The Consul General has the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a
memorandum entitled “Political Alignments within Chinese Communist Party
in the Northeast” which was prepared on April 19, 1948, by Vice Consul
Allen C. Siebens.
Mr. Siebens’ memorandum is very timely and of particular interest for the
reason that as the Chinese communists enlarge their holdings, in and
approach the complete domination of the Northeast it becomes
increasingly necessary for them to formulate a definite policy toward
the future administration and orientation of this area. Such formulation
will in all likelihood develop schisms within the communist ranks, which
will sooner or later cause the pro-Moscow clique (which
[Page 199]
is reported to be the most closely knit
and determined group, although a minority) to come into the open and
take a stand against the more naive but reputedly numerically stronger
pro-China clique. The crystallization of ideological differences into
organized intra-party factions, which should be a logical sequence to
the taking of any such stand, will probably be the signal for determined
aggression and ruthless purging within the party by the Moscow-oriented
group.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Vice Consul at Mukden (Siebens)
[Mukden,] April 19, 1948.
Subject: Political alignments within Chinese
Communist Party in the Northeast.
In connection with the subject of possible political alignments
within the higher echelons of Chinese Communist leadership, and with
particular reference to trends in the Northeast Provinces, I submit
information which I received recently from a former Nationalist
intelligence agent, a native of the Northeast, who states that he
has specialized in North Manchurian affairs and that he is now
discontinuing his intelligence activities due to lack of financial
support from the National Government. Except where otherwise
indicated, the information in this memorandum consists of written
and oral data supplied by this source.
According to data, the Chinese Communists commenced in April of 1947
to define their membership in terms of the “Yenan” clique and the
“Sungpei” clique. The Yenan clique was defined as consisting of
members who fulfilled at least one of the following qualifications:
1) senior membership in the Chinese Communist Party, 2) recipiency
of “fundamental” training by the Communist Party, 3) membership in
the senior executive staff of the Communist Party, 4) membership in
the Communist group organized by the Yenan “government”, 5) general
membership in the Communist Party, subject to certain undefined (by
this source) criteria of loyalty and effectiveness.
The Sungpei clique was defined as consisting of persons coming from
the following categories: 1) the former executive staff of the
various bodies of the Northeast Salvation Society, which was under
the direction of the Communists during the war against Japan, 2)
those who were more or less forced to join forces with the
Communists for the preservation of personal interests, 3) those who
joined forces with the Communists out of sheer opportunism, hoping
to obtain positions of influence, 4) members of the former Manchukuo
puppet Army and other former Manchukuo puppet officials.
[Page 200]
The Sungpei clique apparently is suspected by the Yenan clique of
harboring individuals of doubtful loyalty to the Communist cause. In
April of 1947 the Yenan clique therefore assigned one of its
members, Lin Feng, to mix with the Sungpei clique members for the
purpose of discovering the general nature of their thinking. Upon
completion of this assignment, in September, 1947, Lin Feng
allegedly issued a manifesto, quoted below in English translation,
of which a copy was given to members of the Communist Party in the
Northeast who occupied positions above that of hsien (district)
political representative:
“There should be no distinction of an international character
in our Party. The Chinese Communist Party especially should
be pro-Soviet Russia and should not be against Soviet
Russia. However, the comrades who recently joined our ranks,
since V–J day, unexpectedly oppose the aims of our Party.
They are likewise opposing the activities of Soviet Russia
and its will. It is really regrettable. Hence, we should
become, united. We should be unanimously friendly to Soviet
Russia without any distinction of clique.”
The Sungpei clique is reputedly characterized as being anti-Soviet
tad in favor of reaching some type of agreement with the Government.
The Yenan clique is reputedly pro-Soviet, tends to dedicate its
first loyalties to the Communist International, and favors waging
the civil war until clear-cut Communist hegemony over specific areas
has been achieved.
The leading personalities in the Yenan Clique, according to this
report, are as follows (informal remarks mine for purpose of limited
reference in the case of personalities who possibly not especially
well known):
Mao Tse-tung
Li Li-san (Li Min-jen)
ChuTe
Lin Feng
Formerly temporary member Central Executive Committee CCP,
perhaps now permanent member. Influence political rather
than military. Reported of Hunanese origin. Reported
presently Dean of Communist University at Chiamussu, of
which chief function reputedly is to train future
administrators and Party leaders.
