interests, and the elimination of any prospect of that revitalization of the party and Government which was necessary to give hope of ultimate success in the face of a dynamic Communist movement. Whatever he may turn out to be in practice, Li Tsung-jen during the campaign became the symbol and the rallying point of discontented and progressive elements who had lost faith in those controlling the Government and who demanded new faces and new and more effective policies. Li represented a demand for effective government in contrast to the lack of achievement of the discredited group in power. Lacking experience or organization, his supporters challenged the party machine and won. It now remains to be seen whether Li can provide that kind of dynamic leadership which will coalesce these elements into effective opposition and give substance to the program on which Li based his candidacy.
Li’s victory was a disastrous blow to the CC clique which not only failed to deliver in one of the most important jobs ever assigned to it [Page 222] but also seriously undermined the position of the Generalissimo himself by misinforming him on what he could expect. Most of the opposition criticism was directed at the person of the Generalissimo for attempting to nullify democratic procedures. Much of the criticism directed at him should more properly have been turned on the CC clique, but the adverse effect on his prestige exists nonetheless. The Generalissimo’s position is made doubly difficult by the fact that he openly and bitterly opposed the man with whom he must now work. It remains to be seen how he will accommodate himself to this situation. In this sense he continues to be as in the past—the key man. If he attempts to oppose Li and to box him in, he will drive Li to increasingly desperate moves since Li gives all indications of intending to be active in the national life. The Generalissimo on the other hand is a practical man and a politician. If he concludes that Li represents the dominant force in Nationalist China and decides that he cannot destroy him, he may well decide to join him, at the same time discarding his previous sources of power. He is reported to have been exceedingly angry over the election of Li. He may indeed now be too old and has been in undisputed power too long to adjust himself, or he may again demonstrate that he is still the master politician in China. The decision is his.
The Kmt was originally a revolutionary party and the revolutionary tradition remains strong within it. The party is still committed to the activation of the principles of Sun Yat-sen. Kmt dissident groups in Hong Kong and abroad have adopted reform slogans and policies, and in recent months even more conservative groups within party have been talking in similar terms. The source of this interest in change is the pressure of the success of the Communist revolution. The action of the Assembly confirmed the Generalissimo in power but rejected his anti-reform policies. In his present constitution position he can either accept and implement, or deny the popular demand for change. However, Li’s election also gave this demand a constitutional and legal status, and it may be this circumstance which will constrain the Generalissimo to include new talent in his Government and adopt the policies which will represent an attempt to combat revolution by social change. Further proof this is realized is that the two principal defeated candidates, Sun and Cheng Chien, have already started to organize what they call reform groups.
There has yet been no reaction from the Communists. Unless, as is rumored, they have substantial reason to believe that Li is prepared to compromise with them and to take them into a coalition government more or less on their own terms, they must be disappointed, realizing that the election of Sun would have favored continuous growth of a situation calculated to foster Communist causes.
[Page 223]The other group to be considered is the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee in Hong Kong. This committee claims to have a definite time scheduled now for the removal of the Generalissimo. It is known that the committee and T. V. Soong have been making the coyest kind of eyes at each other from afar, just in case such a misalliance might prove convenient. The committee claims that it has maintained closest contact with Li Tsung-jen during recent months. If these allegations are correct, then it may well be that the claimed timetable has foundation and that the struggle in the Assembly was but the first round in a life and death struggle between the Generalissimo, the CC clique and the Whampoa clique on the one hand, and Li and his associates on the other. If the civil war and economic deterioration continue on their present disastrous course Li and his associates seem assured of eventual success, with increasing probabilities that Li from choice or necessity will be driven into an understanding with the Communists. We shall have to watch developments with extreme care, yet our efforts should, we believe, be directed toward influencing Generalissimo to accept the situation and support more liberal policies.
- Fenghua was Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s birthplace in Chekiang; he retired there upon resigning from the Nanking Government in August 1927. For correspondence on this subject, see despatch No. 1204, September 22, 1927, from, the Charge in China, Foreign Relations, 1927, vol. ii, p. 22.↩