Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East: China, Volume VII

893.00/4–2748: Telegram

The Consul General at Shanghai (Cabot) to the Secretary of State

Shanghai, April 27, 1948—1 p. m.
[Received April 27—9:51 a. m.]

933. Reference statement in second paragraph of Embtel 725, April 21 to effect that, since Communist supporters believe present regime confirmed and continued in power by recent American aid, more violent anti-American propaganda campaign by Communists can be anticipated.

Of the politically alert population of Nationalist China, there is a very large proportion which is fundamentally anti-Communist and anti-revolutionary; which considers however that Nanking regime as presently constituted, must inevitably collapse through incompetence, corruption, and lack popular support against Communists; which feels that drastic purge and reform of that regime offers only hope of salvation; and which views American aid prior to revitalization of Government with open hostility or grave misgivings as merely serving to confirm rotten regime on its path to disaster. Hopes of these people, who include students, intellectuals, businessmen and many others, have to significant extent been pinned on National Assembly and especially on Li Tsung-jen’s candidacy which, rightly or wrongly, many identify with reform and progress.

If NA proceedings result in Li’s election or other developments involving real change in complexion of Government and introduction of new vigorous elements which offer some promise of effecting drastic reform, there is good reason to hope that this important segment of articulate Chinese public will largely swing over to support of liberal forces in Government and of American aid.

If on contrary results of NA are rejection of Li and other popularly regarded “liberal” forces and the confirmation of stand pat Kmt politicians in their domination of Government and influence over Generalissimo, consequent save [wave?] of disappointment and revulsion against Government, whether or not productive of immediate violence, is bound to be serious. Many of those who have been wavering with respect to support of Government will turn toward Communists and revolution as only alternative. Their opposition to American aid would be revived and the coincidence of the aid’s timing with NA’s confirmation of rightist control of Government would invite new wave of anti-American feeling.

Despite American aid, or really because of it if it does in fact assist continuance of CC control, large masses of people will follow exiled liberal leaders in supporting Communists’ civil war or at best apathetically regard Nanking efforts. Either will result in an inevitable extension of civil war with further destruction and chaos in larger and larger areas where Chinese Communism of a more and more Soviet nature can take root and thrive.

That Communists are preparing to exploit such contingencies would seem indicated by report that Chou En-lai is advocating more emphasis on wooing of liberals (Embtel 725, April 21 to Department) and by article by Communist “theoretician” Jen Pi-shih, published in April issue of Hong Kong Communist publication Masses. While we have not seen this article, we have learned from two good sources that it has caused excitement in local intellectual and liberal circles; and that its main thesis is an admission that Communists have been too severe toward landowners (small, middle and large), industrialists and intellectuals, and will have to treat them more considerately.¹⁰ With respect to intellectuals, article is said to be aimed directly at those who have lost faith in Govt but have hitherto feared persecution by Communists and to play skillfully on theme of “futility of supporting rotten regime” when good existence under Communists is guaranteed.

In summary, results of unclarified US aid to China program will be: (1) strengthening of far left groups; (2) indefinite continuation and extension of civil war; and (3) fostering of anti-Americanism in liberal groups through latter’s claim of non-support and in reactionary groups by their claim of inadequate support.

It would seem to us that, while situation now evolving at Nanking thus holds serious potentialities from American standpoint, something can be done towards softening anti-American outburst which may eventuate.

Question has been asked locally why US official treatment to press has not been made clarifying our position as one of giving aid to Chinese people regardless of their Government provided Government is not Communist dominated, and that US Government is therefore completely disinterested in outcome of Nanking political maneuvering. Opportune time for such statement would be on release of terms of letter of intent. If properly worded, such statement would serve to correct popular misunderstanding that American support of Generalissimo means underwriting his reactionary coterie, to counteract much Chinese Communist propaganda, and to enhance or help salvage (depending on NA outcome) American prestige among Chinese liberals.

Cabot

10. In despatch No. 66, April 29, the Consul General at Shanghai quoted a pertinent section of Jen’s article in question: “Toward students, teachers, professors and intelligentsia in general, we must avoid adopting any adventuristic policies. What is our view of the intelligentsia? The majority of professors, teachers, scientists, engineers, artists, et cetera, come from landlord, rich peasant or capitalist families. But the work they themselves do is a sort of mental labor. Toward these mental laborers, the democratic regime should adopt policies of protection, and should as much as possible win them to serve the people’s republic.” (893.00/4–2948)