893.00/5–148: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

782. Past week has seen considerable deterioration Government military position in China proper, involving loss Weihsien and isolation Hsian. Weihsien fell before exceptionally heavy Communist assault in which heavy artillery was used in reducing strongly fortified well-defended and well-supplied position. Adjacent Nationalist commanders failed provide relief, which was within their means. Air force cooperation was faulty and largely ineffective. Over-all coordination and direction of entire defensive campaign was conspicuous by its absence. Since Government naval blockade ineffective, [Page 215] Communist capture Weihsien gives them uninterrupted line communications from Liaotung peninsula to northern Kiangsu and Government’s lack capability take offensive permits Communists concentrate for major drive toward Yangtze delta should they so desire.

Although details are lacking, isolation Hsian appears to have followed collapse Hu Tsung-nan’s defenses in Wei River valley. While Kansu troops are reported to be regaining control Hsian-Lanchow highway, it is not likely that they can drive Communists from Hsian plain. Northern defenses Szechuan are now threatened.

Other fronts relatively quiet. Manchurian Communists continue regroup and rehabilitate rail communications. On bases present information, their intentions regarding next offensive move are unpredictable. Communists now control over half Hupeh Province, mainly north and west Hankow. In this area they are reported recruiting on large scale and reorganizing their forces, particularly in vicinity Shasi. Some units reported to have crossed river to west of Tung-ting Lake and Government has established field headquarters Changte to counter such move. Small Communist cadres, probably organizers, are reported to have crossed Yangtze near Kiukiang and Government appears unable dislodge Communist force operating north bank Yangtze near Nantung.

It is our belief that Communists now engaged in building up military strength and concentrating in preparation future major offensives. Up to present Communists have won economical victory through reduction Government strength by steady attrition and through keeping Government on defensive by isolation of the several fronts, sporadic raids and constant harassing of Government communication. Given concurrent progressive deterioration Government’s economic and political positions and seeming inevitability their general collapse, it is difficult to see why Communists should abandon present successful strategy which involves only slight expenditure manpower and material.

However, in Weihsien battle Communists suffered extremely heavy losses to take point which has no immediate value to them, but which would have great strategic importance if Communists were to embark on massive offensive toward Yangtze delta. Similarly, Communist lodgements on Hsian plain and western Hupeh can be explained as desire concentrate in places of strategic importance to future large scale offensives.

We believe these developments may indicate change in Communist strategic concepts. One possible explanation such change is feeling on their part that American aid, particularly in its military aspects, will so improve Nationalist military position that they must expedite completion their military program before Nationalists develop capability [Page 216] forestall them. Also Communists doubtless believe our military aid will be increased to protect economic aid if necessary. Finally, Soviets, desiring see rapid spread Communist control to prevent possible development American bases on Chinese soil in event war between United States and Soviet Union, may be advising this apparent change strategy.

Stuart