893.00/4–2148: Telegram

The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State

725. Source close to Chinese Communists and well known to me made following three statements in recent conversation with me. (1) If Generalissimo should withdraw, peace conferences could be resumed. (2) If present National Assembly should be treated as illegal and Generalissimo not remain as head of Government, this would still be possible. He could retain any other position. (3) Chou En-lai now recommends adoption policy luring liberals and people generally to Communist side while carrying out program sabotage against Government until conditions regarding Generalissimo met.

Foregoing substantiates previously reported belief Communists desire negotiated settlement and willing negotiate with Government [Page 203] provided it not headed by Generalissimo. In light second and third statements we may expect renewed and intensified Communist propaganda attack on legality National Assembly and its deliberations, as representing will of Generalissimo rather than Chinese people, plus increased propaganda and other subversive activities in Nationalist China by Communists. Since they believe present regime confirmed and continued in power by recent American aid, we can also anticipate their adoption more violent anti-American propaganda themes.

Many delegates National Assembly, particularly those from, North China and Manchuria, desired play serious role as representatives people in ameliorating conditions their constituencies. However, Assembly was so controlled that expression opinion critical of Government was curbed and not allowed to become basis for parliamentary action, and delegated powers Assembly to amend constitution were curbed except for amendment increase presidential powers. Many, if not bulk, delegates are disappointed in hope Assembly would be vehicle for influencing Government adopt more effective and constructive policies for present emergency. This feeling of frustration was intensified by generally unrealistic or evasive character of reports to Assembly by Generalissimo and Cabinet Ministers. Thus, unless Generalissimo, as new constitutional president, can demonstrate ability form Government capable effective political, economic and military action, which most delegates regard as highly doubtful, Communist attacks on legality Assembly will find increasingly large and sympathetic audience.

We have previously reported mounting dissatisfaction within Government, as distinct from Assembly, over quality Generalissimo’s leadership. Assembly and attendant political maneuvering has done nothing alleviate this discontent. Establishment of new Government unlikely give Generalissimo’s critics increased confidence his ability improve matters. Hong Kong ConGentel 77, repeated as Embtel 699 of April 17, suggests Generalissimo’s opponents may have definite timetable overthrow his Government. Shanghai Consulate General April 16 reported following statement by Kan Chieh-hou, actively promoting Li Tsung-jen campaign, “Li Tsung-jen group wishes take over Government by evolutionary measures in order strengthen it so that it would be in position negotiate end of civil war with Communists”. No barrier exists to political cooperation between Li and Hong Kong and South China dissidents. Also there are grounds for belief Li would have support from Moslem elements and from North China leaders. In this situation there exists possibility of formation political coalition designed displace Generalissimo or put him in position where negotiations with Communists possible. While it is generally conceded Generalissimo’s opponents fear consequences [Page 204] of overt move against him, their despair at prospect of continuation of what they consider his inept leadership might at any time provoke them to action. Leaders, northern and northeastern delegates, Assembly have come to take election Li Tsung-jen to vice presidency as indication Government’s intention take constructive action in satisfaction their requirements. Thus, failure Li’s candidacy might conceivably be factor precipitating serious split in Government.

Stuart