Liu Ch’eng-tung
Mayor of Harbin. Graduate of Catholic University, Peiping.
During period of Marshall Mission was fond of asking
officers Executive Headquarters why U. S. as impartial
arbitrator continued to supply arms to Nationalists.
Wan Yi
Prominent Communist General in Kirin area. Reputed to have
commanded attack against Ssupingk’ai in May, 1947. A
Nationalist
[Page 201]
General during war ol resistance, subsequently imprisoned by
Gimo after rivalry with another Nationalist General and,
according to one source, because of alleged “liberal”
thinking. Joined Communists in about 1944 subsequent to
release from prison, did not become very active until after
V–J day. Apparently involved in “Peace Plan” for Northeast
reported from Changchun and Peiping in latter part 1947
(reference not available here) to Embassy. This gives
grounds for doubting validity of including him in Yenan
clique. Seems to have joined Communists out of
opportunism.
The leading personalities of the Sungpei Clique, as listed by the
source of this report, are as follows: (informal remarks mine, as
above):
Chow Pao-chung
Communist military commander Kirin theatre, which has been
most important Communist field command. Formerly fought
Japanese under a commander Wang Huan-lin. A superior combat
commander who perhaps being used by Communists from
standpoint expediency and who serving them from same
standpoint.
Chang Hsueh-shih
Fourth son of Chang Tso-lin, Manchu[ria] war lord, younger
brother of Chang Hsueh-liang. Son of a concubine and
reputedly became Chang Tso-lin’s favorite son after Chang
Hsueh-liang showed signs of personal decadence. Fought
Japanese in central Hopei under General Lu Cheng-ts’ao (see
below), joined Communists after V–J day. Not more than 40
years old, reputed to have strong following among students
of Northeast, many of whom rumored to have followed him to
North Manchuria. Reported not to be especially active
politically. Under Communists was and still may be president
of Northeastern University at Chiamussu.
Lu Cheng-ts’ao
Former lieutenant of Chang Tso-lin and Chang Hsueh-liang.
Engaged in military operations against the Japanese in Hopei
during war of resistance. Joined the Communists after V–J
day when ignored by the Nationalists during taking-over
period. Reputed to have with him a substantial number of
experienced soldiers and officers who followed him to North
Manchuria. Now Deputy Commander under Lin Piao. Reputedly
strong anti-Kuomintarig. An able tactician.
| Yu Tien-fang |
} |
No significant
information available about these personalities.
Biographical data for these as well as others who
are determined to have importance will be forwarded
when available. |
| Chou Wei-pin |
| Hsieh Yu-ch’in |
| Liu Ch’ing-t’ing |
Conversations with various sources indicate that the group referred
to in this report as the Yenan group is generally cohesive and
united while the Sungpei group consists generally of individuals
whose most common denominator is that they don’t belong to the Yenan
group and are not Party members. The source of the above report
agrees that to his knowledge there is no evidence of potential
effective resistance
[Page 202]
within Communist ranks to the policies now being molded by top Party
leaders.
It appears that at this time, when tendencies toward regionalism can
be detected within Nationalist ranks, the Communists on their part
are progressing toward greater unity. The dominant group within the
Party apparently has maintained and is increasing a preeminence
which will enable it to face with some confidence the ultimate task
of extending into the ranks of its present leaders the policies of
“settling of accounts” and “screening” which already have been
instituted as part of the organizing procedure for Communist
areas.
This preeminence is, of course, directly dependent on the continued
military success of the Communist forces and on the ability of the
Communists to administer adequately the territory they conquer. This
second requisite to the continued ascendancy to power of the inner
“Yenan” clique is in turn dependent on Communist ability to muster
qualified administrative personnel, and present indications are that
there is a shortage of such personnel within Communist ranks. Party
leaders, therefore, can be expected to delay purges in the high
echelons until such time as “reliable” leaders have been developed
from within the party. That this process of development is still
Operating slowly seems to be demonstrated by the reputed
appointments recently of a former Manchukuo puppet to the mayoralty
of Kirin (Using Shih-lien) and of another (Hsi Cha) to the
anticipated mayoralty of Changchun.
